In the basic vocabulary of humanitarian assistance, “Do No Harm” and “Local Capacities for Peace” (LCP) often interchangeably describe the tool developed by the Collaborative for Development Action and a broad range of NGOs to analyze whether influxes of aid (food, shelter, training, etc.) build communities’ unity or contribute to conflict and violence. Early on, World Vision committed to testing the tenets of LCP, first in relief contexts and more recently in community development. Thousands of WV staff have now received training in LCP, generating a groundswell of programme redesign and improved sensitivity to sources of conflict.

This stimulating book chronicles World Vision’s groundbreaking experiences and learnings in adapting LCP for long-term transformational development, as well as for enhancing how faith-based NGOs could work in multi-faith environments where religion can be either a divider or a connector in relationships. Among the outcomes documented, community and local government leaders began adopting the LCP framework in their own design of programmes and applying LCP principles in their own lives. Also discussed are new resources now available as World Vision continues to develop and refine tools to use alongside LCP that further conflict-sensitive development in varieties of micro and macro contexts.
A Shared Future
Local Capacities for Peace in Community Development

Michelle Garred, editor
with
Mohammed Abu-Nimer

World Vision
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TWO types of criticisms are leveled against the “do no harm” (DNH) approaches to humanitarian aid. On the one hand, some claim it is too idealistic. “Is it really possible to do no harm?” they ask. “Would it not be more realistic to try to mitigate negative impacts, as much as possible, understanding that conflict situations will always be so complex that it is impossible to attain perfection?”

On the other hand there are people who question the “negativism” and “limit edness” of “only doing no harm.” “Should we not focus on doing positive good? Is it enough simply to avoid negative impacts? Are aid workers not required by our motivations and our positions to make forward-looking, positive contributions?”

These two criticisms capture the reality of the contexts where much humanitarian and development programming occurs, and they reflect the dual mind-set of aid workers. The contexts are challenging in two directions: how do we avoid becoming embroiled in the systems that perpetuate poverty and exacerbate conflict, and how do we, simultaneously, contribute to positive systems that result in greater economic and socio-political security?

And the mind-sets of aid workers are at least as complex as the contexts of the work! Humanitarians and developers are realists. We accept and work with muddled circumstances without exaggerated or naïve expectations about our power, and at the same time, we urge ourselves on to greater effectiveness, higher goals and more comprehensive programming to achieve better results for the people with whom we work. The work of humanitarianism and of development support poses many dilemmas, but among the most important is this necessary balancing of hard-headed realism and personal/programmatic modesty, on the one hand, with the challenge of effectiveness, of not being content with marginal progress, as if this justifies the demands we make on our programme participants, but pushing always to make a significant difference, in the most positive way, in the lives of the people where we work.

The Local Capacities for Peace Project (which was the original name of the collaborative effort to learn how international agencies can work effectively in conflict settings—later also known as the Do No Harm Project) was started, more than ten years ago, precisely to address and find some way to deal with this dilemma. War
challenged aid workers, whose purpose was to save lives, alleviate suffering and help people establish sustainable economic and political systems. The fact that those fighting the war used aid’s resources—both tangible and intangible—for pursuit of their own military and political agendas was “in the face” of aid workers in many countries. Workers could not avoid this reality, so it became important to figure out options for dealing with it. To do positive good required avoiding doing harm.

There is, it turns out, no simple balance sheet of assistance. Some people claim that aid does some good, it does some harm and, overall, we can add them up and see if the good outweighs the bad or the bad outweighs the good. This may be a tidy way to imagine the world, but it does not represent the reality that field programmes experience.

Rather, from many sources in many lands, working in a range of assistance programmes, the evidence shows that negative impacts can have ramifications that seep out and persist and cannot be calculated on a balance sheet of impacts. Further, very often, activities required to avoid doing harm actually directly contribute to and/or support positive connectors and capacities in the society. That is, doing no harm actually does have direct, positive impacts. The imagined dichotomy that would allow a single-minded emphasis on either avoiding harm or doing good is not real. We are—all of us in all walks of life—responsible for both.

This book, put together by World Vision staff who work at these two goals all the time, recognises this reality. And it does so with refreshing practicality as well as thoughtful analysis.

As the chapters that follow report, World Vision set out to apply the lessons learned from, and the methodologies of, the Local Capacities for Peace Project in settings where the focus of its field programming was on long-term and region-wide development. They are applying these lessons and methodologies systematically and collaboratively across programme contexts, and as they do so, they are recording their experiences and insights so others can learn from them. That is what this book offers for all of us.

Three themes raised in different ways in different chapters strike me as especially useful for broader learning:

First is the strong emphasis on the practicality of using the Do No Harm Framework. The uses reported in the chapters illustrate how solidly grounded the World Vision programmes are in taking such a tool, using it sometimes in combination with others and making an immediate and direct difference in both their understanding of what they are doing and in their ways of doing it in “real-time activities.”
They echo the strong original emphasis in the LCP project that we can, and must, learn on the ground and from experience. Theories—if they are to be useful—must be born out of the observance of multiple cumulative realities from which it is possible, indeed, to learn generalisable lessons about how to do better in all our realities.

Second is a strong recognition of the importance of uncovering and becoming aware of the impacts of assistance programmes on the relationships among groups in the recipient societies where aid is given. Some of the chapters tell how people were, previously, unaware of these impacts and, therefore, unconcerned about them. Through use of the DNH approaches, we are told, awareness of impacts has increased significantly. People have changed their personal styles of interaction to encourage more involvement of societal subgroups. They have also changed the content and direction of programming.

As one writer puts it, using DNH tools, World Vision staff and members of the communities with whom they work have recognised that good programme content (referred to as the why and what of programmes) can be undermined by wrong implementation. Specifically, “wrong implementation” has to do with who is included (or not), when and where programmes occur and how they are carried out as they favour (or not) some groups over others. By recognising such impacts, World Vision staff and partners have accepted responsibility for ensuring that all programmes both do no harm and promote sounder and more positive relations among societal groups.

And third is a process theme, having to do with the observation that the use of the DNH approach, itself, carries an implicit ethical message that is important for its impacts on intergroup relationships. When agency staff, and governmental officials with whom they work, are seen to apply the DNH framework, this, the writer reports, signals a commitment to equality of opportunity, sharing of resources, inclusiveness and fairness, and a concern for exclusion and marginalisation. The signal is seen, in the contexts reported on, to represent an important step in lowering tensions and conflict among groups and in promoting their connectedness.

World Vision is a leader in applying DNH to development programming, but it is not alone. In a recent “Ten Years Later” Do No Harm consultation, which included a large number of individuals, NGOs and governments who have been involved in the project over the years, about 80% of the participants came from the “development” world rather than the “humanitarian” world. This represents a real shift from the early days of the project. In the early 1990s when DNH began, the impetus was from humanitarians who daily faced the challenges of open wars that surrounded them and, often, cause distortions in the intended outcomes of their
assistance. Although this was the preponderance of experience, even then, there were some development aid workers who joined the collaborative learning, adding their experiences to the analysis and confirming the relevance of the lessons for the circumstances they faced. From these early signs that the learning from DNH was relevant to both emergency and developmental contexts, we have come a long way.

The commitment of World Vision to undertake a thoughtful and thorough effort to apply and test the methods in their area development programmes has made a welcome, and significant, contribution to all our efforts to trace the impacts of our well-intentioned programmes on the longer-term security of local groups. It has added wonderfully to our knowledge of the potential for personal and programmatic transformation that can come from serious consideration of such impacts. It has demonstrated that doing no harm is an essential part of doing good and that doing good cannot be understood without recognition of programming impacts on the relationships of people to each other.

The book is indeed a good read. I recommend it!
Introduction

Bill Lowrey

In the past ten years, two terms have worked their way into the vocabulary of the humanitarian world in such a way that they roll off the tongue of practitioners as though everyone who hears the phrases will automatically understand the meaning. The terms are “Do No Harm” (DNH) and “Local Capacities for Peace” (LCP). It is a tribute to Mary Anderson and her colleagues at the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) that phrases coined in their field-based research are now accepted as part of the basic vocabulary of humanitarian assistance. However, there is a big difference between using the terms in conversation and applying the framework in the field. The concepts are simple, codifying wisdom of aid workers over the years into a usable framework for analysis. But operationalising the tool so that it helps aid workers and communities to analyse their contexts and reshape their programmes is easier said than done.

This book seeks to demonstrate the value of the LCP tool in the community development context. That is what makes this book unique. The recognition of the value of DNH in emergency contexts spread almost spontaneously among aid workers. Large amounts of material aid in contexts of conflict were self-evident as carrying the potential for either exacerbating divisions or when used wisely, relieving great suffering and supporting local capacities that could strengthen peace. But in the early years of use of DNH/LCP, little was known about the relevance and usefulness of this tool in the development context.

This book makes a substantive contribution to community development workers, to NGOs who are striving to integrate peace work into their programmes and to the humanitarian and development community that is motivated by a vision for a more just and peaceful world. This is not the last word on LCP in the development context; it is just one of the early words. It is an exploration of some of the learnings of World Vision in using the LCP tool in community development. You will find stories that resonate with your own experience and stimulate fresh ideas for your work. You will find tools that can be applied. And you will find a depth of reflection that we hope will stimulate the humanitarian and development community to go far beyond our present experience and to discover new or improved ways to apply a brilliant but basic tool that needs to be foundational to our way of operating.
In this introduction, I will

- Summarise the LCP framework
- Describe the process World Vision has used to apply the framework in community development
- Place LCP in a context of other tools that we have found important in the larger mission of integrating peacebuilding into relief, development and advocacy
- Explain how LCP is helpful for World Vision as a faith-based NGO working in many multi-faith contexts and in contexts where religion can be either a divider (something that separates people) or a connector (something that brings people together)
- Provide a broad-brush roadmap of what you can find in this book

**Do No Harm (DNH) and Local Capacities for Peace (LCP)**: These two terms are frequently used interchangeably. They describe a methodology that has been developed to help humanitarian assistance organisations analyse the context of a conflict and the way aid interacts with the conflict. The framework provides a method of analysis that assists NGOs towards achieving the goal of doing no harm while providing aid and helping NGOs to recognise and support the people’s local capacities for peace. The DNH/LCP framework for context and programme analysis was originally developed for humanitarian agencies doing relief in an emergency context. The emphasis was on providing aid without causing harm. However, as more agencies began to stress the possibilities of strengthening connectors in the context of conflict, the terminology of Local Capacities for Peace grew stronger. Within World Vision, a major initiative grew to apply the learnings of the DNH/LCP framework in the development context. This coincided with an effort to strengthen peacebuilding as an integrative and cross-cutting theme in the development process. The DNH/LCP framework became a foundational tool for these efforts by World Vision, and the terminology that became most prominent was Local Capacities for Peace, or LCP. Therefore, throughout this book, the term that is used continuously is LCP. The reader should recognise that LCP is synonymous with Do No Harm. They are two sides of the same coin and both terms refer to the same framework.

**The Basic Issues of LCP**: Aid is not neutral in the midst of conflict. The aid and how it is administered can cause harm or can strengthen peace capacities in

the midst of conflicted communities. All aid programmes involve the transfer of resources (food, shelter, water, health care, training, etc.) into a resource-scarce environment. Where people are in conflict, these resources represent power and wealth, and they become an element of the conflict. Some people attempt to control and use aid resources to support their side of the conflict and to weaken the other side. If they are successful, aid can cause harm. However, the transfer of resources and the manner in which staff conduct the programmes can strengthen local capacities for peace, build on connectors that bring communities together and reduce the divisions and sources of tensions that can lead to destructive conflict. To do no harm and to support local capacities for peace requires careful analysis of the aid programme, examining how aid interacts with the conflict, and a willingness to create options and redesign programmes to improve its quality. It also calls for careful reflection on staff conduct and organisational policies so that the “implicit ethical messages” that are sent communicate consistent messages that strengthen local capacities for peace.

**Development of the LCP Framework:** The LCP project began in late 1994 as a collaborative effort of more than 50 international nongovernment organisations, donor agencies and local NGO workers. It was organised by the Collaborative for Development Action, whose president is Mary Anderson. The process was field based, and it wrestled with the question of how aid programmes can be conducted in a conflict context without feeding the conflict. It also sought to provide alternative ways to address the issues that underlay the conflict. Several phases unfolded step by step between 1994 and 2001.

- **Phase I:** Fifteen case studies developed from conflict zones. An inductive approach was used to examine the interaction of aid and conflict. From the cases, a booklet of lessons was compiled.

- **Phase II:** The booklet from Phase I was used as a basis for 25 feedback workshops in which NGO field workers tested the lessons with their own experiences. The modified framework was then published in the book *Do No Harm*.

- **Phase III:** Twelve organisations, including World Vision Sudan, implemented the use of the framework in conflict zones. From this process, a manual was produced that drew together some of the best learnings on options for programme design and redesign.²

- Phase IV: Mainstreaming—supporting the interagency process of integrating the principles and methodology of LCP into NGOs field programming, headquarters’ policy development and fundraising.

**Key Elements of the LCP Methodology:** The LCP analysis begins with the context of the conflict but focuses primarily on the local context where the particular aid programme is operating. An analysis is done of the dividers and sources of tensions that are evident in the local context. Then consideration is given to the natural connectors that people have in the community and their local capacity for peace. This recognises that most people, even in conflict zones, are engaged in normal, peaceful activities and have indigenous capacities for resolving conflicts and connecting people in constructive ways. In the midst of the dividers and connectors comes an aid programme. Every element of that programme, including the resources that are transferred and the staff who manage the programme, interacts with the dividers and connectors. The impact of this aid on the dividers and connectors determines if harm will be done or capacities for peace will be strengthened. Where negative impact occurs or can be predicted, options are generated and considered and programmes are redesigned. This method of analysis focuses on ultimate impact rather than immediate inputs and maintains a focus on quality programming that will contribute to a more peaceful society and long-term transformational development.

**A Step-by-Step Process for Doing an LCP Context and Programme Analysis:**

1. **Analyse dividers and sources of tensions between groups (D/T):** Systems & Institutions; Attitudes & Actions; [Different] Values & Interests; [Different] Experiences; Symbols & Occasions.

2. **Analyse connectors across subgroups and Local Capacities for Peace (C/LCP):** Systems & Institutions; Attitudes & Actions; [Shared] Values & Interests; [Shared] Experiences; Symbols & Occasions.


4. **Analyse the aid programme’s impact on dividers/tensions and connectors/Local Capacities for Peace:** Is the programme design, its activities or its personnel increasing or decreasing dividers/tensions? Is it supporting or undercutting connectors/LCP?

5. **Consider options for programme redesign and re-check the impact on D/T and C/LCP:** How can the programme details be redesigned so it will
do no harm and strengthen local capacities for peace? Ensure the redesign options avoid negative impacts on the dividers or connectors.

This same analytical process is graphically depicted in Mary Anderson’s LCP framework.

**The LCP Framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context of Conflict</th>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Tensions / Dividers / Capacities for War</th>
<th>AID</th>
<th>Connectors / Local Capacities for Peace</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Redesign</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**World Vision’s Use of LCP in Community Development**

World Vision was initially drawn into the LCP project of CDA from the emergency operations side of the organisation. World Vision Sudan became one of the 12 implementing agencies conducting projects in CDA’s Phase III process. This experience solidified for us the value of LCP. However, the reality was that World Vision was not an exclusively relief organisation. In fact, World Vision is primarily focused on children and seeks to impact the well-being of children, their families and communities through sustained and integrated transformational development. Therefore, for LCP to become relevant throughout the organisation, it would have to be applicable in the development context.

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One of the most widespread mechanisms of integrated development that World Vision uses is known as area development programmes or ADP’s. An ADP takes place in a defined geographical area consisting of numerous villages or towns. World Vision staff work with communities and community organisations to support the process of a community owning its own development process and developing its capacity to create sustainable transformational development. Transformational development is defined as a process through which children, families and communities move towards wholeness of life with dignity, justice and hope. The scope of transformational development is holistic, including social, spiritual, economic, political and environmental aspects of life at the local, national, regional and global levels. Transformational development is not necessarily linear, and events such as natural disasters, destructive conflicts and pandemics (HIV/AIDS) may interrupt or set back the process. Therefore, enhancing “resilience to crises” is emphasised through programmes that have a bias for peace and reconciliation, and employ processes and actions that reduce risks and enhance capacities of families and communities to cope, mitigate and respond to disasters, conflicts and HIV/AIDS.5

World Vision recognised that LCP was developed primarily to analyse micro contexts and specific aid projects. However, our primary instrument for development was the medium-size or meso-level contexts, and our approach was focused on integrated development programmes rather than sector specific projects. Intuitively we believed that LCP had much to offer in the development context. And we suspected that there would have to be additional tools that would be used in complement with LCP. A common proverb says, “If the only tool you have is a hammer, then everything looks like a nail.” We did not want LCP to be our only tool. But we needed to find out how useful it could be in the development context and what its limits might be. Then we could determine what additional tools were needed for integrating peacebuilding with relief, development and advocacy.

In addition to the ADP model of development, World Vision peacebuilding was developing regional networks as a means of developing national office capacity to integrate peacebuilding and development as a cross-cutting theme. In the Asia-Pacific region, the peacebuilding network linked their commitment to using LCP with their approach to development in ADPs. With funding commitments in 2001 from WV Canada and WV USA, two Centres of Learning (CoL) were established in Banggai ADP in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, and Sarangani ADP in Mindanao, Philippines. The idea of a CoL was to apply LCP principles in a development context, document learnings, impact the ADP programming and staff, and introduce

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LCP principles and practices into community decision processes. The learnings were deeply rooted in specific ADPs and community contexts. However, the learnings became valuable for the Asia-Pacific region and have since spread to other parts of the World Vision International Partnership. The two CoLs had contrasting contexts. One was in a country that is predominately Muslim with a Christian minority and the other is a country that is predominately Christian with a Muslim minority. In both contexts, religion is one aspect of the complex conflict settings.

In the past four years, these CoLs have become primary laboratories for discovering the strengths and limitations of LCP in the development contexts and documenting learnings in the process. Three of the four case studies in this book have grown out of these CoLs, and the learnings and analysis section also reflects the CoL experience. Those training LCP trainers have had an added incentive to have trainers who can work in the indigenous languages of the communities. LCP has moved from a tool for NGO staff to also be a tool for community leaders and community-based organisations. One of the results is that community members develop a conflict sensitivity to their own design of programmes, begin applying the LCP principles in their own lives and families, and have tools to also hold World Vision staff accountable for how programmes are developed.

While it is beyond the scope of this book, it is worthwhile to note that there have been some unintended impacts of this process of application of LCP to development. During the past four years, World Vision has completed an extensive process of creating a framework for its transformational development. Part of that process included researching ways to deal with the three greatest threats to development, namely natural disasters, destructive conflicts and pandemics like HIV/AIDS. As a result, five strategic processes were identified as key to integrating peacebuilding and development. These processes are aligned with our new framework for transformational development and with key indicators that we monitor and evaluate to determine impact. In 2005, after a two-year process, World Vision adopted a new common framework for design, monitoring and evaluation called LEAP (Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning). Significantly, in this framework, context analysis has been given a prominent place, DNH/LCP is recognised as a foundational tool at the micro level and peacebuilding is defined as a cross-cutting theme that must be integrated into good development.

In the process of applying LCP in the ADP context, we concluded that LCP must be a foundational tool for all of our programming in contexts of conflict. However, we also concluded that it is a tool that is most effective in the micro context when we are working with specific projects. The CoLs field-tested other tools that are commonly used in community development to see how they could be used
with a peacebuilding lens and linked with LCP. As a result, during the past two years, we have created a new set of tools that are built on the LCP foundation but can be applied at the meso level, the level of our ADPs. This set of tools is now called iPAD for Integrating Peacebuilding and Development. The key staff who led the CoL process of applying LCP to development became members of a team that created the iPAD.

**LCP and the Development of Complementary Tools**

Within World Vision there has been a strong embrace of LCP as a foundational tool at the micro level and a special interest in its relevance in the development context. That is the focus of this book. But it is also important to recognise that LCP is not the best tool for every task. We became convinced that we needed to find or develop tools that would be more effective for two other situations. The first, as mentioned above, is the need for a set of tools to integrate peacebuilding in integrated community development at the meso level. And the second is the need for a set of tools that help analyse a context at the macro level, especially in highly complex and turbulent settings.

The following diagram demonstrates the framework of core tools that we use for quality programming in conflict contexts.

**Macro Level: Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC).** At the level of national or regional conflicts, we concluded that more sophisticated tools were needed to understand the context. It is not sufficient to only examine dividers and
connectors. There are a number of tools that are available in the field of conflict analysis, and agencies like DFID, UNDP and USAID have all developed their version of tools that meet their particular needs. World Vision had particular needs to conduct macro-level analysis that could contribute to advocacy strategies, project scenarios that could function as early warning for emergency response, inform the design of development programmes that integrated peacebuilding, and enable national office staff to mitigate against potential risks for staff, programmes and communities. The set of tools that have been developed and are now being used includes analysis, mapping, scenarios generation and operational implications. The diagram below indicates the tools involved.

![Diagram of Tools for MTSC (Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts)](image)

**Tools for MTSC (Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts)**

- Rapid Historical Phase Analysis
- Symptoms of Instability Analysis
- Actor Characteristics Analysis
- Political Economy of Instability Analysis
- Inter-group Relationship Analysis
- Scenarios & Sensitivity Analysis
- Operational Implications
- MSTC Mapping

**Meso Level: Integrating Peacebuilding and Development (iPAD)**. At the level of an ADP where numerous villages or towns, thousands of community members and a significant geographical area are engaged in integrated transformational development programmes, we concluded that LCP provided a basic frame that needed to be supplemented. Therefore, when our research identified five strategic processes that could help in the integration of peacebuilding with development, we substituted these processes for the aid programme analysis that is normally a part of LCP. In addition, we identified several conflict analysis tools and PLA (participatory learning and action) methods that could strengthen the context analysis. These

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included timelines, Venn or chapatti diagrams, village mapping, 10 seeds for wealth ranking or distribution of resources, and the ABC diagram (Attitude, Behaviour, Context) that is helpful to identify latent conflicts. Focus groups were incorporated in the methodology so that the community could do its own self-assessment of how they were incorporating the strategic processes, identify gaps in their approach and wrestle with ways to strengthen their peacebuilding process.

The five strategic processes that World Vision uses for this meso-level analysis are:

- Creating a Culture of Good Governance
- Transforming Persons
- Working in Coalitions Impacting beyond Commonly Recognised Boundaries
- Enhancing Community Capacities that Generate Hope
- Developing Sustainable Livelihoods with Just Distribution of Resources

LCP continues to be the foundational tool for this meso-level analysis. Therefore, we only train staff in the use of these tools if they have become “LCP practitioners.” That means they understand LCP, are able to apply it to their programmes and have shown skill in conducting an LCP assessment of specific projects. At that point, LCP practitioners are ready to build on their skills and add some additional tools that assist them in working in the meso-level context with integrated development programmes.

**Modified LCP Framework for iPad**

(“Integrating Peacebuilding and Development”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context of Conflict</th>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Tensions / Dividers / Capacities for War</th>
<th>Strategic Processes: Good Governance Transforming People Working in Coalitions Enhancing Local Capabilities Sustainable Livelihoods &amp; Just Resource Distribution</th>
<th>Connectors / Local Capacities for Peace</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Redesign</td>
<td>Resource Transfers</td>
<td>Implicit Ethical Messages</td>
<td>Redesign</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A Shared Future—Introduction
Micro Level: LCP. The foundational tool at the micro level of programming is LCP. In order to make maximum use of the tool, there has been a strong emphasis on developing trainers who can conduct training workshops for a critical mass of staff. World Vision now has approximately 100 trainers across its international partnership and more than 3,000 staff have been through two- or three-day workshops. This basic training creates an understanding and familiarity with LCP, but it does not make a person a practitioner. Those with the greatest interest and aptitude are developed further to do LCP analyses of contexts and programmes. Most people who take a basic workshop never develop that level of operational skill. However, the goal has to remain to develop staff that can conduct an LCP analysis, generate options for redesign, modify programmes to improve quality and do continuous monitoring in a changing context. Those who have contributed to this book have followed that path.

LCP Implications for a Faith-Based NGO in Multi-Faith Contexts

World Vision is a Christian NGO. That is our identity and part of our core values. We acknowledge that our mission is to “follow Jesus in working among the poor.” Part of that commitment is to serve all people without regard to anyone’s religion, gender, ethnicity or any other distinguishing characteristic. We do not proselytise, and we believe that any use of resources or power related to humanitarian assistance and development that would pressure, intentionally or unintentionally, a person to change his or her religion is unethical. To the degree that we are faithful to this impartial and compassionate commitment to serve all, we believe that our deeds, our lives, our behaviours, our attitudes and our words will bear witness to our Christian faith.

World Vision works in contexts where there are people of many faiths and NGOs that have their own faith identity. We are prepared to collaborate with all people who seek the well-being of the community and work for more just and peaceful societies in which all people are empowered to seek their full potential. We are committed to building bridges that link people, communities, organisations and shared values across a rich variety of diversity.

As part of this commitment, many World Vision national offices have growing involvement in inter-faith peacebuilding. In the Asia-Pacific region, WV Development Foundation of the Philippines supports a Mindanao inter-faith religious leaders network that advises on transformational development programmes at both local and island-wide levels. WV Indonesia developed an innovative training programme to equip inter-faith religious leaders in North Maluku with basic skills in trauma healing. WV Cambodia has facilitated the launch of an inter-faith peace-
building initiative for youth, which is co-led by representatives of Buddhism, Islam and Christianity.

WV Kosovo has facilitated the development of a strong multi-faith and multi-ethnic Community Council of Peace and Tolerance in the divided city of Mitrovica. Additionally, World Vision is facilitating an inter-faith religious leaders consultation process in other parts of Kosovo and has helped create a Kids for Peace programme that brings together children and youth from Muslim and Christian communities. World Vision Jerusalem-West Bank-Gaza is a mixture at both the staffing and community programming levels of Muslim and Christian Palestinians. And in numerous countries in Africa, World Vision works closely in linking Christian, Muslim and African traditional religious leaders and communities to build more peaceful and just societies.

Nonetheless, the applications of LCP analyses of the contexts in which we work and the programmes we support have revealed that we sometimes fall short in practice of our stated objectives. LCP has forced us to do serious reflection. We are willing to be challenged when we exacerbate divisions in a manner that causes harm to people or communities. This will be evident in case studies that have been rooted in the ADPs where our Centres of Learning are embedded. Issues of choosing local partners, selection of sponsored children, sensitivity to land issues, processes for selecting or electing board members for community-based organisations and even the way we draw boundaries for the formation of an ADP can all have hidden and unintended negative impacts. We have discovered that many times we have been blind to subtle ways in which we as an NGO hire staff that are most like us. LCP has turned the light on some of our own dark places. And as communities have learned to conduct LCP analyses, the communities have also learned to hold us accountable. This is a value we affirm. But it can be very uncomfortable and humbling. We are discovering more of what it means to be accountable to the communities we serve as well as the donors to whom we report.

Roadmap of This Book

Now I invite you to move along this journey with us. This book does not have to be read from beginning to end. You, the reader, are the context for these chapters. Let your interests guide you in considering the contribution of LCP to community development.

Chapter 1
From Relief to Development:
Adapting the Use of LCP

12  A Shared Future—Introduction
Michelle Garred  
Conflict-sensitive practice and peacebuilding manager, WV Asia Tsunami Response Team

This chapter summarises WV Asia-Pacific’s learning about how LCP applies to community development programmes, as compared to emergency response.

Chapter 2  
Becoming Inclusive:  
Long-Term Benefits of LCP in Programme Strategy  
Andreas Darmega Sihotang  
Manager of Area Development Programme Banggai  
and Terry Silalahi  
Peacebuilding coordinator, WV Indonesia

This case study from the LCP Centre of Learning in Sulawesi, Indonesia, illustrates how sustained application of LCP helped to transform WV’s programme approach in support of Muslim-Christian relations.

Chapter 3  
Connector Bridge  
Dr. Cherry Waing  
Team leader of Area Development Program Dagon South,  
with Dr. Saw Allan  
Micro project and local partner coordinator, WV Myanmar

This case study from Myanmar/Burma describes how a simple LCP insight led to lasting improvement in inter-ethnic relations and local infrastructure.

Chapter 4  
What Are We Trying to Develop?  
Lessons Learned from the Philippines in Community Leadership  
Abikök C. Riak  
Programme officer for Eurasia, World Vision USA

This case study relates how community leaders applied LCP to establish just leadership structures for the local people’s organisation in the LCP Centre of Learning in Mindanao, Philippines.
Chapter 5
Far-Reaching Reform: Integrating LCP in Local Government
Bonie S. Belonio Jr.
Zonal manager of South-Central Mindanao, WV Development Foundation Philippines

This case study continues the story of the Mindanao Centre of Learning by telling how LCP has influenced the perspectives and service delivery of local government leaders.

Chapter 6
LCP Practice as Innovation: Mainstreaming LCP in Area Development Programmes
Allen Harder
Independent consultant and former senior peacebuilding advisor, WV Indonesia

This chapter analyses WV Indonesia's experience of mainstreaming LCP in integrated development programmes, with reference to Everett Rogers' theories on the diffusion of innovation.

Chapter 7
Applying LCP for Conflict-Sensitive Quality Programming
Allen Harder
Independent consultant and former senior peacebuilding advisor, WV Indonesia

This chapter explains how LCP enhances programme quality and can be integrated throughout the design, monitoring and evaluation cycle.

Chapter 8
Mainstreaming LCP in a Federal Organisation
Abikök C. Riak
Programme officer for Eurasia, World Vision USA

This chapter explores World Vision's experience of mainstreaming LCP at national and international levels, with emphasis on organisational development and planning.
Chapter 1

From Relief to Development: Adapting the Use of LCP

Michelle Garred

OVER the past four years, World Vision has tested the applicability of Local Capacities for Peace (LCP), a tool originally intended for planning emergency response in community development contexts. This chapter summarises our learning to date about how LCP applies to development programmes, as compared with relief. This summary draws heavily on experiences in the LCP Centres of Learning established in Mindanao, Philippines, and in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, as well as work in other Asia-Pacific countries. These field experiences are then further detailed in the latter chapters of this book, including both case studies and analyses of lessons learned.

The basic concepts of LCP hold true in development programmes, as in relief. Development assistance interacts with “dividers” and “connectors” in ways that either worsen conflict or support local capacities for peace. The applicability of LCP to development contexts has in many ways surpassed expectations. Nonetheless, the implications of LCP analysis in development programmes can be quite distinct. Adaptations are required at both conceptual and operational levels.

Adapting LCP analysis to the development context means recognising risks of latent destructive conflict, while giving attention to effects of “resource transfers” on local power dynamics and to the potential of positive “implicit ethical messages.” Programme redesign is linked to community empowerment, because LCP requires grassroots community-based organisations (CBOs) to become the drivers of change. In such contexts, LCP also tends to surpass its original purpose by fostering personal growth in individuals and by laying a foundation for peacebuilding programming.

These learnings hold a number of implications for NGOs’ use of LCP. World Vision has developed a methodology called Community-Based LCP Assessment, in which staff teams use familiar tools, such as participatory learning and action
(PLA), and focus group discussions to facilitate LCP self-assessment by local stakeholders, leading to integration of LCP in programme design. LCP training practices are also being shaped to support contextualised application at grassroots level and to further organisation-wide mainstreaming.

I. Understanding Destructive Conflict

With regard to development programmes, LCP has proven useful for identifying “dividers” and “connectors” in three types of contexts:

1. **Ongoing low-intensity violent conflict**: Increasingly, some development programmes operate in and around ongoing low-intensity violent conflict. Typically, these development programmes integrate small-scale relief responses with ongoing development activities. If the intensity of violence increases, development activities may be suspended while scaling up relief response. Conflict clearly threatens the sustainability of the development effort.

2. **Latent conflict with high risk of violence**: Some communities reporting little or no current violence nonetheless face “latent conflict,” in which serious underlying tensions pose a high risk for escalation into violence. Such communities often experience polarisation of major social groups or violence in neighboring communities with similar demographics. LCP helps to identify and address the risk of future violence, thus serving as a form of disaster mitigation for the community and risk management for NGOs and donors.

3. **Latent conflict with low risk of violence**: In some communities, latent conflict is recognised, but there is little immediate risk of escalation into violence. This may be because the level of tension is relatively low or because the groups involved are small. There may be systematic oppression of a particular social group (often called structural violence), but the group does not have enough cohesion or power to mobilise a response.

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1 These categories are illustrative, not absolute. Some contexts may fluctuate between categories.

2 WV development programmes in Poso, Indonesia, and Maguindanao, Philippines, fall into this category. These are neighbouring communities to the LCP Centres of Learning.

3 The WV LCP Centres of Learning in area development programmes in Banggai, Indonesia, and Sarangani, Philippines, fall into this category. See chapters 2, 4 and 5.

4 Most WV development programmes in Cambodia fall into this category.
In relief-oriented LCP practice, latent conflict is not considered a priority if it poses little risk of escalation into large-scale violence. However, some conflicts can be quite destructive to holistic, transformational and sustainable development—i.e., in terms of justice, poverty alleviation, human well-being, communal harmony and good governance—even if physical violence never occurs. Power abuse by local authorities or other stakeholders can drastically inhibit vulnerable families or individuals from reaching their potential. In holistic development programming, these issues are considered important, and LCP can help to identify and address them.

Latent conflict is sometimes difficult to recognise. It can be helpful to visualise destructive conflict according to the “iceberg” model, in which violence above the surface is evidence of a larger but less visible conflict system.

**Iceberg Model of Destructive Conflict**

In many development contexts, there may be more than one latent conflict. In such cases, it may be necessary to first identify multiple aspects of conflict, taking time and care to surface those that are latent, and then prioritise those that are most destructive for focused LCP analysis.

II. How Development Programmes Affect Conflict Through Resource Transfers

World Vision has found that resource transfers fall into the same general categories in both relief and development programmes. However, details of how resource transfers function in development programmes can be quite different, and situa-
tions may overlap into more than one category. A particularly prominent theme is interaction of both material and non-material resource transfers with local power dynamics. Given the subtlety of these dynamics, there is a significant risk of inadvertently reinforcing exclusion. Patterns are described below.

- **Theft or diversion:** In development programmes, theft of aid resources for military purposes is not common. However, diversion often occurs through corruption. For example, when aid workers pay bribes, this reinforces systemic corruption and weakens the accountability of governance structures needed to help manage conflict. Also, if local power dynamics influence the beneficiary selection process in ways that divert resources to support corrupt authorities, then aid resources can reinforce exclusion and abuse of power.

- **Distribution effects:** The case studies from Sarangani, Philippines,\(^5\) and Banggai, Indonesia,\(^6\) both illustrate how disproportionate distribution of resources to one social group can worsen existing inter-group tensions. This can be especially problematic for development programmes, because resources include not only material goods, but also capacity-building opportunities and decision-making power. Programme planning decisions and implementation are often undertaken through grassroots partner agencies, such as CBOs. During the start-up phase, identification of beneficiary groups and partners is critically important, because this shapes future composition of the CBO. If the CBO disproportionately represents one social group more than others, its members may channel programme resources towards their own affinity groups. Thus the effects of preliminary targeting decisions are multiplied many times and existing or new power dynamics set in motion. In either case, if the programme life cycle is a long one, it can be very challenging to change these structures once in place.

On the other hand, resource distribution also has potential to bring people together across lines of conflict. Several WV development programmes struggling with “distribution effects” have discovered that infrastructure projects, such as schools or bridges, can become a key entry point for change, by signaling a shift to greater inclusivity. For example, a road construction project in West Kalimantan, Indonesia, was seen to tangibly benefit both Dayak and Madurese ethnic groups, and provided

\(^5\) See Chapter 4 by Abikök Riak.
\(^6\) See Chapter 2 by Andreas Sihotang and Terry Silalahi.
opportunities for inter-group collaboration in planning and labor. This unifying effect is not automatic—it must be carefully planned. Often the participatory process is more important than the resulting infrastructure. If successful, this can lead to consideration of other, more far-reaching changes to programme structure.

- **Market effects**: Market effects are subtle in development programmes, but nonetheless influence the context of conflict. In Cambodia, one remote development programme built roads to help farmers get their produce to market. Once access improved, land values began to increase. Wealthy developers and local authorities began to maneuver for ownership of the land, and the poor were at risk of displacement. This effect significantly increased tensions in a community where land grabbing and property border disputes were existing dividers. Following an LCP analysis, the programme is now planning initiatives focused on equipping community members with knowledge of land law and rights, land titling process and costs, and good governance. Also, as part of its food security initiative, the programme will include land titling support for the poorest families in the community.

- **Substitution effects**: In development programmes, agencies often target communities on the basis of need, which means gravitating towards marginalised areas. In Nepal, many development agencies target programs towards geographically isolated areas, where decades-long lack of service and infrastructure is cited as a grievance driving the current Maoist insurgency. While working to meet needs in these communities, the agencies fear that they are also reinforcing patterns of neglect and freeing up resources for military expenditures.

- **Legitimisation effects**: In one Cambodia development programme, World Vision sought to build democracy and local leadership capacity through election of village development committees. The village chief, as the key local leader, partnered with World Vision by nominating candidates and hosting elections on his property. Unfortunately, the village chief was also reputed to be involved in nepotism and land grabbing, while enjoying the protection of

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7 Allen Harder, “One Road at a Time: An ADP Contribution to Building Peace in Indonesia” (WV Indonesia, 2001).
powerful political parties. Thus World Vision’s reliance on this village chief actually legitimised this systemic abuse of power.\(^{10}\)

### III. How Development Programmes Affect Conflict Through Implicit Ethical Messages

Implicit ethical messages (IEMs) apply in development programmes just as they do in relief, though the details may differ. For example, in relief programmes, discussion of “different values for different lives” often centres on disparities between national and international staff. In development programmes, the more likely disparity is between staff from the local community and staff deployed from the capital city. In both cases, the message of differential treatment is the same and can unintentionally reinforce local patterns of discrimination and injustice.

In the original LCP framework, IEMs are generally stated in negative form, as messages we should avoid sending. However, each negative IEM also has a corresponding positive. These positive IEMs are important in all programmes, but particularly prominent and strategic in development, because values promotion is considered part of the holistic development process for building peaceful communities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implicit Ethical Messages in the LCP Framework(^{11})</th>
<th>“Positive” Implicit Ethical Messages(^{12})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms and Power</td>
<td>Non-violence, Risk-Taking, Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrespect, Mistrust and Competition between Aid Agencies</td>
<td>Collaboration, Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Workers and Impunity</td>
<td>Accountability, Transparency, Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Values for Different Lives</td>
<td>Expressed Value for All Lives, Respect, Equality, Inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerlessness</td>
<td>Distributed Power, Hope, Personal Responsibility, Possibility Thinking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{10}\) Bill Forbes, “Who Are We Empowering?” LCP training case study, WV Cambodia, 2004.

\(^{11}\) Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), ch. 5.

Belligerence, Tension and Suspicion | Respect, Courage, Trust, Perseverance
---|---
Publicity | Own Voice, Media Access, Truthfulness, Accuracy

In Nepal, some local NGO staff described the powerful potential of positive IEMs in a context characterised by pervasive violence and corruption as contributing factors to violent conflict. In some conflict-affected communities, empowerment of the poor is perceived to come only through use of force. Therefore, when NGOs demonstrate progressive social impact without supporting use of force, this communicates rare hope for the possibility of peaceful change. Any agency with significant resources may be suspected within the community of misappropriating funds. Therefore, some local agencies practise “public auditing,” in which community members themselves examine the records. This not only builds trust in that particular agency but also raises standards of transparency to which other agencies working in the area are expected to conform.

IV. Community Ownership and Programme Redesign

LCP analysis results in design changes, for both new and ongoing programmes, in order to avoid worsening tensions and to strengthen local capacities for peace. Types of LCP redesigns undertaken in development programmes are often similar to those undertaken in relief. The primary difference lies in community ownership of the redesign process.

Large-scale relief programmes are usually implemented directly by NGOs, both international and national. NGO staff, predominantly from outside the local community, are responsible for conducting LCP analysis and redesign. LCP redesign influences the way in which the NGO interacts with community leaders, but community leaders themselves are unlikely to be introduced to LCP.

In development programmes, most NGOs employ proportionally more local staff, and partner extensively with CBOs. In World Vision, programme structures differ greatly by country, but the consistent goal is for CBOs to become over time

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the primary planners and implementers of the development programme. Thus only rarely, in very early start-up phases, can NGO staff work alone on LCP analysis and redesigns. Once CBOs have formed, they take responsibility for implementing community-level redesigns. Thus the CBOs themselves must become LCP practitioners as part of their own capacity building and empowerment.

World Vision began LCP training for CBO members in 2001, and in simplified form, the basic concepts of LCP proved easy to understand and apply. When CBO members use LCP to inform programme decisions, and share LCP concepts with other community members, then LCP directly impacts the community itself, resulting in grassroots social change. Results of such grassroots change have surpassed expectations.

In Sarangani, Philippines, the local People’s Organisation learned LCP and customised government-prescribed by-laws to ensure consistent representation of marginalised minority groups in its board of trustees. In Banggai, Indonesia, project committee members have conducted LCP assessment in 48 villages and now use LCP to review mini-project proposals developed by village self-help groups.

At community level, LCP analysis applies to programme design details, both large and small. Some redesigns by CBOs imply broad structural changes, while others involve not what is done but simply how it is implemented. Some changes, though powerful, may be so small in scope that they never appear in the written programme design.

Though fully developed in only a few locations, these CBO experiences are already contributing to a significant shift in how World Vision uses LCP. LCP training and mainstreaming processes must be designed to support CBO uptake. However, this does not replace the need for strong LCP practice among our own NGO staff. LCP application remains relevant and necessary at all levels, from the CBO to the international board.

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14 In WV Development Foundation Philippines, CBOs are called “People’s Organisations” and are legally registered entities handling all aspects of programme implementation from early stages. In WV Indonesia, CBOs are called “Project Committees” and assume responsibility more gradually, based on start-up work done by WV staff.

15 See Chapter 4 by Riak.


V. LCP “Gets Personal”

LCP tends to surpass its technical programme design purpose and transforms the way NGO staff and CBO members see their work. This takes place in both relief and development programmes. However, it appears more pronounced in development programmes—perhaps simply because the relatively secure operating conditions and longer programme cycles allow for more reflection.

NGO staff and CBO members describe this transformation in various ways: “paradigm shift,” “new lens,” “new mind-set” and “new worldview.” The phrase developed in the LCP project mainstreaming phase to describe this type of individual change became “personalising LCP.”

When people personalise LCP, they see that each of their own programme actions can significantly affect relationships in the broader community:

- “LCP has helped me to organise recruitment of sponsored children . . . to assess the impacts of our decisions.”
- “LCP makes me more cautious when considering project activities.”

Many people also describe an attitude shift from exclusion to inclusion:

- “Before LCP, the understanding in proposals was that projects were for self-help-group members. After LCP, it is not only for . . . members. We now consider the future of the whole village.”
- “I now see differences as a gap to bridge. Being different is normal, but differences no longer make me feel stiff about it. I am more ready to accept people as they are.”

Project teams that apply LCP consistently often describe improved relationships between their members.

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18 In the LCP mainstreaming phase, interagency consultations determined that mainstreaming is a three-part process: “Conceptualise—Personalise—Operationalise” (Collaborative for Development Action, Consultation Notes, November 2001). This runs parallel to a framework promoted by WV Indonesia: “Think peace—Be peace—Do peace.”


20 Project Committee Focus Group Discussion in Garred, Harder and Sihotang.

• “Before [LCP], we didn’t care for each other. After, we became conscious that what we say can hurt others.”

• “Before, the lowlanders were afraid to go to the upland . . . Now no more fear, because they understand each other.”

• “Before, the Bisayans [ethnic group] often underestimated the B’laans [ethnic group], but now through enlightening the minds . . . they treat them all the same.”

People also tend to apply LCP outside the development programme, in other aspects of daily life.

• “The first day of the training I attended, LCP helped me think back that the way I relate with my children reflects that I am not a connector among my lovely children even though in my heart, I want my lovely children to become closer.”  

22

• “To stop fighting after soccer games between villages, teams are now mixed—the fighting has stopped.”  

23

Finally, LCP is seen as an affirmation of knowledge that is already resident within the community:

• “We actually know what dividers and connectors are in our community, but we don’t pay close enough attention to them.”  

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• “LCP has only sharpened the analysis. LCP helped to break through.”  

25

Not everyone who uses LCP will experience personalisation. This is not necessary for a technically correct application of LCP, and it must not be forced. However, personalisation does appear to be necessary in generating the commitment required for local NGO staff and CBO members to undertake redesigns that impact their own identity group. Personalisation is also a key catalyst in building the consistency needed to mainstream LCP throughout a large long-term development programme.

22 LCP Training participant feedback, WV Cambodia, November 2003.

23 Project Committee Focus Group Discussion, Area Development Programme Banggai, in Garred, Harder and Sihotang.


25 Staff Focus Group Discussion, Area Development Programme Banggai, in Garred, Harder and Sihotang.
VI. LCP Links to Peacebuilding

Conceptually, it is clear that LCP is not equivalent to peacebuilding:

- The focus of LCP is working in conflict - improving the quality of aid programmes that operate in contexts of conflict.
- The focus of peacebuilding is working on conflict—actively resolving disputes and addressing their underlying causes through restoration of healthy inter-group relationships and just social structures.
- Further, LCP refers to an analysis tool used to design programme activities, while peacebuilding refers to the programme activities themselves.

At the height of a large-scale relief response, this conceptual distinction is easy to maintain because emphasis is appropriately placed on “doing no harm.” However, the distinction becomes less absolute in development programmes, because there is often more emphasis on strengthening “local capacities for peace.” When LCP analysis leads to intentionally and consistently strengthening local capacities for peace, then LCP overlaps with peacebuilding.

CBO members tend not to dwell on these abstract definitions. When they accept LCP as compatible with their own aspirations for harmonious living, it opens the door to a broader vision for peace. In Banggai, Indonesia, self-help groups spontaneously developed new activities to strengthen “connectors” in villages affected by inter-religious tension:

- Safari Ramadhan, an inter-faith children’s holiday celebration, involves joint learning activities for Muslim, Christian and Hindu children.
- A karaoke competition involving participants of all faiths lasted two weeks. Christians organised the event, but the greatest number of participants were Muslim.
- Teacher exchanges allowed Hindu, Muslim or Christian teachers to be invited for the first time to teach children from other religious groups.

Additionally, project committee members in Banggai articulate uses for LCP that go well beyond the intended purposes of the tool:

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26 Project Committee Focus Group Discussion in Garred, Harder and Sihotang.
27 Project Committee Focus Group Discussion in Garred, Harder and Sihotang.
• Mediation: “Before LCP, we didn’t know how to resolve problems. Now we can better resolve disputes . . . Facilitating, digging out the issues, is what helps. Solutions appear at that point.”

• Community dialogue and early warning: “I think that if we see something that will result in conflict, we need to form a communication forum to discuss together what kind of connectors we need to develop.”

Of course, LCP is not intended to be a tool for peacebuilding, mediation or community dialogue. LCP lays a foundation, gives confidence and opens a door for peacebuilding to naturally begin.

The Banggai experience illustrates specifically how LCP lays a foundation for peacebuilding:

• LCP raises awareness regarding the existence of latent conflict.
• LCP raises awareness regarding how development programmes interact with latent conflict.
• LCP helps to position the NGO as an impartial and inclusive actor.
• LCP gets CBO and community members engaged, because its basic concepts are simple enough for the non-specialist to understand.
• LCP gives confidence, because it provides people with a framework to better understand and act upon the “dividers and connectors” reality that they already know.
• Learning LCP often nurtures personal transformation. “It is now my burden—personal commitment—to see communities live in peace with each other.”
• LCP analysis leads to identification of opportunities to actively strengthen connectors.

LCP reaches its limit upon identification of programme options that strengthen connectors. That is, LCP can generate ideas for peacebuilding, but does not tell us how to design and implement peacebuilding. In practice, it is not necessary for NGO staff to determine exactly where “strengthening local capacities for peace” shifts into “peacebuilding.” However, it is very important that staff recognise the limitations of the LCP framework and plan accordingly.

28 Project Committee Focus Group Discussion in Garred, Harder and Sihotang.
29 Staff Focus Group Discussion in Garred, Harder and Sihotang.
VIII. LCP as a Foundation

Most conflicts are highly complex, but LCP is a relatively simple analysis tool. This is necessary for rapid analysis in the early stage of a large-scale emergency response. LCP’s simplicity also makes it wonderfully usable at the grassroots level. However, all tools have limitations, and in longer-term development, some limitations of LCP do become apparent.

In World Vision’s experience, the main limitations are as follows:

1. **Multiple actors in conflict**—LCP applies best to conflicts that involve two primary and easily identifiable actor groups. Conflicts with multiple actor groups, unclear relationships or shifting alliances are more difficult to analyse.

   In Banggai, Indonesia, Christian-Muslim tensions were rightly prioritised for in-depth LCP application because this represented the largest immediate risk. However, this required delaying attention to land rights tensions between locals and trans-migrants, which posed a risk in the longer term.

2. **Issues in conflict**—Some issues can be identified through use of LCP but not fully analysed. These include:

   - Human rights violations and other forms of abuse of power
   - Gender relations and gender-based discrimination
   - Domestic violence and violence against children
   - Criminal violence not linked to an identifiable actor group

   LCP is very useful in bringing recognition to these issues. Identification as “dividers” or “connectors” brings each to the forefront of discussion, even in cultures where such topics are discouraged. However, additional tools are required for in-depth analysis and planning.

   In addition, LCP literature talks a lot about violence. Thus when dealing with issues of power and human rights, we must emphasise that peace means more than the absence of violence. To address this, WV Cambodia has adopted the following definition of violence: “Violence includes any action, attitudes, structures or sys-

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tems which harms another person or group, or which intentionally inhibits them from reaching their potential.” Where human rights violations appear as dividers, the appropriate response may not be restoring immediate harmony, but instead to strengthen mechanisms of social justice. This awareness is particularly important in cultures that value smooth relationships and discourage confrontation.

3. **Levels of conflict**—As presented in *Do No Harm*, the LCP framework is not intended for analysis of macro- or international-level conflict. In fact, to apply LCP analysis properly requires in-depth analysis of minute details of social context and programme design. LCP, therefore, works best for analysis at the local level, focused on sub-components of broader programme design.

For example, in Banggai, Indonesia, LCP has increased awareness among NGO staff and CBO members regarding “ripple effects” of violent conflict in neighbouring Poso. Yet they question whether the LCP framework can effectively help them to address this and have noted that, for broader analysis, additional tools are required.

With these limitations in mind, LCP works very well as a “preferred foundation.” As a powerful catalyst for grassroots change, LCP provides profound yet simple concepts and broad appeal. World Vision recommends that development programmes begin with application of LCP, first to help NGO staff and CBO members to address their minimal obligation to “do no harm,” and then to position themselves as impartial actors contributing to peace.

In later stages, other tools are added for purposes of:

- In-depth conflict analysis—World Vision uses two additional tools, one at district/regional level and another at national/international level.

- Peacebuilding programme design—For development programmes seeking to move from LCP into peacebuilding, World Vision draws programme design skills from such diverse disciplines as peace education, inter-faith dialogue, facilitated problem solving, child rights and child participation, civil society strengthening and advocacy.

- Programme implementation—The Centres of Learning in both Sarangani, Philippines, and Banggai, Indonesia, have provided NGO staff and CBO

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32 Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War.*

33 Project Committee and Staff Focus Group Discussions in Garred, Harder and Sihotang.

34 See Introduction.
members with additional training in communication skills and informal mediation.

IX. Implications for LCP Assessment, Training and Mainstreaming

All of these documented learnings have significant implications for LCP assessment, training and mainstreaming in a development context. Key points are summarised here, with reference to further detail in this and other publications.

Assessment. Upon establishing LCP Centres of Learning in Banggai, Indonesia, and Sarangani, Philippines, World Vision was faced with several key challenges in adapting LCP from relief to development contexts:

- How can LCP be made “operational,” in a way that consistently influences programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation?
- How can community stakeholders be involved and, in fact, take ownership of the LCP analysis and integration process?

It was clear that the practice of office-based LCP analysis by WV staff would not be sufficient to meet these challenges. Instead, through experimentation, the Centres of Learning developed an alternate approach called “Community-Based LCP Assessment.”

In community-based LCP assessment, community stakeholders apply LCP analysis to their own development programmes. WV staff work as teams to facilitate their self-assessment. Data is gathered and analysed using familiar participation tools, adapted for LCP purposes.

1. Focus Group Discussions
2. Key Informant Interviews
3. Participatory Learning and Action—structured learning exercises such as village mapping, timelines, Venn diagrams, ten seeds, etc.

This follows the same analytical process as other applications of LCP, with the distinction being that data is generated and decisions taken at community level. Results are documented in a written report, including recommendations to programme decision makers for improving impact on conflict. If the community groups choose to implement the recommendations, these changes become part of the programme’s design and ongoing implementation.

35 World Vision’s “Facilitation Manual for Community-Based LCP Assessment.”

A Shared Future—From Relief to Development
This approach to community-based LCP assessment tends to support:

- Rigorous analysis due to field-generated data
- Identification of “latent” tensions that programme staff might have overlooked
- Development of community members’ capacity to conduct LCP analysis
- Integration of LCP throughout the programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation cycle.\(^{36}\)

**Training.** Evaluation of the LCP Centre of Learning in Banggai, Indonesia, has identified the following success factors in training for consistent, skilled application of LCP analysis at the programme level. Though every context is unique, these principles have been observed to be widely applicable.\(^{37}\)

1. Repeated exposure—Often a time lag occurs between an individual’s first LCP training and consistent LCP practice. Follow-up “refreshers” and interactive mentoring are essential. In many cases, it is also helpful to repeat the formal training.

2. Assessment practice—“Hands-on” experience in community-based LCP assessment (as described above) plays a very key role in grasping and personalising LCP. “When we did assessment . . . then we really understood.”\(^{38}\) WV continues to explore this finding, because it may imply an increased role for assessment practice within our LCP training system.

3. Contextualised training at grassroots level—Grassroots-level LCP training must obviously be delivered in the local language. Trainers often reduce dependence on text and rely more on drawings and role-play. Importantly, trainers may also need new training case studies that are relatively short, involving a limited number of straightforward issues and rooted in the local context. When training Western-educated staff, case studies from unfamiliar contexts are often desirable, and participants are willing to transfer the learning from the case study to their own programme context. However, participants from other cultural backgrounds may strongly prefer case studies that

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\(^{36}\) See chapters 6 and 7 by Allen Harder.

\(^{37}\) Garred, Harder and Sihotang, “LCP Centre of Learning Evaluation Report.”

\(^{38}\) Staff Focus Group Discussion in Garred, Harder and Sihotang.
more closely parallel their own experience, with a lesser degree of abstraction.\textsuperscript{39}

This implies a relatively labour-intensive “Training of Trainers” system, able to equip and support large numbers of LCP resource staff who are fluent in local language and culture. New trainers require mentoring, and all trainers work far more consistently and effectively when paired with a qualified partner.

**Mainstreaming.** It is possible to significantly improve a programme design with only an introductory knowledge of LCP. This is illustrated in the connection of two communities via bridge construction in Kyaing Tong, Myanmar/Burma.\textsuperscript{40} The value of quick LCP applications should not be overlooked.

Nonetheless, in-depth systemic applications do require attention to multi-level “mainstreaming”:

- LCP as a paradigm or lens for staff
- LCP integration in programme design, implementation monitoring and evaluation
- Consistent LCP application in organisational systems and structures
- LCP reflected in organisational vision, mission and values

For World Vision, LCP mainstreaming is an ongoing effort.\textsuperscript{41} In future years, the emerging lessons documented here and in the chapters that follow should help to speed LCP uptake. Nonetheless, LCP mainstreaming requires deep levels of individual and organisational change, for which there are no real shortcuts.

- Individuals need time to develop consistent, skilled application of LCP analysis.
- NGO staff often need to experience the value of LCP before they become willing to extend it to CBO partners, thus creating a two-tiered LCP application process.
- Once long-term development programmes are underway, and their structures already established, broad LCP redesigns may require strong leadership and significant time to implement.


\textsuperscript{40} See Chapter 3 by Cherry Waing and Saw Allan.

\textsuperscript{41} See Chapter 8 by Riak.
Chapter 2

Becoming Inclusive: Long-Term Benefits of LCP in Programme Strategy

Andreas Sibotang and Terry Silalahi

This case study traces the implementation of the Local Capacities for Peace (LCP) Centre of Learning in the Banggai Area Development Programme (ADP), established as a laboratory to learn about the potential of integrating Local Capacities for Peace within development programming in contexts of conflict.

From this work in Banggai and its influence on the area development programme’s strategy and approach, it was learned that some programme activities and approaches unintentionally weakened relationships between Muslim and Christian groups, strengthening exclusivity between both groups and heightening risks that underlying tensions might escalate. LCP assessment called for changes in programme strategy and approaches, and provided a framework for analysis that continues to influence and inform the programme staff, community leaders and participants, and overall programme strategy. This case study includes some context analysis (national and local), a description of the Banggai Area Development Programme and a summary of overall learnings and key changes implemented as a result of LCP assessment and recommendations.

Outcomes have proven sufficiently encouraging to inspire World Vision Indonesia as a whole and World Vision’s international partnership to adapt LCP insights and methods as part of long-term development strategy for transforming relationships and power dynamics so that justice, hope, well-being, reconciliation and peace may flourish among the children, families and communities with whom the organisation works.

The National Context

Indonesia is an island country of many different tribes and ethnic groups. Five acknowledged religions are practised: Muslim (about 85% of total population),
Christian Protestant and Catholic\(^1\) (about 10% of total population), Hindu and Buddhist (about 5% of total population). During the “New Order” era under former President Suharto’s government (1966-1998), strict authoritarian civilian and military control was maintained to provide stability and safety for economic growth. Political parties, as well as judicial and legislative bodies, were under government control, and democracy was almost non-existent. Public discussion and press coverage of politics and government policies were rigidly restricted by government and military control. Moreover, discussion regarding ethnicity, religion, race and inter-group relations\(^2\) was prohibited to prevent conflict within communities, although some government policies ignited tension in and between communities.

Local tensions based on ethno-religious identity were intensified through the government policy of transmigration and spontaneous migration of people from Java, South Sulawesi, Bali, Lombok, and Madura, to the less populated regions of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and Papua. Tensions escalated due to local competition for jobs (particularly in civil service jobs and key positions within the bureaucracy), disputes over land and resources between settlers and indigenous people, and social jealousy where economic disparities between these groups emerged. All these tensions remained latent during this period of tight control, since there was no effective legal system to resolve conflicts effectively.

After the severe economic crisis of 1997 and the end of President Suharto’s regime in May 1998, these latent tensions burst into scores of communal conflicts in some regions. Most conflicts involved identity issues such as ethnicity and religion. In Jakarta, many Chinese were killed; in Kalimantan, conflicts involved Dayak and Madurese ethnic groups; while in Maluku and Central Sulawesi, conflicts broke out between Muslim and Christian identity groups.

**Local Context: Banggai District**

Banggai is situated in Central Sulawesi, bordering Poso district, where so-called “religious conflict” between Muslim and Christian groups occurred. The conflict in Poso erupted after a fight between a Christian youth and a Muslim youth who got drunk. Fighting escalated to communal violence. Attacks on Muslim or Christian villages by each group are common. According to some analysis, the fighting is only a trigger, rather than the root cause of conflict. Local competition for civil service jobs, economic disparity, and affinity links to key positions in the district (especially

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\(^1\) In Indonesian demography, Christian Protestants and Christian Catholics are usually considered as separate groups.

\(^2\) The government uses a specific term, “SARA,” for the issues regarding ethnicity, religion, race and inter-group relations.
Bupati, head of district) had already surfaced latent tensions between Christians, who are commonly local people, and Muslims, who are commonly settlers. In Poso, Muslim and Christian groups tend to live in different villages. Division between villages grew after the conflict escalated.

**Location of Banggai Area Development Programme**

The conflict in Poso lasted from December 1998 through early December 2001. On December 21, 2001, the national government facilitated a peace conference in which Muslim and Christian groups signed a peace agreement, named Malino Declaration. However even after the declaration, attacks on Muslim and Christian villages continued to occur. Moreover, some mysterious snipers killed Christian or Muslim people indiscriminately.

Because Banggai borders Poso district, the conflict in Poso influences Banggai communities to some extent. People became both more sensitive to and cautious about rumors that spread. Villages’ structure reinforced this—most Banggai villages, especially in Bunta sub-district directly bordering Poso, consist entirely of one religious identity group. In the relatively few cases of villages where more than one religion is practised, people live separately by religion in different sub-villages. During a Christmas celebration in one village, Christian youth in the village guarded the local church armed with chopping knives after hearing rumors of an attack planned against their village.
Prejudices grew, and relationships between villages and groups became increasingly fragile. Fortunately, local government has responded actively, anticipating and handling rumors and incidents that could lead to communal conflict. The local government introduced forums, which although meeting irregularly, nevertheless provide opportunity for religious leaders in district and sub-district levels to anticipate the escalation of tension between community groups.

Besides factors already noted, other influences on relationship patterns between Muslim and Christian groups, positively and negatively, include:

- **Perception of global issues:**
  The conflicts in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq have been perceived as conflict between religions. To some extent, this perception strengthens religious fundamentalism.

- **Different values and interests regarding pork:**
  Among Christians, pork is commonly served during parties or celebrations. For Muslims, pork is ritually unclean (*haram*). Moreover, for some Muslims, even the cooking equipment is ritually unclean. Therefore, some Muslims hesitate to visit a Christian house or attend any celebration with Christians, since they hesitate to drink from the glass and eat from the plate that might already be contaminated by pork.
  In Christian communities, pig is a livestock commodity that can be sold for a high price. Among Muslims, pig is ritually unclean. Christians who live near Muslim villages or sub-villages sometimes cause conflict by failing to keep pigs in a secure pigpen and allowing them to escape or wander through a Muslim yard.

- **Religious codes:**
  In 1991, the Indonesia Muslim Council launched a code that forbids Muslims to attend Christmas celebrations. Christmas celebrations, especially when combined with worship, are perceived as an effort to proselytise Muslims who attend the celebrations. More than one Christian community has said that relationship patterns between Muslim and Christian have been different since 1991. Previously, Muslims visited Christians during Christmas. After 1991, this inter-relating decreased, even among relatives.

- **Shared ethnicity and culture:**
  Historically, it is believed Banggai people are brothers descended from the same ancestors. They are Saluan and Balantak ethnic groups, consist-
ing of both Muslim and Christian. Intermarriage has further blurred ethnic distinctives, and many Muslims and Christians are relatives. Because of this, some people believe communal violence is unlikely in their area.

- Willingness to live in peace:
  Both local communities and local government are committed to peaceful living. This can be seen in how communities actively work to maintain tolerant attitudes towards each other. For instance, after realising how different values regarding pork were affecting village relationships, Christians asked their Muslim neighbours to cook for a party or invited Muslim neighbours to cook together with them. Banggai communities also interact through sports, school activities, public works and facilities, holidays, ceremonies and daily conversation. There is a local term for working together with people from different groups—*Mapalus* or *Mosaut*. A traditional dance named *Dero* celebrates youth from different groups.

**Banggai Area Development Programme**

*History*

World Vision Indonesia started the programme in Banggai district in 1984 through Change Agent Project (1984-1985) and Development Assisting Centre Project (1985-1995). The project was implemented in 96 villages across 10 sub-districts and focused on health infrastructure and training. It was implemented through local foundations for education and community development, known as YPSK and YPM, managed by the local church.

From 1993 to 1995, WV Indonesia conducted a seed project for an area development programme in Banggai district. The ADP model was introduced as an effort to gain optimal results in pursuing holistic transformational development that is sustainable, people-centred and responsive to the needs of children, families and communities. Fundraising for the programme is conducted through World Vision’s sponsorship programme. Banggai was the first ADP in WV Indonesia and is funded by WV Canada.

During the seed project, WV Indonesia conducted two seminars, recruited and trained some cadres and motivators, and collected baseline data. Through the seminar, the local government recommended some villages in three sub-districts (Luwuk, Pagimana, and Bunta) to be assisted, referring to data of the least developed
villages in the district. However, during the socialisation process, most Muslim villages refused to receive WV Indonesia assistance because rumors indicated that this Christian organisation would proselytise Muslims through distribution of the aid.

The Area Development Programme was started in October 1995 and intended to operate for 15 years. For the first five years, ADP activities focused on programme socialisation, sponsored children recruitment and self-help group formation in villages. Because most Muslim villages refused WV assistance, most assisted villages are Christian villages and most beneficiaries and sponsored children are Christians. Although WV Indonesia expanded its operation to Lamala sub-district in 1996, it had previously experienced similar situations in Luwuk, Pagimana and Bunta.

Demographic data from assisted villages of Banggai Area Development Programme is shown in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>Number of Villages</th>
<th>Number of Assisted Villages</th>
<th>Number of Population in each sub-district (Based on Statistic Data of Banggai District in 2002)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunta</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagimana</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luwuk</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamala</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8,930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Current Activities**

Banggai Area Development Programme currently operates in 48 villages spread throughout four sub-districts, with 3,121 families as beneficiaries and 3,054 sponsored children. Sixteen staff members work with the programme; three are hired from Jakarta through WV Indonesia’s national office, and the thirteen others are hired locally. The staff members are from different ethnicity groups; however, no Muslim has yet joined the programme staff team.

Besides sponsorship activities, the Area Development Programme also conducts health, education and income-generating projects. Most projects are planned and

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3 “Socialisation” is a term used in Indonesia regarding the process of informing, sharing and clarifying an idea, a programme or an initiative for the purpose of gaining support from the “target group.”

4 In fact, World Vision is a Christian organisation that assists people of all ethnic and religious groups, without intention to proselytise them.

5 The Indonesian term for self-help group is KSM (kelompok swadya masyarakat). These groups are established by the community with the assistance of ADP staff, and the groups become local implementing partners of WV Indonesia at the village level.
implemented by local self-help groups. Generally, there is one self-help group in one village. Larger villages may host two or three self-help groups. Currently, 54 self-help groups function in the 48 villages. At sub-district level, the self-help groups formed a representative forum named Sub-District Representative Committee consisting of six to eight people to assist self-help groups within the sub-district. The Sub-District Representative Committee conducts a quarterly meeting with the self-help groups, and each self-help group meets monthly to discuss their programmes within the village.

Every year, the Area Development Programme conducts a participatory learning and action (PLA) in each self-help group to foster local participants’ discussion of participatory learning activity problems and capacities in the village, and to plan programmes to be conducted in the next fiscal year. Then the programmes are discussed at sub-district and district levels through some seminars with the local government. Final results are compiled in the Area Development Programme’s Plan of Action, to be proposed to WV Canada as the donor. Once approved by the donor, the programmes are “re-socialised” to the self-help groups. Finally, to implement the programme, the related self-help groups write a proposal to the Area Development Programme.

Infrastructure programmes like water pipe installation and school renovation surely benefit entire communities and all children in the villages. However, other programmes specifically focus only on self-help group members and sponsored children. For instance, toilet, healthy house, plant seed programmes and vocational training assist only self-help group members. Also, medical checkups, supplementary feeding and school kit distribution focus on sponsored children.

The LCP Centre of Learning

Background

The Local Capacities for Peace Centre of Learning (LCP-CoL) Project was initiated by WV Asia-Pacific Regional Office, with an approximate budget of US$50,000/year. The LCP-CoL was to provide a field-based learning environment for using the LCP framework in a development context, for researching impact and collecting lessons learned. Two expected impacts resulted from implementation of the Banggai LCP-CoL. First was an effect on the way WV Indonesia staff members think about their work, due to LCP analysis methodology, and on the way this thinking influenced project design and implementation. The second effect was im-

6 The Indonesian term for Sub-District Representative Committee is DPK (Dewan Perwakilan Kecamatan).
proved community relationships that could lead to decreased risk of violent ethno-political identity conflicts.

Methodology of Centre of Learning Implementation

- LCP training for both staff and community:

One step in implementation of the LCP-CoL was to develop LCP understanding. LCP training was conducted for staff and community in May 2001, February 2002 and April 2003. Discussions and disseminations were also organised to deepen LCP understanding. A local case study was developed and used during disseminations, to contextualise the learning process. A concrete and relevant case helped staff and community in terms of application. A broadening understanding of LCP also helped staff and community to analyse their own context within their area. After LCP training in April 2003, the Sub-District Representative Committee conducted assessment in some villages.

- Ongoing awareness-raising and mentoring:

To encourage LCP understanding and application locally, a full-time staff CoL facilitator was placed in Banggai Area Development Programme. The facilitator ensures LCP remains a priority for mainstreaming throughout the programme. Discussion of LCP regularly occurs during monthly staff meetings, community meetings and Sub-District Representative Committee quarterly meetings.

- Community-based LCP assessment:

Community-based LCP assessment is the core of the Centre of Learning, since it provides the learning regarding local context and programme’s impact on this context.

In May 2001, Area Development Programme staff and regional peacebuilding staff conducted an initial assessment in Bunta sub-district using the key informant interview method. More than 30 community leaders and representatives were interviewed to learn about local context and programme impact. Through this assessment, two major tensions within the community were identified. One involved the relationship between settlers and indigenous people, and the other was the relationship between Muslims and Christians. The analysis concluded that the greatest potential risk of conflict lay in issues between Muslims and Christians. The assessment also indicated community perceptions regarding WV Indonesia projects through the Area Development Programme. Some in the community, especially Muslims,
still perceived the programmes as only for Christians. In fact, most beneficiaries were Christian; self-help group meeting venues were often in a church and opened with Christian devotion; and Muslim members of the community often lacked information and explanation regarding the programmes. Due to these findings, the assessment team recommended some changes in programme approach.

A second assessment was conducted in April 2002, and the third in May 2003. These two follow-up assessments tracked changes in programme design and resulting influences on local context. The third assessment introduced focus group discussions, in addition to interviews.

The assessment process itself has become an ongoing learning tool for programme staff members to deepen their understanding about LCP application. Through the assessments, staff can receive vital direction regarding how to implement LCP in the programme. “When we did assessment . . . then we really understood,” one staff member said.

LCP Assessment Recommendations and Changes in Programme Approach

As described, LCP assessment included community-based context analysis, programme impact analysis and recommendations for programme changes. Based on these findings, Banggai Area Development Programme reconsidered its activities and changed some approaches to programming.

The first assessment in 2001 illuminated the fact that many people perceived WV Indonesia assistance as being aimed at Christians. As explained, the history of how the Area Development Programme entered the villages certainly influenced these perceptions. A Christian self-help group chairperson, asked about meeting venues and Muslim involvement in the self-help group, noted, “Maybe that is why they hesitate to join us and be active in the self-help group.”

Since that assessment, Banggai Area Development Programme has been encouraging self-help group members to meet in more “neutral” venues, such as houses, schools or other community spaces. Instead of opening meetings with devotion, a time for reflection provides opportunities to invite others to express their diverse faiths. World Vision Indonesia clearly states its identity as a Christian organisation that implements its programmes to serve all needy people, regardless of their religious or ethnic origins.


A Shared Future—Becoming Inclusive
The second assessment (April 2002) engaged the programme staff team more deeply in planning, thinking of indicators of change in the community and interviewing local people. Some interviewees had participated the prior year; some were new. Among changes documented, fewer self-help groups conducted meetings in churches, and community-wide understanding of what the Area Development Programme is and how it works seemed to be growing. Interviewees made more positive comments towards other groups and showed less prejudice towards other groups in discussing incidents of tension or potential conflict. Yet, room for improvement still remained.

After the second assessment, the Banggai programme adjusted its strategies/approaches to work more on strengthening self-help groups, to continue broadening distribution of information about the self-help group and Area Development Programme, to involve more people from different groups in its programmes, to develop and strengthen inter-faith forums, and to interpret World Vision’s core values and mission statement into its local pluralistic context. Some programmes providing broad benefits to the entire community—such as school renovation, water pipe construction, seminars/trainings/workshops and screening of education films for school children—aimed to demonstrate that the programme and self-help groups are not exclusive and are intended to strengthen interactions between Muslim and Christian groups.

In May 2003, the third assessment found that LCP changed ways of thinking among staff and villagers, and that this had significantly impacted programme activities. Far fewer self-help groups conducted monthly meetings in churches; more people from all groups benefited from and became involved in programme activities regardless of religion and ethnicity. All programme staff grew in awareness of LCP, and more staff actively encouraged the community to think and work together. Interactions between Muslims and Christians significantly increased in both volume and intensity. This might have contributed to a measurable increase in understanding and decreased tensions between groups. A summary of key findings, recommendations and programme changes is shown in Table 2.8

Indeed, changes and impacts surpassed staff and village expectations, and resulting discussion regarding LCP methodology to strengthen local capacities for peace has encouraged many staff members to alter their own attitudes and behaviours at deeply personal levels. In their work, field staff now intentionally approach the Muslim community to hear input and invite them to become involved in self-help

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groups. Currently, some Muslims are actively involved in self-help groups and have become self-help group officers. Moreover, a Muslim village took the initiative to ask for assistance from Banggai Area Development Programme.

Table 2. Key findings, recommendations and scope of change in Banggai Area Development Programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Findings</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Scope of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Perception of WV Indonesia as a Christian organisation that might proselytise people of other faiths.</td>
<td>Re-socialisation of WV as an inclusive, non-proselytising organisation that serves people of all faiths.</td>
<td>• Ongoing staff dialogue with beneficiary community members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Muslim communities hesitated to join self-help groups since self-help groups usually conducted meetings in churches.</td>
<td>Change of self-help group meeting places from churches to public venues. Change of self-help group meeting times and refreshments to accommodate Muslim practice.</td>
<td>• Up to 40 of 53 self-help groups have stopped meeting in churches. This change has affected all four sub-districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Most beneficiaries (sponsored children and self-help group members) are Christian. WV Indonesia was perceived as an organisation that works only for Christian communities.</td>
<td>Inclusion and active recruitment of non-Christian sponsored children.</td>
<td>• Increase in Muslim sponsored children from 75 to 100. Total number of sponsored children is 3,054. New sponsorship growth is very limited at this advanced phase of the programme cycle. Therefore, other means have been used to expand benefit to Muslim villages (see below).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Key Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Scope of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion and active recruitment of non-Christian self-help group members.</td>
<td>• 20 of 20 self-help groups located in mixed villages now have mixed Christian-Muslim membership. (The other villages are homogenous).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election of non-Christian self-help group leaders.</td>
<td>• 6 of the 20 self-help groups in mixed villages now have non-Christian leadership.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Increase in community-wide activities that benefit beyond sponsored children and self-help group. | Examples include the following:  
  • Water pipe projects  
  • Road maintenance and bridge building project  
  • Textbook distribution to schools, instead of to sponsored children only  
  • English course opened to all children, including many new non-Christian students  
  • Health extension project  
  • Children’s Day, and Sports and Arts Weekend  
  • School furnishings projects |

Another effect of LCP on programme strategy is due to increasing encouragement and empowerment of multiple community-based organisations to use LCP analysis. After conducting some LCP exposures for the Sub-District Representative Committee and self-help groups, Banggai Area Development Programme also empowered the Sub-District Representative Committee to conduct LCP assessment in every assisted village. Through these assessments, much was learned about relationships between community groups within each village and how self-help group programmes—assisted by the ADP—have impacted the relationships. At a micro
level, it is clear the self-help group can contribute towards enhancing local capacities for peace within each village. At the very least, noted Mr. Ongki Djabain, self-help group chairperson in Sinampangngyo village and Sub-District Representative Committee member in Pagimana sub-district, “Having conducted the assessment in some villages, I become more aware about the way I lead my self-help group.” Currently, the Sub-District Representative Committee uses LCP analysis in reviewing and recommending programme proposals from self-help groups.

Conclusion

The Banggai Area Development Programme has utilised LCP analysis methodology—including disseminations, trainings, assessments and intense discussions with programme staff, the Sub-district Representative Committee and self-help group boards and members—to sharpen LCP understanding throughout the community. This broadening understanding has influenced thinking, interpreting and implementing of projects. Staff learned that some activities and approaches had unintentionally weakened relationships between Muslim and Christian groups. The resulting changes in Area Development Programme strategy and approaches recommended by the yearly LCP assessment provide some evidence of how LCP analysis can influence programme strategy and operations in ways that strengthen inclusiveness and discourage exclusivity between groups.

Moreover, the LCP-CoL, to some extent, inspires other area development programmes, World Vision Indonesia as a whole, and even World Vision’s international partnership and sister organisations, to think deeply and long-term about how their work affects the webs of relationships between groups in their locality and region. This has been reflected by greater enthusiasm to attend LCP assessment debriefings with field facilitators, Area Development Programme managers, and senior management. Indeed, each year, more and more people from programme management and beyond attended debriefing sessions.

Among the measurable changes in programme strategy and approach, efforts to be more inclusive did not result in immediate reconciliation of tension, or resolve conflicts directly—these outcomes will likely require the long and sometimes painful journey of transformational development itself. However, LCP in a development context has certainly shown that its concepts support the building of a sustainable culture of peace between community groups in area development programmes.
MORE than a river separated the people of Pan Lau and Nant Baw Awe villages in Myanmar/Burma. For many years, ethnic and religious differences had made it difficult to build a bridge across the large stream that rages during the rainy season. In 2002, a simple Local Capacities for Peace (LCP) analysis revealed that collaborative effort could build unity while making a lasting improvement to local infrastructure.

This case study illustrates how a small investment in LCP training, when applied, can significantly improve programme design and impact. Some details remain undocumented due to the remote location of the project site. Yet the Nant Baw Awe Bridge is a replicable example of what can be accomplished under “real world” constraints by a committed LCP practitioner.

Background

The Nant Baw Awe Bridge is 60 feet long, 12 feet wide and 9 feet high. The bridge crosses the Nant Baw Awe stream, which is 50 feet in width. In summer there is no water in the stream, but in the rainy season the stream can get to 6 to 7 feet deep, creating a current so strong it can even take away cows and buffalo in its flow. The bridge connects Pan Lau village to Nant Baw Awe village. It is situated about 15 miles east of Kyaing Tong, in the north-east of Myanmar/Burma, close to the Golden Triangle.

Before the Nant Baw Awe Bridge was completed, there used to be another bridge, which used to collapse during the rainy season and had to be rebuilt many times by the different villages. The villages had never united in building the bridge because they did not get along well with one another due to their religious and ethnic differences. The new bridge was completed in three months, which was longer than expected. During construction, the bridge collapsed twice because of the stream’s strong current. The difference from past experiences is that the new bridge is strong and will last.
The villages

In Pan Lau village, at the edge of the stream, live the Shan ethnic group, which is Buddhist. The population of the village is 414. After crossing the bridge and hiking about 45 minutes into the hills, you come to Nant Baw Awe village, where the Akha ethnic group lives. Scattered around the main village are seven smaller villages that have a total population of 997. The majority of the Akha people worship Nats (super natural spirits), but in two villages, people have become Christians. Both the Shans and the Akhas are cultivators and earn a moderate income.

Kyaing Tong is the major town in the district. For the Akha people to travel to Kyaing Tong, they have to take buses from Pan Lau. Without the bridge, this is impossible. The Shan people also suffer when the bridge is out because their businesses of selling and buying all sorts of commodities depend on the Akha villagers, who are their customers. The bridge has a further strategic use: It provides an essential link between sick people and the hospital during emergencies. Also, there is one primary school in Pan Lau village and one in Nant Baw Awe village, but children in Nant...
Baw Awe have to go to Pan Lau village for post-primary education because of the shortage of dedicated teachers.

In terms of lifestyle, the Shan people are richer than the Akha. Most Shan people own farms in the low land. The Akha minority group is poor, living in the highlands. The Akha feel that the Shan look down on them. Religious values differ strongly between Shan Buddhists, Akha Christians and Akha Animists. Before the bridge, there was no previous cooperation on development issues, but the school was open to all children and some adults had business relationships with members of the other group.

Constructing the bridge

When World Vision started working in Pan Lau and Nant Baw Awe and conducted a participatory learning and action (PLA) survey, the community identified the need for a bridge, as well as the need for equal access to education for their children and to markets to buy and sell their products. In addition to meeting these practical needs, the project allowed community members to learn more about their cultural differences and their values. The project manager, who had received LCP training, immediately recognised an opportunity ahead of her. She and her project team facilitated a “Participatory Resource Development” planning process to support the bridge project as a means of strengthening “connectors” between the Shan and Akha people.

The WV project team took the initiative to organise a series of meetings with the leaders and elders of the nine villages. This delicate process was greatly helped by the ethnic and religious diversity of the project team, which included Shan, Akha, Lahu, Myanmar, Kayin and Wa staff. Finally, the decision was made to build the bridge. It was agreed that World Vision would bear half of the expenses and the villages would pool their money to cover the remaining half. All the villagers would volunteer in building the bridge.

On the day of the laying of the foundation, everybody participated, regardless of the religious persuasion. The Nat worshippers and the Buddhists were present at the dedication service organised by the Akha Christians. The Christians were also present at the ritual offerings conducted by the Buddhists and the Nat worshippers.

For the construction of the bridge, the Akha people worked together, led by their traditional leaders. The Shan village headman from Pan Lau village contributed his time in supervising the construction work. To transport the construction materials, they had to pass through Pan Lau village to reach the bridge. The road in
the village was not wide enough for the vehicle so the Shan village headman negotiated with his villagers who lived by the side of the road to spare a few feet of their land to widen the road. The Shan villagers willingly agreed to share their land.

The elders of the nine villagers stepped outside of their traditional roles to take part in unloading materials from the truck at the building site and carrying and putting sandbags in the stream in order to slow down the current. Even children joined their parents in carrying what they could. There is a Burmese saying that “even the smallest grain of sand counts.” The bridge collapsed several times due to unexpected flash floods. Each time they had to clear away the debris and start again. The people got quite disappointed and discouraged, yet the project staff and the village headmen continued to encourage them to carry on with their work. In this way, the process of the bridge construction was finally completed, bringing a more unified community spirit for all the people living near Nant Baw Awe.

Conclusion

As the construction of the bridge started with ritual offerings to lay the foundation, so the villagers celebrated the completion of the bridge construction with ritual offerings. The Shan Buddhists from Pan Lau village, the Akha Nat worshippers, the Akha Christian people from the hills and the staff from World Vision joyfully celebrated their success together. A clear sign that a change had taken place was when the Akha Nat traditional leader, who used to dislike Christians, named his garden “The Garden of Eden.”

Three years later, the communities have better relationships with each other. The Akha have a better income, because they are able to sell their products in town. Some Shan now also sell their products in Akha villages.

Many Akha children use the bridge to attend post-primary school in the Shan village. Primary schools have been built in the Akha villages, since it is now possible to transport construction materials. The Shan Buddhists, the Akha Nat worshippers and the Akha Christians continue to attend each other’s rituals, and they often celebrate together.
In late 2000, World Vision in the Philippines began a process to intentionally explore the potential of its long-term development programmes to contribute to local capacities for peace. Through a project called the Local Capacities for Peace Centre of Learning (LCP-CoL), a four-year journey began. Two ultimate goals of the CoL involved change at two levels. First, the project sought change in the way the agency and staff think about and interpret the work they do in conflict areas and how this way of thinking transfers to project design and implementation. The second (more difficult to measure) impact sought was genuine improvement in community relations that would lead to decreased risk of violent ethno-political identity conflicts.

Written in early 2001, in the first few months of the CoL, this case study outlines one particular aspect of the project: NGO or agency impact on community leadership structures. In tracing how the LCP process was used at the community level to affect leadership structures in Sarangani, at the southern tip of Mindanao, the case study describes the conflict situation in the southern Philippines and some history of the agency (World Vision) in the Philippines, particularly in the southern Philippines province of Sarangani. Briefly, the specific context of Malapatan municipality and the environment is explored as it relates to community relationships and World Vision’s impact on that environment. Key programming decisions and their influence on leadership structures is highlighted. In conclusion, a postscript has been added that reflects on outcomes of the project evaluation conducted in June 2004.

With editorial support from Dinah Dimalanta and Bonie Belonio (World Vision Philippines), Andreas Sihtotang (World Vision Indonesia) and Chamly Coonghe (World Vision Lanka).
Background to the conflict in the Philippines and Mindanao

The Philippines is unique in that it is the only country in South-East Asia with a Christian majority. The long history of Spanish and American colonialism resulted in Christianity’s position as the dominant religion and culture in the country. More than 90% of Filipinos are Christian, and of that, more than 80% are Roman Catholic. The Muslim minority is concentrated in the Sulu Archipelago, Palawan, and parts of Mindanao. In addition to approximately 2 million Christians and 4 million Muslims, there are 2 million indigenous people. Colonialism, combined with government efforts in the 1920s and 1950s to resettle Christian settlers from Luzon and the Visayas to the resource-rich and relatively underpopulated Mindanao, reinforced the dominance of Christianity in Mindanao. That massive resettlement programme resulted in an 80% Christian population in Mindanao by 1983, causing deep resentment among local Muslims and indigenous people.

As a result, much of Mindanao has been characterised by ongoing and protracted low intensity conflict between ethnic and religious groups. In the 1970s, land disputes led to the creation of private armies by both natives and settlers. Philippine army troops were sent in to restore peace, and when President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed to seek greater autonomy for Mindanao. Subsequent breakaway groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), have sought Mindanao independence. Though peace talks are currently in process, more than 100,000 people, mostly civilians, have died in years of violence. Though often presented as a religious conflict, the root causes of the conflict are the economic, political and cultural marginalisation of the Muslim and indigenous peoples of Mindanao.

World Vision in the Philippines is a locally registered NGO under the name of World Vision Development Foundation (WVDF). Founded in 1954, the national office is known for quality programming and commitment to transformational development. Its area development programmes (ADPs) are characterized by holistic, integrated and sustainable development projects covering large geographical locales, focused especially on the needs of children in the area’s communities. Currently, 53 ADPs operate in 33 provinces and 28 cities, with more than 88,000 children receiving direct assistance and an estimated 4.7 million people spread across 4,239 barangays (villages) nationwide. ADP activities are geared towards education, enterprise development, values transformation and health.

\[2 \text{ Moro is the collective name for the 12 Islamised ethno-linguistic groups in the Philippines. Moro was considered a pejorative term until adopted by the MNLF.}\]
World Vision does not implement projects directly. Embracing the value of people empowerment, World Vision implements through community-based people’s organisations as its project partners. These people’s organisations are responsible for implementing and managing projects, utilising community development approaches. World Vision staff members begin work in communities with people who show leadership potential and interest in the area development programme (ADP). World Vision assists in organising them into a group called the core group of area leaders. This group assists in implementation of activities throughout the project. After initial leadership development training, the group elects its board of trustees and is then registered with the government as a legally constituted body that manages the ADP. Board of trustee (BoT) members are not responsible for direct project implementation. Rather, the BoT is responsible for managing the ADP, with some World Vision support, and determining, through community consultation, policies for the ADP, composition, and amendments to by-laws of the people’s organisation. Leadership development, aimed at the wider group of area leaders, the BoT and selected community members, is a major component of the ADP.

Through partnerships with existing structures and institutions within the community, World Vision projects purposely engage local governments, religious institutions, social development organisations and agencies, civic groups and other social actors in facilitating holistic development processes in marginalised communities. These partnerships are seen as integral and key to the success of any World Vision programmes throughout the country, as they increase the likelihood of sustainable, long-term outcomes even if World Vision funding support phases out after designated periods in specific geographical areas.

**Sarangani Province**

Sarangani’s estimated 420,000 population consists of at least 50 major ethno-linguistic groups in the province. Different ethnicities registered as Muslims make up 11% of the population, the majority of whom are Maguindanaon. The B’laans, indigenous to Sarangani Province, comprise 38%. Visayans, predominantly Christian settlers from the Visayas, make up 51%.

Malapatan is one of seven municipalities of Sarangani Province. World Vision operates in six barangays of Malapatan.³ Religious demographics in Malapatan are estimated as 70% Christian and 30% Muslim. Christians include approximately 40% B’laan and 60% settlers. Maguindanaons comprise the bulk of the Muslim popula-

³ The six barangays of Malapatan in which WV operates are Libi, Sapu Padidu, Sapu Masla, Tuyan, Patag and Lun Masla.
tion, in addition to some Tausogs. There is some debate over these figures, as many Muslims and indigenous groups do not register births with the government.

**Location of Sarangani Area Development Programme**

![Map of Southeast Asia showing Sarangani Area Development Programme](image)

**Context of Conflict in Malapatan Municipality**

During LCP assessments in Malapatan, two main areas of conflict were identified as current and future sources of violent or destructive discord related to Malapatan:⁴

- Land ownership and resultant disparities in access to resources
- Negative attitudes and actions expressed and demonstrated between groups in conflict

**Land ownership and disparities in access to resources**

In the 1920s and 1950s, government-sponsored resettlement programmes relocated hundreds of thousands of landless Ilongos, Ilocanos, Tagalogs and others from the Visayas and Luzon, who settled throughout Mindanao. Thousands of settlers arrived every week until the 1960s, and competition for land—aggravated by a clash between concepts of land tenure and ownership among Muslim, indigenous and majority Filipino groups—fuelled social tensions. Though the conflicts were class-based (between poor Christian settlers and Muslim elites; poor Muslims and

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⁴ In LCP assessments, several components of the ADP had positive and negative impacts on conflict. This case study focuses on the specific impact of core group leadership on the context of conflict.
Christian elites who usually were representatives of the state; and intra-elite), they have been interpreted as primarily religious in origin, between Christian settlers and Muslims.

In Malapatan municipality, disputes leading to loss of property and life are common. In barangay Libi, where B’laan Christians are the majority, land ownership was identified as the main divider, manifest in frequent incidents of communal violence. Christian settlers own most of the land. B’laans’ traditional concept of land ownership is based on their ancestral territories. Ancestral lands include cultivated land as well as hunting grounds, rivers, forests, uncultivated land and mineral resources below the land. Over the years, several incidents of communal violence have occurred related to land in Sapu Padidu, where the community is more mixed, ethnically and religiously, than in Libi. Most Christian settlers have acquired prime agricultural land near the coast, the highways and other infrastructure. The B’laans tend to live in the highlands and the Muslims in the center, both with limited access to social services and infrastructure.

Many Muslims in Mindanao feel that the local government is not doing anything to solve land disputes because land reform on any serious level would threaten the current leaders’ interests. Land ownership issues are tied directly to widespread disparities in access to and control over resources, as Muslims and tribal minorities remain the poorest and most marginalised groups in Mindanao. Christians, and in particular Christian Visayan settlers, are perceived as privileged, more “advanced”, and with better access to technology, credit, farm equipment and education. Muslims feel that they are subjected to ridicule and vilification and that their views are neither sought nor given sufficient consideration in matters of development. A commonly held belief is that government-sponsored development projects end up benefiting primarily non-Muslims and those Muslim leaders “co-opted by Manila,” while most Muslims and indigenous groups are left with destroyed environments, depleted resources, such as overfished waters, and loss of livelihoods.

**Attitudes and Actions**

Deep-seated tension and distrust manifest in daily interactions between different groups in Malapatan. All have stories of relatives mistreated or killed by “the other.” Family feuds (*rido*) are common. Some Muslims in the ADP tell non-Muslims not to trust Muslims they do not know personally. Bigotry and arrogance among Christians towards Muslims is evident in both individual and group conversations. One area Christian leader commented unhelpfully that Muslims will need to “change their ways” if there is to be peace and reconciliation.
During ADP meetings, many negative stereotypes were revealed. Christians called Muslims “treacherous.” Muslims noted that the media report “murder by a Muslim” but do not refer to religion if a Christian commits the crime. Muslim culture is blamed for poverty in Muslim communities. Christian midwives turn down work in Muslim communities because of “poor hygienic conditions.” Muslims are afraid to eat with Christians for fear of pork in their food. Ironically, roast pig (lechon) has become a symbol of cultural importance during significant Filipino Christian celebrations. In many cases, Muslim Filipinos do not feel “Filipino,” because so many key cultural traits are Christian in origin, both culturally and religiously.

Education has been identified as both connecting and dividing groups in Malapatan, depending on group interests. Education is valued by all, but for different reasons. Christian Visayans see education as a way for their children to have better lives and get good jobs. Muslims and indigenous groups see education primarily as a way to ensure they are “not taken advantage of in the future.” Muslims attest that Christians have greater access to secondary and post-secondary education and that the system of education favours Christian Visayan settlers.

Impact of ADP Leadership on the Context of Conflict

In August 2000, the core group of ADP Sarangani was ready to vote for its board of trustees. The group members spent time deciding criteria for eligibility, the process they would use in elections, the date and location. Upon suggestion by the World Vision staff, the group decided that the board would be composed of seven members. Of 56 people voting, 18 met board eligibility criteria and were willing to take up positions of leadership.

After a democratic process of one vote per person, the votes were counted. The seven seats on the board went to four men and three women. One woman was a B’laan Christian. The other elected members were all Visayan Christians. One elected Visayan Christian noted that she was not happy with the BoT selected because no Muslims were elected. She felt it would be easier for the board to agree on inclusive and sensitive policies and by-laws if there was Muslim representation. A Muslim who had run but was not elected noted that it was not necessary to have a Muslim on the board as long as the BoT recognised the diversity of the different barangays and respected different interests of all members. The person with the most votes, who later became the BoT chairman, noted that the elected board would not forget the interests of the Muslim community.

After the election, other area leaders raised concerns with the election results. Others were concerned that no Muslims were elected to the board even though
they represented more than a third of the area leaders and total project participants and, in barangay Sapu Masla, more than 75% of project participants. Some were surprised that the results were so skewed even though the core group was very diverse, with about 46% Christian Visayans, 34% Maguindanaon Muslims and 20% Christian B’laans. The group eligible and willing to take up BoT positions was also diverse. What is also interesting is that the area leaders began to question the electoral outcomes before World Vision staff raised it as an issue.

When the south-central Mindanao World Vision team met to discuss the election outcome, opinions clearly differed, leading to some interesting and challenging debates on the electoral process/outcomes and World Vision's role in the process. For some, the issue was how to ensure Muslim representation on the board. The ADP coordinator maintained the validity of the process because it was democratic. She commented that it might not have been the time for Muslims to be on the board, or that perhaps voters, Muslims and non-Muslims, felt Muslims did not have the capacity to be on the board. She asserted that over time, Muslim area leaders would gain the confidence and capacity to be on the board. Another team member expressed concern that advocating for equal representation on the board was equivalent to regulating and enforcing differences. Others argued that to not say anything would be tantamount to mirroring the wider Filipino society, where Christians from the Visayas and Luzon have the most access to power and influence—a system ensuring that even in a “democratic” process, religious and ethnic minorities continue to be marginalised.

The team came up with the following options:

- Add two new places on the board and include the two people with the highest votes from the original election. This would ensure that one member would be a Muslim.
- Add two Muslims who had the highest number of votes.
- Redo the elections in the hope that at least one Muslim is voted in.

Analysis

World Vision is in the business of transformational development—development of the poor and disenfranchised. In the ADP documents and in discussions with staff, it is clear that the agency acknowledges the need to address root causes of poverty and conflict. The challenge for the team members was taking the next step and thinking through how they would address this practically. One suggestion was to focus more on understanding politics and local dynamics. The argument was made that if these dynamics were ignored, then the ADP was at risk of being unconsciously supportive
of existing systems that increase power and prestige for some at the expense of others. Staff and local leadership expressed the importance of putting mechanisms in place to ensure that the ADP can be a model of “interdependence and solidarity among diverse groups.” The importance of a representative decision-making body was discussed in relation to goals for the ADP and community perceptions of World Vision.

The elections provided an incredible opportunity for the ADP coordinator to discuss the process and outcome with area leaders, focusing not only on their concerns about the election but also on the lived-out values of an organisation committed to transformational development. The analysis carried out, although not extensive, was enough to help staff see how the ADP design could strengthen systems of exclusion and elite building, as opposed to systems of inclusion.

It was clear to staff that LCP is not meant to be a tool of affirmative action, prescribing equal numbers of representatives from each group to maintain ethnic and religious harmony in a pluralistic community. Rather, the tool’s strength is in helping development practitioners understand how different components of their ADP design could affect relationships between different groups in conflict. LCP analysis helped staff see how ADP design could intentionally strengthen systems of inclusion and participation.

Outcomes

**BoT Composition**

After much consultation between area leaders, the board and the ADP coordinator, a decision was reached: expand the elected seats to 11, thereby including the Muslim who placed 9th in the August 2000 elections. This allowed for both religious and geographic representation.

**BoT By-Laws**

In December 2001, the Sarangani Community Development Foundation Inc. (SARCODFI) was legally constituted as a people’s organisation. On application for registration, SARCODFI chose to not use the “generic” by-laws prescribed by the government, but rather spent time in customising it to address the need for religious and ethnic representation. Article II on Trustees, Section 5 on Representation, states: “There shall always be at least one or more Muslim and one or more B’laan or any tribal group who shall be elected into the board of trustees provided he/she meets

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5 World Vision Transformational Development Framework Track III draft matrix on integration of peacebuilding.
the qualifications for an election to the board. Also, there shall be one representative from the youth and children’s sector.”

Transformation of ADP Coordinator, Area Leaders and Board of Trustees

Conversations with the ADP coordinator, area leaders and the board yielded interesting reflections. Though the ADP coordinator was initially reluctant to influence a change in electoral outcomes, she noted that “the decision that we took made the whole leadership more cohesive afterwards.” Although there is no direct causal link between changes in the BoT and increased ADP participation, World Vision staff note that since these changes, there has been increased attendance and participation from Muslim area leaders during project activities. More Muslim leaders are actively engaging with staff to discuss project activities. One Muslim area leader said she had much more faith in World Vision because it was able to see the needs of the Muslim communities. Many have commented that the ADP is a strong force for peace in Malapatan, building bridges of trust and a culture of participation and peace.

Postscript

The above case study was written in early 2001. A final project evaluation was conducted in June 2004 and led by Dr. Mohammed Abu Nimer of the American University, Washington, D.C. The evaluation team concluded that one significant contribution of the project was “being a successful mechanism to provide ‘space’ for tri-people interaction. Such intentional and constructive space has been a major factor in improving relations among area leaders and other community members.”

More specifically, the evaluation highlighted some key longer-term outcomes:

1. **Leadership preparation**: Area leaders are not just being trained to be members of the board. Rather, their capacity is being built to be better community leaders. Among the BoT, composition is more diverse than after the first election. This reflects three things: 1) increased representation from minority groups, 2) more confidence among minority groups that they would be respected as leaders and 3) more confidence from the majority group that they do indeed welcome leaders from different ethnicities and religions. This diversity combined with the decision to hire diverse staff has led to a shift in community perceptions about SARCODFI, which is no longer seen as exclusively in support of Christians but rather, as a faith-based organisation

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6 SARCODFI constitution and by-laws.
7 Other members of the evaluation team were Phoebe Maata and Ligaya Muñez.
8 Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Phoebe Maata and Ligaya Muñez, Summary for Centre of Learning (COL) Final Evaluation by Objectives and Outputs, June 2004, p. 12.
in support of all peoples. Community trust has increased based on key decisions and actions.

2. **Changes in how area leaders make decisions**: The evaluation report states, “area leaders clearly have been the most affected group [because of] LCP and conflict analysis activities.” During evaluation, area leaders reported several stories and anecdotes of how prejudice and stereotypes have been reduced due to “intensive and continuous monthly meetings and LCP trainings.” Area leaders facilitate most community organising. LCP training and increasing cooperation with other groups has led to a willingness by groups to enter communities that they would not have before. The report notes that “one of the major accomplishments of the [CoL] is the significant structural changes in the participation of various tribal groups in the ADP activities and organisation.”

3. **Impact on World Vision senior leadership**: The evaluation states: “In three years, through the work of LCP and ADP Sarangani, the challenge of widening its approach to include non-Christians in its staff has began. Sarangani is the first ADP in World Vision that has hired non-Christians in its ADP project staff. It is clear that LCP impact has triggered a series of reflections in World Vision and has challenged it to move from a Christian majority mindset towards a more inclusive approach of working with non-Christians based on a religious pluralistic approach.” More than 90% of World Vision staff members interviewed during the evaluation noted that the LCP approach strengthened their Christian identity since peace is core to the Christian faith and the experience of LCP has made them more aware and accepting of people from other faiths.

Though there is still a long way to go in terms of mainstreaming LCP into core organisational functions, the CoL in the Philippines has provided opportunity for World Vision staff from around the world to see how work in development contexts can contribute negatively or positively towards peace. These lessons learned have been the subject of numerous articles and case studies. Much personal and professional growth has taken place over the past four years. Change can be seen in the community of Malapatan and among World Vision staff in south-central Mindanao. Most importantly, lessons learned from the CoL have provided a unique opportunity for World Vision to get one step closer to its vision of peace for all communities of the Philippines.

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Chapter 5

Far-Reaching Reform: Integrating LCP in Local Government

Bonie S. Belonio Jr.

The Local Capacities for Peace (LCP) framework has become significant in the work of local governments in Sarangani Province, Mindanao, Philippines, since the establishment of World Vision’s LCP-Centre of Learning in the region in 2001. The Centre of Learning deliberately set out on a journey to learn whether a framework once designed for relief programmes could be experimented with to test its viability, efficacy and efficiency in the realm of development—this time engaging local government officials.

For development workers, improved delivery of services by local government means not only communities’ and families’ enhanced access to quality service, but also enhanced relationships that could decrease inter-group or communal tensions and the risk of violence that potentially threatens the sustainability of community development initiatives and capacity building. How LCP brought about paradigm change among local government officials, and how this shift of mind-set translated into concrete actions that positively affected decisions, priorities and service delivery of the local government, is the subject of this case study.

Lessons learned included the viability of Local Capacities for Peace to influence local government in the conduct of its business in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious setting. Additional learnings showcased how LCP functioned, as local government leaders undertook both personal and governance challenges to ensure that government services enhanced relationships of families and communities, thus reducing risks of communal and structural violence, and expanding possibilities for a just and peaceful society.

For detailed background on the context of this area, and on the work of World Vision in the Philippines, see the preceding chapter, “What Are We Trying to Develop?” by Abikök Riak.
Local Governance In Malapatan Municipality

Malapatan is one of the seven municipalities of Sarangani Province. World Vision operates in six barangays (villages) of Malapatan: Libi, Sapu Padidu, Sapu Masla, Tuyan, Patag and Lun Masla. The religious breakdown in Malapatan is estimated as follows: Christian 70% (including both indigenous B’laan and Visayan settlers) and Muslims 30% (including primarily Maguindanaons and a smaller number of Tausogs. In the context of local governance, sources of tension include the following:

Land ownership

As detailed in the preceding chapter, the protracted armed conflict in Mindanao is fuelled by the competition for land between indigenous tribes, Muslims and Visayan settlers. In Malapatan, disputes leading to loss of life and property are common. Many Muslims feel that the local government is not doing anything to solve land disputes, because this would threaten the current leaders’ tenure in office and access to fiscal resources.2

In 1997, landmark legislation to protect indigenous people and their ancestral domain was signed by President Fidel Ramos. The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA 8371)—known as the “Ancestral Domain Law”—was seen as a breakthrough for many indigenous groups grappling with ancestral domain claims. However, the government fell short in translating the new law to uplift the lives of indigenous people, particularly in addressing problems of ancestral domain. Making the matter worse, many indigenous people in the country do not know the IPRA law. Little effort has been expended to educate indigenous people, leading to confusion and conflicting interpretations. In fact, majority B’laans in barangays Sapu Padidu, Sapu Masla and Tuyan were not aware of the IPRA law. Government-disseminated information reached only tribal leaders and did not filter down to the grassroots. Reorganisation in the government’s Office of Cultural Minorities has been cited as one reason for this. Some government appointees intended to serve as representatives in the said office are not true-blooded lumads (an indigenous person by birth), and hence, not surprisingly, have not adequately advocated for indigenous people.

Nepotism and favoritism in local and municipal government

A common expression among ordinary people towards people in power: “If you are near the heart, you have access; if you have relatives in position, you are fortunate.” Barangay captains in barangays Sapu Padidu, Sapu Masla and Tuyan are Muslims, but one Muslim LCP participant said that in his barangay, nepotism and favouritism

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2 See chapter 4, “What Are We Trying to Develop?”
is very evident in local government and economic structures. When he applied for construction work, he was rejected time and again although he was qualified for the work, because he was competing with barangay officials’ relatives. Other Muslims in that workshop reported similar experiences. They said that at the municipal level, employees hired are relatives of the mayor or other municipal officials, even if they are not college graduates.

Illegal logging

In barangays Tuyan and Sapu Masla, the presence of illegal loggers is very evident. One Muslim Imam cited many powerful Muslims in government who own chain saws. Chain saws are used to cut trees in the mountains. Barangay Tuyan experiences flooding during heavy rain because of the dwindling number of trees in its upland areas. Although community people fight against the illegal cutting down of trees, especially the B’laans living in the mountains, they fear for their lives. Some who boldly opposed this illegal activity have been murdered. Tension between the B’laans in the mountains and lowland settlers continues to persist because of unabated cutting of trees.

Unfair distribution of government projects and services at municipal and barangay levels

Although most barangays in the municipality are accessible to land transportation, other social infrastructure and services—the government’s primary and elementary schools, health clinics, barangay hall offices—are concentrated around the barangay centre. Visayans populate the centres. In remote communities without access roads, B’laans must walk for hours to the nearest health center or school. The B’laans see this as evidence of unfairness and inequality considering the high illiteracy rate among B’laans. One B’laan pastor said his group had requested road improvements from government agencies several times, but these requests were denied.

A barangay official in Sapu Padidu also commented that sometimes approved budgets are either re-aligned in favor of other projects or diverted to other areas depending on the whims of people in power. This explains in part why some B’laans have joined rebels called B’laan Bandido and the communist New People’s Army.

LCP Training for Local Government Leaders

Since the beginning of ADP Sarangani operations in Malapatan, Sarangani Province, communities around the municipality have grown vibrant, against all odds (many of which are cited above). Community activities undertaken by Sarangani
Community Development Foundation Inc. (SARCODFI) stirred sleepy neighbourhoods that included patches of mono-ethnic and mixed-ethnic settlements. SARCODFI started child sponsorship in six barangays in 1999 and expanded its services to cover health development, education, micro-enterprise development, water development and values transformation.

When the Local Capacities for Peace Centre of Learning Project was introduced in 2000, the area development programme (ADP) was already implementing analysis of its services’ impact on conflict in the locality. World Vision, for its part, had grown increasingly sensitive to perceptions that its Christian identity was a potential divider in a multi-faith community. The ADP has since become very intentional in demonstrating genuine inclusivity and in working towards involvement of all groups in the community. Capacity-building activities related to LCP were provided to project leaders and staff. SARCODFI’s organisational structure and by-laws were amended to provide representation of the three main ethnic groups on the project’s board of trustees. These and other changes were designed to allow interests and issues of various groups in the area to be considered throughout the entire development process of the ADP. LCP assessments would also help provide information and feedback for the ADP to learn whether its projects exacerbate existing tensions in the community rather than strengthen local capacities for peace.

Recognising essential roles of religious leaders and local government officials in achieving its mission, the ADP, through the Local Capacities for Peace Project, offered LCP workshops to local government officials—mostly municipal council members, heads of municipal offices, barangay captains and barangay councillors. Two workshops were conducted, the first in August 2003 and the other in January 2004. The 2003 workshop included 37 government officials as participants. Of this number, 10 were Maguindanaon Muslims, 12 B’laans and 15 Visayan Christian settlers. The group was receptive towards the framework and upbeat in integrating the concept in decision making and in the implementation of services. In January 2004, workshop participants initially expressed similar receptivity to the framework, also acknowledging its relevance in local governance.

In both workshops, trainers and participants initially grappled with the relevance of the framework to the work of the local government, because the framework was designed for relief experience and many illustrations and categories were culled and labeled from relief scenarios. This required trainers to dig into their own development experience to contextualise examples of how aid can exacerbate or lessen existing tensions in communities. Tracing these experiences and adapting the framework with suitable categories required major preparation. As for participants, initial impressions that the LCP framework might be irrelevant gave way to discus-
sions and sharing at a deeper level. At that point, participants tended to grow more willing to accept the framework as flexible enough to apply to day-to-day affairs at the barangay and municipal levels. Genuine appreciation grew as group members discovered ways in which the framework could further assist their planning, implementation and evaluation activities in the community.

With this introduction of LCP, local officials realised that much of their programming failed to look into the context of conflict in the area, as well as the impact of programmes on relationships between people groups. During the workshops, these leaders readily identified “connectors” and “dividers” in their own village or in the municipality as a whole. They were asked to identify one project they helped to implement in the same village or municipality, and to detail approaches and methodologies used. Each then analysed the impact of this project on existing connectors and dividers earlier identified.

Two prominent projects examined were a multi-purpose solar drier project in one barangay and a “plant now, pay later” project of the municipal government. Groups analysed both projects regarding how they strengthened existing connectors or increased existing tensions or dividers. The group as a whole realised that the multi-purpose solar drier project enhanced convergence of people of different ethnic groups, providing a public space where farmers dry copra products, youth hold goodwill basketball games, and the community at-large celebrates barangay Foundation Day and sponsors other social gatherings, assemblies and consultations.

On the other hand, although the municipal government’s “plant now, pay later” project was acknowledged for augmenting income and living conditions of farmers in the municipality, the group as a whole identified flaws in its established guidelines and criteria. One municipal councillor said, “Our programme of agro-forestry favoured the landed because of the way we set the criteria for the beneficiaries. We required land titles for those interested in our fruit tree seedling dispersal project, as an evidence of land ownership. However, we realise now that we are just enriching the capacity of those who already have land. What about the B’laans who never have land titles to show? What about the tenants who are willing to avail of the programme?” Some heads of offices in the municipality also recognised that many programmes similarly exacerbated existing tension between and among the tri-people in the area. These leaders committed to look into these programmes further once they got back into their respective offices and to conduct necessary reviews and adjustments, an outcome that they said emanated from their participation in the workshop.
LCP in Barangay Lun Masla

ADP Sarangani both directly and indirectly shares the essence of Local Capacities for Peace among families and local government officials as it facilitates development in its target communities. By ensuring equal distribution of resources and representation of each existing tribe, the LCP-CoL transmits the message of equal opportunities and shared resources. This has influenced local governments’ facilitation of business, since people in local communities have become more conscious of the LCP approach. Local government officials have also participated in training on Local Capacities for Peace that directly influences their understanding and work with the communities.

Miller Esparagoza, a Visayan Christian barangay captain in Lun Masla, embraced LCP early on. Elected for three terms by his own constituents, this village chief experienced a personal transformation when introduced to LCP. As a former military enlisted man, Esparagoza used to bring in his military background and experience in running affairs of the barangay. “Before, I used to decide things on my own: I instruct people what to do and expect them to follow me. Plans in the barangay council are based on my own perception of things. I plan what’s best for the people in my village….” His 17 years of military experience was a big influence on the kind of leadership he exercised during his term.

In 2003, Esparagoza participated in LCP training conducted by the ADP for local government leaders of Malapatan. After intensely engaging in workshop discussions on existing barangay issues, he became convinced of the value of LCP and started to apply the framework in local governance.

“LCP has opened my eyes in the way local government leaders should facilitate development in areas where more than two ethnic groups exist,” he said after the workshop training. “There is a need to carefully analyse where resources are put and who benefits from them, since this may create tensions among the various groups in the area.”

Going back to his usual business in the council, Esparagoza immediately influenced reforms in planning and implementation approaches. Before the annual budget was finalised and submitted to the municipal government, he consulted with purok\(^3\) leaders throughout his village. He presented draft plans and sought their ideas and comments. “There were no community consultations before. People were just recipients of the things we agreed to in the council,” Esparagoza related. “What we feel are their needs carries into the annual budget plans of the barangay.

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\(^3\) A purok is a cluster of households.
But this time, we realised that this was not good because it does not reflect the real needs and sentiments of the people. That is why we have to consult the people.” The village chief admitted that he had not been transparent in the way he handled affairs of the barangay before. He acknowledged that he had not wanted the council to question the basis of decisions he made. This past behaviour had created tension within the barangay council and cost him potential allies within the group.

“One of my significant learnings with LCP is the need for transparency,” he says now. “As a barangay captain, I have to be transparent in my decisions to the members of the council. This is the only way in which I can gain their support and trust in order to ease the tension that exist amongst us. I realised that my attitudes have become a divider in the group. With the change of approach, I have slowly gotten the support of my colleagues.”

As a result of Esparagoza’s personal and public transformation, the council’s committees have become functional again. There is renewed hope and optimism among members of the council. The group started to institutionalise the prioritisation of plans and the implementation of activities. Before approval of a project, the council carefully deliberates to ensure that project beneficiaries have not frequently availed of government services in the past in ways that encourage resource inequalities. If a certain community receives projects either from the national government or from development NGOs, it becomes a lesser priority for the council. In fact, every development project provided by external agencies that needs the council’s approval must undergo the same prioritisation process. As a result, many council projects accrue benefits to previously marginalised upland communities composed mostly of B’laans.

In barangay elections during May 2003, many B’laans in Lun Masla participated in the elections for the first time. Miller and his council members painstakingly facilitated the registration of hundreds of B’laans during voter registration in preparation for the elections. The council provided vehicles to transport people from homes in remote villages to registration precincts located in the lowlands. Council members tapped tribal chieftains to explain the need for villagers to vote and exercise their rights of suffrage. The council also hired educated B’laans to assist in filling out registration forms. Asked during a focus group discussion whether they hoped to gain political mileage by this action, council members explained that their motives arose from LCP consideration of B’laan families living in far-flung communities who have long been deprived of the opportunity to vote and be involved in the chance to choose their preferred leaders to run the government. “It was a reflection arising from one of our discussions during the LCP training,” a council member said.
Implementation of government projects in the community have increasingly been coordinated with local tribal or religious leaders, especially in predominantly B’laan or Maguindanaon Muslim communities. The LCP approach led to purposeful involvement of these informal community leaders—who wield so much influence among ethnic groups in the area—to help in delivering government services. Barangay council members recognised that local religious leaders play a pivotal role in maintaining peaceable co-existence of ethnic groups in the area. Making them part of project implementation would ensure that resources delivered by the government would undergo scrutiny and decision making not only by the council, but also by local religious leaders. The majority of council members who undertook LCP training argued that existing systems and practices in the community connecting people should be recognised and strengthened.

“One of the main reasons there’s relative peace in the municipality is the strong sense of respect of the people to their respective religious leaders, who are seen as their link to reach out to other ethnic and religious groups,” according to Esparagoza. “There are strong inter-faith relations established in the area, and the local governments just have to recognise that in order to maintain the peace in our communities.”

Similarly, the barangay justice council also underwent vital changes. Composition of the council was expanded to ensure equitable representation from the three major ethnic and religious groups in the locality. The reforms paved the way for increased numbers of B’laans and Maguindanaon Muslims in the barangay justice council. Many disputes now—especially those between tribes or ethnic groups—are readily settled by the council and no longer reach the village chief.

Captain Esparagoza stressed that local government leaders should serve as frontline connectors to people in the community. Prior to LCP training, local government often aggravated existing tension and conflict in the community by the way community development was facilitated, especially in distribution of resources and access to basic services. Government officials were at times not even conscious of favouring one group of people in the community. To avoid heightening tension or escalating conflict, he suggested, local governments should address the real problems of the people. He now believes that consultation with people is the best way to good governance and that local government should give utmost priority to the plight of marginalised groups, particularly indigenous people, poor families and depressed communities, in order to avoid communal or ethnic violence. If local government fails to uplift living conditions of families in these areas, or continues to deprive a group or groups of people, then locales may have to grapple with increased criminality and potential ethnic violence in the future.
Asked about his own dealings with conflict after the training, Esparagoza said, “I got important principles in settling disputes from my own understanding of the concept of Local Capacities for Peace. Before, I was harsh with my words when made to settle disagreements between persons or families in my village. I didn’t care what I said to them. I didn’t have patience and my word was the law. My being a former military man explained why I used to act and behave in that manner when asked to settle disputes. But now that I have undergone this training, I realised that what I have been doing in the past when it comes to my role as mediator didn’t actually help in easing the problem and tension between conflicting parties. It didn’t help redeem the persons concerned. With this, I’ve learned to become patient. I make sure that I have time to listen to each side to ensure that my decision will not unnecessarily favor one party. I have become conscious of my own attitude so as not to further increase the tension between the parties.”

Analysis of Multi-Level Transformation

The changes in barangay Lun Masla are the most far-reaching impacts to date of LCP on local governance in Malapatan Municipality. Yet they are illustrative of a broader change process involving neighbouring barangays. These changes begin at the level of individual transformation and can culminate in genuine institutional reform.

Change in Attitudes and Behaviours of Individual Government Leaders

A number of barangay officials trained in LCP experienced paradigm shifts that eventually manifested in changed behaviours and attitudes. Consciousness of their own actions and attitudes towards their constituents and people groups has become a primary concern. Now aware of implications of their own actions and attitudes, they became more cautious and deliberate in dealings with people so as not to create or exacerbate existing tensions, especially between ethnic groups. They also are more likely to look for ways in which they can strengthen identified connectors between people in their area.

In barangay Sapu Padido, the Maguindanaon Muslim village chieftain abandoned his illegal logging activities and convinced other chainsaw operators to do the same. He said that by setting an example, he doesn’t have difficulty telling others to follow suit. His decision to drop his illegal activities was greeted with optimism by B’laans, who have strongly opposed unabated cutting of trees in the mountains by people from the lowlands as this threatens their livelihood and existence. This village chieftain’s constituents also noticed his change of heart. Before, he reportedly easily erupted in anger when things did not meet his expectations, but now he has
grown more patient in dealing with people. He also started to facilitate provision of financial support through the barangay council to Christian religious activities such as a fiesta celebration and an organisation of Christian youths in the village.

Similar changes occurred in barangay Patag. The female barangay captain in the area recognised the importance of consulting the three major people groups in her village, namely the Visayan Christians, Maguindanaon Muslims and the B’laans. She made rounds of visits to their leaders to listen and consult about their problems and sentiments. She plans to continue this regularly so that no group is left out of the process.

In Libi, one of Malapatan’s interior villages where the majority are B’laan, the village head is convinced that his LCP learning will go a long way in changing his attitudes towards B’laan elders and other ethnic groups who are a minority in the area. A B’laan himself, he once neglected tribal elders in running the affairs of the barangay and belittled their capacities, creating tension and marginalising a strength of his own culture. He now reaches out to these elders and to the Visayan minority in the area, encouraging them to get involved in barangay affairs. In the council, he advocates for equal treatment of other ethnic groups living in the area.

**Changes in Approaches and Strategies of Local Government**

Personal changes experienced by local government leaders have influenced their strategies and approaches in governance. Officials who have undertaken LCP training echoed the need to institutionalise the process of consultation down to the lowest unit of governance—the *puroks*—as purok consultations are perhaps the best avenue by which numerous members of various ethnic groups can speak their minds. This realisation has been prevalent in each series of LCP trainings conducted among various local government officials.

Purok consultations, with representatives from tri-people, have become regular fixtures in the community. They are now very prominent in Sapu Padidu, Patag and Libi barangays. The consultations have become a point of convergence for existing ethnic groups, thereby increasing tolerance and understanding between and among them. The consultations are a venue also at which government officials can respond to and clarify issues presented by the people. This process not only brings government closer to the people, but also reduces misconceptions about the way government handles its affairs in depressed communities.

Consultation has also been institutionalised at the level of the barangay council. Recognising a need to provide equal opportunities to members of the council,
barangay captains now see to it that consultation processes are observed before decisions are made.

“There is now an enormous awareness of the need to provide equal opportunities for every council member to speak what is on their minds,” said Zenaida Lorejas, barangay captain of Patag. “Although we differ in opinions, we respect each other. In the end, we go for what is best for the community, especially in ensuring that the three ethnic groups are best served.” This process guarantees that council members from minority ethnic groups in the area have a chance to share their minds and influence group decisions. Lorejas further related that this change resulted in more deliberately seeking opinions of ethnic representatives in the council, something not done in the past. A developing culture of openness and acceptance now shapes the council, in contrast with the previous culture of dominance by vocal and educated individuals.

Prevailing awareness among local officials of the LCP framework created a shift in the way the council appropriates government projects and services, reaching out to areas that haven’t been reached by the government in the past. The most deprived and neglected B’laans in mountain villages now receive this attention from their local leaders. Many local leaders in the area agreed that problems of peace and order in the hinterlands—especially banditry—are a result of government neglect of the people living in the mountains. These residents, often B’laans, have been deprived of government social services, especially education. In a farm-to-market road project of Sapu Padido, local officials invited bandits to participate in construction of a road that would provide farmers with easy access to deliver products to the market. The group responded and worked alongside paramilitary volunteers from the community until the project was completed. Prior government neglect, resulting in lack of access to basic social services and absence of opportunities to participate and be heard, oftentimes led people to develop sentiments against the government.

Reform of Local Institutions

One of the most visible structural changes instituted by local government officials after LCP was introduced occurred in the composition of the barangay justice council—the *Lupong Tagapamayapa*. The council, whose members are appointed mostly by the barangay captain, was expanded to include representatives of other ethnic and religious groups. Most members of the barangay justice council once came from dominant ethnic groups in the community. Changes provided for more appropriate representation of other ethnic groups.

The inclusion of three tribes in the council has enhanced the decisiveness and quality of its decisions in resolving disputes, especially those involving families of
different ethnicities. Representation of the tribes ensured good interpretations of involved parties’ beliefs, customs and backgrounds that are significant and material in the settlement of conflict. Still, the council recognises existing traditional ways of settling disputes by respective tribes when conflict arises among families of the same ethnicity.

Lessons Learned

Recognising the role of local government in improving the lives of people in the community, particularly the deprived, oppressed and marginalised, World Vision continues its mission in influencing the way local governments provide basic social services and in upholding issues of justice and peace among all people. Valuing people and human dignity, World Vision believes that through its ADP approach, it can do much to encourage transformation of the hearts and minds of local government leaders. This is the organisational context in which Local Capacities for Peace is introduced to local governments.

World Vision Philippines set out to learn how much influence the framework could yield in the political system of local government in a multi-ethnic community setting like Malapatan. Clearly, changes experienced by local government leaders in Malapatan, as influenced by their understanding of Local Capacities for Peace, has been promising—not only in reduction of potential risk of communal or ethnic violence in the locality, but also in fostering improved relationships among Visayan Christians, Maguindanaon Muslims and the B’laans.

1. **LCP is applicable to local government policy and planning.** The LCP tool has transcended its original audience—first humanitarian assistance and more recently development workers—and has demonstrated its relevance to local government leaders. Even when LCP is presented in humanitarian terms, local government leaders are able to grasp and apply core concepts to their own situations. To further enhance impact, a special version of LCP “customised” for local government use could be considered in the future.

2. **Small amounts of training can lead to significant change.** LCP training was conducted twice for government leaders in Malapatan municipality, and most participating leaders attended only one workshop. Translation of written LCP materials into the local dialect is not yet complete. Yet many trainees have grasped LCP core concepts and put them into action, leading to significant change at the grassroots level. This is possible because the trainees generally have a significant amount of authority within their local spheres. When they see an opportunity
for local improvement, they have authority to act on it. However, their influence over provincial or national policy is quite limited. And in more decentralised bureaucratic contexts, LCP-inspired changes are likely to develop more slowly.

3. **LCP can help to inspire good governance.** This case illustrates how LCP-inspired changes in Malapatan municipality were compatible with recognised principles of democratic “good governance”: enfranchisement of voters, representation, consultation and appropriate allocation of resources for the common good. Further, actions taken by local government leaders to support tribal elders and religious leaders appear to illustrate an organic recognition of the key role of civil society.

4. **Leadership is key.** Significant change in the way local government works and delivers services to its people depends heavily on leaders at the helm. Change in a leader’s paradigm or mind-set is critical in ensuring that good governance is achieved. For development practitioners, this personal transformation is key to the success of its collaborative action with local government and the extent to which an agency or NGO can influence the way local government facilitates the process of development in the community. If local government leaders continue to dictate or impose their will upon constituents, this will stifle participation by the people, thereby creating tension with development agencies, whose business is people empowerment. This may lead to further divisions in an already ethno-centred community. Willingness of a community leader to change mind-set and attitude for the general welfare of people is crucial before lasting changes in systems and processes can ever take place.

5. **LCP can co-exist with politics.** There is no doubt that electoral considerations may influence how a local government leader responds to insights gained through LCP analysis. Yet many show a willingness to prioritise community welfare. Change in barangay councils’ approaches in order to reach out to a neglected group or people group has been a painstaking process, requiring profound openness to new insights and deep commitment among council members. Such changes in strategy require members to go out of their “comfort zone” and be ready to labour in the course of implementation. However, most leaders are well aware of the stakes if neglect continues. LCP training provided them a tool to analyse implications of their work in the context of conflict. As one participant said, “How can we achieve development in our communities when there is ‘unpeace’ brought by continuing divisions among ethnic groups perpetuated by the unequal treatment of the government in the delivery of its services?”
As expressed by former barangay captain Esparagoza, “My platform of government when I ran for a seat in the municipal council was to provide quality service to people in the highlands, especially in health. Because of the lack of ambulance, medicines and blood donors, many of the patients died before they reached the municipal centre. This platform of government was influenced by my learning of LCP, which drove me to bring out the importance for government to cater to the needs of those that haven’t been reached out to.” Esparagoza’s emphasis on government’s responsibility to provide quality social service to marginalised groups got him elected to a three-year term as a municipal councillor.

LCP can help bring people closer to their government. With local government units’ changed priorities—reaching out to long-neglected areas and communities—people in these areas have acquired a new sense of hope in government as they have become a focal point of government services, something not experienced in the past. This change was evident in Lun Masla, when Esparagoza provided more attention to the B’laans in the hinterland, especially in giving them opportunities to participate in the electoral process, as well as in providing medical services for them. As a result, many B’laans previously identified as engaged in lawless activities have given up their illegal activities and returned to lives in which they can make positive contributions to their communities.

6. **Sustainability.** Sustaining use of LCP concepts as a tool in enhancing delivery of local government services requires not only structural reforms, but also continuous and sustained education of local government leaders and community members. Creating an environment where people have a high level of awareness of the LCP framework can drive government and community leaders to ensure that resources are responsibly allocated, that voices of common people are heard and represented, and that policies are acceptable to various groups of people in the locality.

There is a need to continue building LCP advocates in the community. Experiences like those of Esparagoza can’t be successfully replicated without “LCP disciples” like those council members he has mentored in the local barangay council. The more LCP “converts” there are, the more likely it is that use of the LCP framework in local governance will be sustained.

Introduction of LCP to the development field has provided needed impetus for local government to test the framework. What was once a tool in enhancing relief projects has proven to provide a significant impact in how local governments should
conduct business with its own people. This case demonstrates how important it is for government leaders to recognise existing tensions and conflict in their areas, both latent and manifested.

Finally, vital in the process of training more LCP practitioners is the so-called “conversion” of local leaders regarding recognising the value of the framework to enhance programming and delivery of quality service to clients. If key people in the community, organisations or groups embrace LCP concepts “by heart,” changes in processes, structures, policies, dynamics and organisational cultures are expected to take place. These changes provide recognition, realisation and true transformational empowerment to people’s or people groups’ desires and needs for a better life, thereby reducing risks of tensions leading to inter-group or communal violence.
MAINSTREAMING Local Capacities for Peace assumes adopting the practice at the organisational (or institutional) level. The term *mainstreaming* refers to the process of implementing a new practice or idea, from the first introductory phase through to making its use commonplace in the organisation. Yet how mainstreaming happens has not been very well understood. A case study of two area development programmes (ADPs) in Indonesia that successfully adopted LCP and have effectively integrated LCP mainstreaming may be helpful in understanding the process in more depth.

Diffusion of innovation theory, as developed by Everett Rogers,\(^1\) provides a useful perspective for understanding how LCP mainstreaming can occur. Evaluations of the LCP Integration Project\(^2\) and LCP Centre of Learning Project\(^3\) in World Vision Indonesia's ADPs both used diffusion of innovation concepts as a lens through

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2. M. Adnan Anwar, Wildan Pramudya, Desty T. Ginting, “Evaluation Report,” November 2004 (draft). This evaluation was conducted in the West Sumba area of NTT province, in eastern Indonesia. This evaluation occurred at the end of a three-year initiative at the ADP level.

3. Michelle Garred, Allen Harder and Andreas Sihotang, “Evaluation Report,” November 2003 (draft), March 2004 (final). This evaluation was conducted in ADP Banggai, a district of Central Sulawesi province in central-eastern Indonesia. The LCP Centre of Learning has been in operation since 2001. See also the case study in Chapter 2, “Becoming Inclusive: Long-Term Benefits of LCP in Programme Strategy,” by Andreas Sihotang and Terry Silalahi.
which observations were made. This approach is yielding some fruitful lessons in describing LCP mainstreaming in Indonesia.  

Key lessons from the experience of these ADPs about the LCP mainstreaming process at community and ADP levels include how LCP meets the requirements needed for an innovative practice to be successfully adopted. Various stages that LCP as a new innovation goes through as it becomes fully mainstreamed over time are identified. Communication processes that engage multiple actors in LCP mainstreaming are described. Implications for an agency wishing to mainstream LCP practice are then briefly discussed. (The following case study does not address the details of using LCP for assessment, monitoring or evaluation purposes, where successfully using LCP is not dependent on systematic adoption at the programme-wide level.)

I. Elements that Influence Mainstreaming LCP

An innovation is an idea, practice or product perceived as new. “Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system. Diffusion is a special type of communication concerned with the spread of messages that are perceived as new ideas.” Since the term “dissemination” is similar to “innovation” and is more familiar, the term “dissemination” will be used instead.

Four main elements influence if, or how quickly, an innovation will be adopted.

1. The characteristic of the innovation itself: its (a) complexity, (b) trialability, (c) compatibility, (d) relative advantage, and (e) observability. LCP is an innovative practice applied by World Vision to reducing conflict and strengthening capacities for peace in the context of transformational community development.

2. The chosen communication channel, or the means used to introduce and guide the dissemination (or diffusion) process. The process of awareness-raising, training and applying LCP makes up the basics of communicating LCP.

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4 Assessing LCP from the Diffusion of Innovation theory perspective is still at a “hypothesis development” stage and would require a more intensive research approach to fully verify the findings. However, these findings, though tentative, are very encouraging.

3. The innovation process occurs over time—including the decision-making process—through five innovation stages: (a) knowledge/awareness, (b) interest/persuasion, (c) evaluation/trial/decision, (d) implementation and (e) confirmation. LCP adoption also occurs through a repeated process of conceptualisation, operationalisation and personalisation.6

4. The social system in which decisions about an innovation are made—this includes opinion leaders, the social structure (i.e., ethnic/religious structures, the local/settler mix, etc.), and the change agent who promotes LCP (i.e., the LCP coordinator).

Along with characteristics of innovation processes, we also need to consider characteristics of the innovator—who is willing to take the risk and has an inclination to adopt LCP as a new practice.

The concept of critical mass (i.e., the amount large enough to produce a particular result) is interesting for learning about LCP mainstreaming. Has LCP adoption achieved the minimal 15% critical mass needed before it will “take off”?

1. Characteristics of LCP as an Innovative Practice

The evaluations of the two LCP mainstreaming projects in World Vision Indonesia demonstrate that LCP practice7 fulfills the basic characteristics for relatively easy mainstreaming. Observations indicate that LCP is relatively simple to understand and use. “The essence of LCP can be explained and grasped in less than five minutes—any new idea worth its salt should be this easy.”8 Once people have been trained in using the LCP framework, it can be easily tried on a limited scale for testing before being fully implemented. The evaluations found that LCP’s “divider” and “connector” concepts were already known among community leaders and that the principle of “Do No Harm” reflected existing core cultural values. Initial cultural sensitivities regarding discussing conflict in the community could be overcome, and further analysis established that LCP practice is culturally compatible. LCP’s relative advantage was demonstrated in focus group discussions with ADP Banggai Project Committee members and staff, during which numerous comments described how LCP had given participants a practical tool to put their aspirations into action. A staff member declared, “If we find LCP useful, we’ll use it. If not,

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7 LCP practice includes cognitive processes, practical application of what is known and an internalising at the gut feeling level. Personal internalisation of LCP distinguishes “LCP practice” from “LCP tool.”
8 Interview with Wynn Flaten, World Vision Indonesia director of operations.
we’ll leave it.”

Finally, the evaluations confirmed that when LCP put a practical tool into the hands of ADP staff and community leaders, it could be easily put to use. The benefits of using LCP are easily observed and the community can readily notice improvements.

The chart following illustrates that LCP, as a relatively new practice when applied to development, fulfills the basic requirements for successful innovation. There are, however, some differences between how communities and ADPs perceive the process. Different contexts produce different but compatible results.

### Observations on LCP as “Innovatable” Practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics Influencing the Rate of Adoption</th>
<th>Disseminating LCP at the Community Level</th>
<th>Disseminating LCP at the ADP Staff Level</th>
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</table>
| **Complexity:**
The less complex an innovation is to understand and use, the more easily it will be adopted. | • Many WV field motivators and community stakeholders acknowledge that as a practice, LCP is relatively simple and easily understood and applied.  
• A limiting factor occurs when various understandings of how to use LCP are held by field staff —but in general, a common understanding prevailed regarding “dividers” and “connectors” in community life and the “Do No Harm” concept. | • LCP concepts, including community-based assessment methods, are easily understood, but they are more complex to implement when balanced against other programme priorities and methodologies. However, redesigning a project or an approach according to LCP principles has been seen to be doable.  
• The level of complexity increases for management staff when LCP is expected to be incorporated into management structures (i.e., design, monitoring and evaluation structures), budgeting, and reporting formats established by the head office. |

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9 Focus group discussion with ADP Banggai staff.

10 This assessment was not applied to the national level.

11 Adapted from the LCP Integration Project evaluation report and expanded to include data from LCP Centre of Learning evaluation results.
### Characteristics Influencing the Rate of Adoption

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Disseminating LCP at the Community Level</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Trialability:</strong></td>
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<td><em>The more easily an innovation can be tried out on a limited scale first, the more easily it can be fully adopted after the trial period.</em></td>
<td><em>Initial recommendations from LCP assessments that are <strong>manageable in scope</strong> but thoroughgoing—e.g., changing meeting venues, developing sensitivities to food values, etc., to reduce dividers and increase connectors—are more likely to be acted upon as doable.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• LCP was successfully applied to planning and implementing small-scale community activities, which had a positive impact on a relationship problem experienced by the community.</td>
<td>• Similar cultural sensitivities apply at the ADP level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• LCP was applied at a <strong>manageable micro-level</strong>, e.g., developing an uncomplicated infrastructure project, such as water piping, road or bridge building, doable at a limited scale.</td>
<td>• Compatibility with stated organisational goals (and mandates) provided the ADP with encouragement needed to take the risk of adopting a new management practice. Using LCP practice is now an expectation at the national level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compatibility:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>An innovation must be compatible with social norms, beliefs, values and mandate (for an organisation).</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In principle, introduction of LCP did not meet any significant <strong>cultural barriers</strong> on the field. In fact, LCP principles—albeit with a different articulation—already are known in the community.</td>
<td>• Similar cultural sensitivities apply at the ADP level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A factor hindering implementing LCP is how to articulate “divider” factors that are <strong>considered culturally sensitive</strong> in a society that tends to be “harmony” oriented. The potential barrier can be overcome by sensitive facilitation.</td>
<td>• Compatibility with stated organisational goals (and mandates) provided the ADP with encouragement needed to take the risk of adopting a new management practice. Using LCP practice is now an expectation at the national level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Characteristics Influencing the Rate of Adoption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disseminating LCP at the Community Level</th>
<th>Disseminating LCP at the ADP Staff Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relative Advantage:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>An innovation must produce an advantage sufficient to balance the risk or cost.</em></td>
<td><em>Developing a synergy between LCP and ADP programme priorities has been shown to provide higher capacity to achieve programme goals.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Community leaders state that LCP helps the community members to more easily understand their context and points them towards solutions to deal with their conflicts and tensions.</td>
<td>- A prerequisite for perceiving relative advantage is a felt need or strong motive for taking conflict seriously and “doing no harm.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- LCP has given field staff members a “new” perspective to make their field work easier.</td>
<td>- LCP has given field staff members a “new” perspective to make their field work easier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observability:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Results of an innovation must be easily observable and felt.</em></td>
<td><em>For ADP management staff, the “pay-off” for their investment in LCP was most observable at the community level and in changed attitudes and behaviours among ADP staff—i.e., personalisation of LCP resulted in a paradigm shift.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Programme changes resulting from using the LCP approach delivered an observable quick “pay-off” for the community in terms of more inclusive behaviours, new beneficiaries, improved community cooperation, healthier community life, new cooperative initiatives emerging from the community, etc.</td>
<td>- One obstacle is the length of time required and the considerable investment of effort before benefits are observable at the programme-wide level. Having a dedicated, specialised “change agent” (LCP staff) maintained momentum until results were discernable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- LCP processes that are transparent generate trust over time. It is now accepted that if a project activity excludes one group, it will be offset by another project activity that includes the group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The chart shows that considerably more effort and time is required for World Vision programme staff to fully accept and apply LCP than is required for leaders of the village-level self-help groups that partner with World Vision. The “pay off” for the self-help group (results compared with effort) is much quicker than for the programme staff. The staff members have many more factors to consider, most of which are technical and administrative. In spirit, however, both the self-help groups and the programme staff find LCP useful and beneficial.

2. Communication Channels—The Process of Dissemination

Numerous informal and formal communication processes are required for a new practice to be successfully adopted. The classic communication process involves a) the sender of the message, b) the medium which conveys the message, c) the recipient and d) the feedback mechanisms which confirm that the recipient has correctly perceived the message.

The evaluations identified both informal and formal processes of effectively communicating LCP. A number of useful informal communication strategies were documented:

- LCP has been promoted by WV Indonesia as a necessary means to counteract rising tensions and conflicts in the area development programmes. LCP also provided a significant framework for the operation of relief programmes in post-conflict areas to continuously assess the context of conflict.

- Senior leadership effectively “marketed” LCP in meetings attended by key programme staff. The support of the Peacebuilding Unit staff was key to keeping the LCP agenda “on the plate” at the national office level.

- Area Development Programme Banggai field staff effectively promoted its findings and LCP experience in post-LCP assessment debriefing meetings involving senior-level operations staff.

- Continual informal discussions occurred at staff team meetings and with beneficiaries, initiated by the “change agent” — the Centre of Learning coordinator.

- Programme staff and community leaders shared with peers their personal experiences and insights about the usefulness of LCP.

Formal communication mechanisms took several forms:

- Publishing articles in Banggai and in the national office internal media.

- Producing case studies and concept pieces on LCP mainstreaming.
• Translating key LCP materials into the Indonesian language and making them available, e.g., *Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace—or War* and its companion piece, *Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field Experiences*.

LCP trainings are also formal communication strategies. Observations from the Centre of Learning suggest how effective training can facilitate mainstreaming:

• If the formal three-day LCP training was preceded by a number of less formal exposures (or awareness-raising events) dealing with conflict issues in the LCP, training was much less threatening and more palatable—a key element in acceptability.

• Contextualised training materials, simplified and adapted to the needs of participants, promoted quicker acceptance. For example, participants responded to case studies they could relate to their own experience of connectors and dividers, in terms of location, type of conflict and type of programme being implemented. Minimising abstract thinking at the grassroots level enhanced adoptability.

• Doing a field assessment as an LCP practicum shortly after a training was key to helping field staff and community leaders directly experience the value of the training.

The Centre of Learning evaluation uncovered the significance of programme staff “personalising” LCP. To see how this occurred and enhanced mainstreaming, we identified three interactive communication processes at work:

• **Conceptualisation**—the cognitive process of learning the LCP framework—acquired through awareness-raising and trainings.

• **Operationalisation**—practical application of what has been learned—through field assessments, developing and implementing recommendations, designing activities to mitigate conflict, and institutionalizing LCP in the programming cycle.

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14 These processes do not originate with Rogers’ innovation theory; they were developed by Collaborative for Development Action, which uses this framework more at the institutional level (CDA Interagency Consultation Notes, November 2001). This report has applied these interactions at personal and team levels.
• **Personalisation**—the “affective,” or emotional, process by which LCP becomes the paradigm, or worldview, transforming the individual in a personal way. This occurred where benefits of LCP were experienced personally and when these experiences and insights were shared with peers. Staff related changes in the way they viewed their context, from family life to organisational and community life. These interactive processes are cumulative, and each is dependent on appropriate, supportive communication channels.

The communication processes described above are compatible with the stages of innovation adoption described below. Adding the element of time contributes a key to understanding the scope of how LCP adoption occurs.

3. **Phases of Mainstreaming—The Element of Time**

Innovative practices take time to move from initial introduction to full implementation. It is helpful to understand that mainstreaming requires time, and that the process typically requires several phases. The “S-Curve of Adoption Rate Over Time” graph, adapted from Roger’s theory, illustrates how an innovative practice gradually gains momentum over time as it becomes more acceptable and more widely practised by more people. The illustration shows that critical mass is achieved after a period of slow adoption. After that, the adoption rate escalates more quickly.

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15 Rogers, Diffusion, p. 257.
The goal of early phases of a mainstreaming process is to achieve enough critical mass to begin moving toward sustainability. An awareness level of 25%-50% is required to achieve a 5%-10% adoption rate. When 15%-20% of the target group has implemented an innovation, it has likely reached critical mass. The innovation will take off at that point.

In Area Development Programme Banggai, focus group discussions with four project committees explored the experiences of 26 self-help group (SHG) leaders. All had been trained in LCP and in conducting a simple LCP assessment at the village level. Of these leaders, the Centre of Learning coordinator was certain that 50% were able to use LCP practices effectively at the community level. If 13 SHG leaders could use LCP effectively, that would mean that 20% of the SHGs (out of 53) have a leader able to use LCP. It is not known how many other SHG leaders not on the project committee may have been influenced by LCP. It is quite possible that critical mass and take-off has been reached at the SHG leadership level.

The potential that communities see in applying LCP to help them achieve their aspirations for harmonious, functional communities is an enabling factor in quickly reaching critical mass. When community leaders and their followers have good intentions to create healthy social structures in their communities, LCP can be shown to help them achieve these goals—or at the very least, to get them started.

The Centre of Learning “chanced” on achieving critical mass—it was not following a particular strategy. In retrospect, it became clear that broad-based, intensive awareness-raising, training and simple assessments at the community leader level were essential to achieving critical mass. LCP started to take hold when self-help groups were required to follow up by integrating what they were learning into project activity planning.

One way of assessing critical mass at the national level would be to see what percentage of senior staff at the project or programme level understand and actively use LCP in their work. We could assume that if at least 50% of programme management staff are familiar with LCP and if 15% are actively using it, there is a strong likelihood that most senior staff will eventually start utilising LCP. Levels of adoption among senior World Vision Indonesia staff have not yet been assessed, but they would be a good indicator of how complete the mainstreaming process is in the organisation.

Successful mainstreaming occurs when five phases of a new practice occur over time, until fully institutionalised: Knowledge and awareness grow with exposure and training focused on “conceptualisation.” The interest/persuasion phase occurs when a “feeling” about the innovation develops—the beginning of “personalisa-
tion.” The *evaluation/trial* phase—“operationalisation”—results in a decision. This is the first practical step in demonstrating how an innovative practice works. The practice becomes institutionalised in the *implementation/adoption* phase. The final *confirmation* phase remains crucial—an innovation can still be rejected. A new practice needs full support throughout the process.

The evaluations found that successful adoption in the participating area development programmes indeed went through these phases. A number of promising practices began emerging. They are presented on the following chart.

**Phases of LCP Innovation and Emerging “Promising Practices”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of Innovation Adoption</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Emerging LCP “Promising Practices” Observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Knowledge/Awareness          | Cognitive process of disseminating the “idea” (of LCP):  
  • “awareness” knowledge  
  • “principles” knowledge  
  • “how-to” knowledge | • short, introductory sessions or discussions on LCP give exposure—sufficient at “mass awareness-raising” level  
  • principles and methods of LCP provided in more intensive training  
  • working sessions on one’s own project activities to apply the framework |
| Interest/Persuasion           | Persuasion occurs when a “feeling” about the benefits of an innovation is achieved:  
  • movement from cognition to affection (conceptualisation to personalisation)  
  • evidence of usefulness is provided—good “marketing” | • conducting a simple LCP field assessment, as part of intensive training, as key to personalising the LCP concept |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of Innovation Adoption</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Emerging LCP “Promising Practices” Observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation/Trial/Decision</td>
<td>Decision to adopt or reject:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• trialability, relative advantage is discerned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• demonstration of the innovation required at this stage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• rejection can occur here</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• small initiatives tried immediately after a training assessment (at the community level)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• a full-scale community-based assessment, with doable recommendations (at the programme-wide level)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• attempting simple, small-scale project activity changes in response to assessment findings and recommendations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation/Adoption</td>
<td>The innovation is adopted as standard procedure:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• this stage ends when the innovation is institutionalised</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the innovation generates creativity and new, innovative ideas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• routine LCP assessments are conducted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• LCP is incorporated into programme design and annual planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• resources (budgets, personnel, time) are dedicated to maintaining LCP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• indicators, planning formats, monitoring and evaluation systems, reporting mechanisms and early warning systems are established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• LCP “spin-offs,” such as peacebuilding initiatives are introduced if appropriate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Phases of Innovation Adoption | Characteristics | Emerging LCP “Promising Practices” Observed
--- | --- | ---
Confirmation | Innovation “maintenance”:
- regular positive reinforcement
- support and back-up from the “change agent,” especially for troubleshooting
- conflicting “messages” or failure can result in rejection | This stage has not yet been reached in the area development programmes. With the two-year extension of the LCP Centre of Learning project, this stage is achievable. At the national office level, this is a particularly “vulnerable” stage due to complexity and numerous interests competing for attention and time.

The process of adopting LCP practice, from the perspective of the “innovative” characteristics of LCP and the five adoption phases, suggests that adoption at the village level is relatively quicker than at the programme-wide level. In fact, in West Sumba it was observed that the self-help group had a better grasp of LCP basics than did programme staff. This can be explained, in part, by organisational complexity. That World Vision Indonesia becomes increasingly more complex from its most basic structural level (the self-help group) to the top management level is obvious. Moreover, as organisations become increasingly complex, it takes increasingly longer for LCP adoption to go through the five phases. The higher one goes in the organisation's structure, the more technical implications and considerations there are that need to be factored in. The self-help group is not concerned with planning, monitoring and reporting formats, other than complying with agency guidelines. The area development programme and the national office are concerned with balancing many competing demands and will make the investment required to formally systematise a new practice only after they are convinced that it is in their best interests to do so. When that occurs, the new practice becomes institutionalised.

The Indonesia national office is still early in the final stage of institutionalising LCP, even though the mandate and “political will” to do so is strong. Technical mechanisms, in terms of policies and standards requiring LCP use, are still being put in place. Programme officers are still in the process of mastering understanding and use of LCP as a core competency. Given these differences in complexity, it is not ironic that the self-help group can successfully adopt LCP in 6-8 months, whereas
the national office may require more than 3 years. This is the “rule of thumb” timeframe usually required to systematise significant organisational changes. Different rates of adoption, from the national office level to the self-help group, are captured in the following graph, which is an application of the “S-Curve” to the innovation phases model.

This graph is descriptive and represents the sum of the author’s observations and experience over time with mainstreaming LCP in World Vision Indonesia.

4. The Social Context of LCP Innovation

The mainstreaming of a new practice occurs in a social context—which includes opinion leaders (programme staff core team, community leaders), social structures (ethnic/religious/settler-local mix, local institutions), the change agent (LCP coordinator or facilitator), allies, etc. The extent to which the area development programme’s structure and leadership enables or limits introduction of LCP, the community’s experience with dividers and connectors affecting it, community members’ desire to live in harmony, etc., all influence how LCP will be adopted. Focus group discussions with self-help group leaders pointed towards several interesting enabling
factors facilitating the movement of LCP to the grassroots. These local leaders noted the high value the programme staff places on the self-help group and the respect staff shows them as partners in development. They also noted intense involvement by the LCP coordinator—the change agent.

Any new practice requires innovative leaders to get it started. Understanding innovator characteristics is essential to understanding who adopts new practices when and essential to understanding the mainstreaming process. Rogers has identified five natural orientations that predispose people to accept a new practice early on or try it only after they can see that it might be useful or wait until everyone else has adopted it or never adopt it.

### Orientations to Innovativeness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Innovativeness Orientations</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innovators</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Risk takers, venturesome, on the fringes, able to cope with uncertainty, promoters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early adopters</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>Opinion leaders, respected by peers, judicious decision makers, have interpersonal networks, are essential to achieving “critical mass”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early majority</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Seldom are opinion leaders, but adopt early, have well-developed personal networks, confirm the “success” of an innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late majority</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Skeptical and cautious, need encouragement, adopt after feeling “safe,” need innovation to be well tested and respected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalists</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Innovation must be fail-safe, tend to resist change and change agents, their reference point is the past</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following graphic illustrates the distribution of innovator orientations on a “Bell Curve.”
As no special attention was paid to assessing the innovativeness orientations of programme staff or community leaders, not much more can be added other than asserting that choosing individuals or groups to adopt and promote LCP may significantly impact whether or not LCP will be considered, practised or ignored, or even rejected. Attempting to introduce LCP to a leader who is not in the first 16% category would clearly slow down the LCP mainstreaming process; selecting leaders in the last two categories could have dire consequences leading to failure.

II. Lessons Learned and Emerging Promising Practices in Mainstreaming LCP

A number of lessons and promising practices for mainstreaming LCP are emerging out of this case study.

1. Training and Dissemination Process

Raising awareness, training and dissemination all need to be contextualised, systematic and intentional. Good “marketing” is key. LCP practice needs to be well understood conceptually.

- Routine and systematic awareness raising, keeping LCP on the agenda and regularly promoting LCP at all levels of the organisation is essential.
- Training materials and methods need to be relevant to the target group level and their needs: The closer to the community level, the more concrete and relevant the examples, the less abstract conceptually in terms of application,
and the more tuned to community needs. Trainings at the international NGO level, the national office, programme staff and community levels need to be designed accordingly to meet distinct needs.

- Regularly disseminating LCP through internal media facilities, producing case studies and concept pieces, can multiply exposures to LCP and its benefits.

2. Practical Application of LCP

LCP practice needs to be applied, be seen as useful, and systematically integrated into the programme design and programming cycle. The step from conceptualising LCP to practising LCP needs to be intentional and purposeful.

- LCP community-based assessment methods need to be well understood and applicable at the appropriate levels, and such assessments should be conducted regularly.

- Formal LCP trainings need to be followed up by field assessments to make direct application—this “locks in” learnings from the training.

- Recommendations from assessments need to be doable and simple interventions planned to mitigate conflict resulting from programme implementation. Simple infrastructure projects, such as water, roads, bridges and public facilities, are recommended since they typically produce broad-based, quick and satisfactory results.

- LCP practice needs to be seen as beneficial and adding value at each level where it is applied—only then will programme staff make the extra effort to apply it. A key desired benefit is improved programme quality in terms of mitigating conflict and strengthening local capacities for peace.

3. Personalising the LCP Paradigm

Adopting LCP as a paradigm—a worldview, a way of approaching conflict whether personal, family, institutional or community—has emerged as a significant lesson. Personalising LCP takes place as the framework is better understood and practiced. In turn, as LCP becomes increasingly personalised, a corresponding development of understanding and capacity to practise LCP develops. LCP becomes the lens through which a person, or team, views the context of conflict. LCP has become fully personalised when it becomes part of the organisational culture.

- Time needs to be given for LCP practitioners at the field and community levels to overcome anxieties about addressing conflict issues in their communities and to develop confidence in their ability to deal with conflict.
• Opportunities to share experiences and stories of LCP practice need to be created.

• Field staff sharing LCP experiences and stories in venues where senior management staff are present is highly effective in promoting LCP and developing staff confidence. The most effective method of disseminating lessons learned from Area Development Programme Banggai was inviting field staff to report on the LCP assessments in meetings attended by senior World Vision staff. This gave field staff a high level of confidence and a sense of accomplishment. Senior management staff became convinced of LCP’s value through the enthusiasm and articulation by field staff of lessons learned.

• Personalising LCP yields creativity and synergy in finding new options for both conflict mitigation and peacebuilding interventions.

4. The Key Role of LCP Change Agent/Facilitator/Promoter

In the early phases of mainstreaming LCP, full-time support from a dedicated facilitator/change agent is indispensable. A promoter/champion at the senior management level is essential for LCP to go through all its phases and achieve sustainability and mainstreaming.

• An LCP facilitator/coordinator is needed who is fully attuned to community development processes, who is able to spend time in the field discussing and promoting LCP, and who keeps LCP “on the plate” in the area development programme. The learning curve is steep in the first two years, and progress is slow.

• Senior organisational staff/directors need to provide full moral and logistical support to promoting LCP, incorporating it into national programme strategies and providing a mandate to mainstream LCP at all levels.

• A full-time LCP support staff at the national level enhances prospects that LCP practice will develop according to a well-designed LCP mainstreaming strategy.

• Intensive effort is required for at least three years, a commonly accepted amount of time required to affect significant organisational changes.

After LCP has been institutionalised, less intense maintenance work by committed staff will sustain commitment to the basics and continue generating new “promising practices.”
5. Leaders Who Are “Innovators”

Selecting programmes whose management staff members are innovative, risk-taking opinion leaders is essential at the early stages of LCP implementation. Selecting community leaders who also exhibit innovative tendencies and are opinion leaders is also key to sustainability.

- Beginning with leaders and management staff who are not innovative and experimental will relegate LCP practice to an early end.
- It is important to achieve critical mass within three years for LCP to take off and develop sustainability.
- The dissemination process requires innovators who are effective communicators and “marketers” of LCP.

6. Phased LCP Mainstreaming Processes

LCP mainstreaming at the area development programme level is best considered as a phased process. Banggai programme staff suggest that this takes about four years. Once the learning process is consolidated and methods polished, other area development programmes should be able to mainstream LCP more quickly.

- **Year One:** Focus on awareness raising, basic training and simple assessments without the expectation of producing profound results. A full-time LCP facilitator/promoter is needed to guide the process. In this phase, anxieties about LCP are laid to rest and confidence is built.

- **Year Two:** A full-scale, advanced training is conducted, followed by a formal assessment with recommendations to the area development programme. LCP practice is beginning to be integrated into the programme’s “tool box,” along with PLA (participatory learning and action), Appreciative Inquiry and SWOT tools. Additional conflict assessment tools may also be added in phase two to deepen and broaden understanding of conflict issues. LCP becomes a routine part of team meetings, and integrating LCP into the programme design and programme cycle is initiated. Dissemination to self-help groups and project committees is initiated in this phase.

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17 This “mainstreaming cycle” was suggested by the ADP Banggai team when asked what recommendations they would give to another ADP considering implementing LCP—from notes of a Focus group discussion with ADP Banggai staff in April 2003.

18 The evaluation determined that the ADP and the self-help groups were in fact developing more quickly. But for adoption of LCP to fully mature, the four-year cycle recommended here is more realistic.

19 i.e., strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
- **Year Three:** Inclusion of LCP into area development programme systems is finalised. Self-help group leaders are given full LCP trainings and do simple LCP assessments in their communities. LCP is incorporated into self-help group proposal formats, and community leaders begin to be able to articulate dividers and connectors and demonstrate mitigation activities in their proposals. The programme staff begins to take full responsibility for routine implementation of LCP. Critical mass and take-off should be achieved in this phase.

- **Year Four:** Consolidation of LCP occurs, transferring responsibility for LCP from the LCP facilitator/coordinator to the programme’s management. Introduction of peacebuilding interventions in the planned programme activities of the programme are also appropriate at this time.

7. **Technical Mainstreaming at the Organizational Level**

For mainstreaming to be complete, LCP needs to be “institutionalised” at the level of area development programme design, at all phases of the programming cycle, and at the national office: 20

- LCP must be considered part of the whole ADP system—it is not an “extra add-on”—to be successful. This means that LCP must appear in assessments, design, monitoring, evaluation and reporting documents, and should be required to be integrated into the programming documents.

- When the national office has integrated LCP into its programming requirements, the area development programme finds it easier to integrate its system with the national system.

- Institutionalising LCP at the national level is key to sustaining LCP practice at the programme level. Key national-level technical staff members—program officers and technical support team—should have LCP as one of their key competencies to support LCP mainstreaming throughout the operations area.

- Programme design should put LCP at the centre of risk and conflict mitigation, with assessments planned and mitigation measures implemented to reduce dividers and enhance connectors. Programme design should identify different identity groups; what divides them; what connects them; how the

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20 The Banggai staff made these recommendations as a part of the October 2003 Focus Group Discussion.
programme relates to them in terms of distribution of resources, staffing, etc.; and mitigation interventions.

Conclusion

This case study has demonstrated that mainstreaming, or adopting, LCP follows predictable patterns at each of the three levels observed—the self-help group, the programme staff and the national office. Roger’s diffusion of innovation theory unpacks the process in a way that is useful for community development agencies. Mounting evidence suggests that LCP as a new practice is well “qualified” for successful adoption in a community development programme and, with careful nurture, can be adopted in an agency at the national level. Being aware of the fact that some people are more open to trying out new practices than others should help LCP facilitators to carefully select decision makers who will influence whether or not using LCP has a good chance of taking root. Understanding that successful mainstreaming takes time and needs to be nurtured helps to avoid a common impression that “a training or two” is sufficient. This is not to say that a training or two is not useful. That can fulfill a purpose and can be effective to build capacity. However, to be sustainable, effective long-term integration of LCP will require the more lengthy process of new practice adoption. This has implications for funding, time and staff commitments.

It can be safely said that the adoption/mainstreaming of LCP in Area Development Programme Banggai has reached the “take off” stage. The role of the LCP Centre of Learning has been pivotal to this development. Whether or not Banggai should set the standard for the other programmes is debatable, as considerable resources not available to other programmes have been put into the Centre of Learning. However, once the learning process has been consolidated and methods polished, other programmes should be able to mainstream LCP relatively easily and in a shorter time, without the intensity of a Centre of Learning. The process does, however, require careful nurturing.

This study of LCP mainstreaming indicates that LCP is a promising practice for use in community development in contexts of conflict. In addition to learning lessons about LCP mainstreaming, this case study contributes to a fund of experience for assessing other innovative ideas, practices and technologies in any sector (agriculture, health, economics, advocacy, policy, etc.) and developing a strategy for mainstreaming them. Lessons learned in LCP mainstreaming have already been applied to implementing promising new education methodologies in World Vision Indonesia’s North Maluku Rehabilitation Programme. Understanding the innovation process has helped staff take a more systematic, long-term approach to guiding
its adoption by elementary school teachers. This case study can also help project staff understand why some other innovations have not been working as hoped.

In conclusion, it is hoped that this case study encourages community development decision makers and programme staff to take a systematic approach to mainstreaming LCP practices. That this has been accomplished by an area development programme working in a context of conflict is an encouragement to others facing similar challenges.
Chapter 7

Applying LCP for Conflict-Sensitive Quality Programming

Allen Harder

CONFLICT-SENSITIVE programming considers the context of relationships between groups—rather than individual stakeholders—that have different identities with the potential to create barriers to development or enhance development. The term “identity group” for the purposes of this chapter is defined as a group that ascribes characteristics and affiliations to itself that distinguishes it from another group.

Programming in conflict-sensitive areas requires considerable additional context analysis and attention to identity groups’ relationships throughout the programme cycle. Even where conflict is not apparent on the surface, thought needs to be given to latent tensions that a programme might spark. As this volume’s pioneering case studies from the past four years document, the local capacities for peace (LCP) framework provides a tool to enhance quality programming for conflict-vulnerable areas.

World Vision recently developed “LEAP for Quality” (Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning),1 the organisation’s common learning approach to design, monitoring, and evaluation (DME). LCP has been integrated into this new approach. The LCP framework contributes to programming by filling in some gaps not considered in typical DME frameworks. Three crucial social impact variables2 affecting inter-group community relationships are usually overlooked in conventional programming. Yet these are essential to better understand key issues...
that conflict-sensitive context analysis is designed to address:

1. the quality of relationships between significant identity groups in the community;
2. the impact on those relationships of introducing resources into the community, or conversely the impact of accessing local resources;
3. the impact of the agency’s implementation strategy on those relationships.

These variables permeated lessons learned from World Vision Indonesia’s experience in mainstreaming LCP, and they can be expected to play significant roles in influencing whether higher quality programming that is aware of and sensitive to conflict and that will “do no harm” and enhance “local capacities for peace” can be achieved.

Part I. Applying LCP to Quality Programming

The Break-up — Case 1

STAFF from an international NGO had just arrived in a remote village in Papua to officiate the grand opening of a newly completed water piping project. They were anticipating the celebration of a great step forward in improving village health. Access to safe, fresh water would result in healthy children and mothers would enjoy newfound energy as they now did not need to walk kilometres for household water. The agency’s health programmes could now move ahead. However, this was not to be. On the morning of the celebration they were horrified to see the project in ruins. The water pipes lay broken and scattered. The peaceful village was in disarray. Having implemented a number of successful projects similar to this one, the agency’s staff members were puzzled. During their reflection time, they discovered that the village was dominated by a certain clan that used its influence to exclude a rival clan from becoming involved in the project and enjoying its benefits. Improved health was not their first priority. They appeared to be more interested in controlling the water as a new resource in the village. The NGO was blissfully unaware of these dynamics and proceeded to implement its project through the dominant clan. The night before the opening ceremony the rival clan reacted. Not only was the project in ruins, but the village was now in a state of open conflict. The project had left the village in a worse condition than before.

This case occurred in Papua, Indonesia, and was told to the author by an agency staff person.

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3 This case occurred in Papua, Indonesia, and was told to the author by an agency staff person.
In this case, careful context analysis of village relationships during project planning would have averted the water project’s failure. A good quality project had been undermined by an inadequate plan and implementation design. Using the LCP programming tool throughout this project’s cycle could have averted failure. It would have uncovered the latent conflict between the village clans, anticipated the impact of bringing in substantial outside resources on their relationships, and identified options to maximise participation and access to benefits for the whole village and to reduce latent tensions. An LCP assessment may even have generated an additional project outcome aimed at using the water piping project to help transform the dysfunctional clan relations. In the evaluation of the project and during the reflection stage, the agency did make a correct assessment of why it went wrong and was able to take corrective action when designing future projects. They may have even decided to redesign the project and take a risk to try again to bring water into the village and restore broken relationships—both between the clans and between the agency itself and the village.

Three Crucial Variables for Understanding the Interface Between Community Relationships and Community Development Programming Dynamics

Many excellent quality programmes do not fulfill their potential, are ineffective, harmful or even fail because social relations and the impact of transferring resources on those relations have not been adequately considered. Good programme content (the why and what) can easily be undermined by underdeveloped or even divisive implementation strategies (the who, when, where, how). Applying the LCP framework to all phases of the programme cycle ensures that these three crucial variables and amending options are considered.

1. Programming with Community Inter-group Relationships in Mind

It is common knowledge in the world of psychology that healthy, holistic relationships are prerequisite for healthy, well-rounded development. In the world of community development, dysfunctional relations in a community form a significant barrier to social, economic and political development. Latent conflict (a form of dysfunction) can be aggravated into full-blown conflict, as Case 1 illustrates. Many community development programmes are confronted by latent or potential conflict at varying degrees of risk, where a strategy to prevent open conflict is called for. Other programmes are being implemented in post-conflict contexts, where strategies to mitigate conflict and work at post-conflict rehabilitation are needed. More rarely, a response to conflict in the crisis stage could be called for.
Identifying identity groups that could be in tension can be a challenge when tensions are subtle. The following types of identity groups are not comprehensive, but they represent some primary types affecting conflict-sensitive programming:

- **Given/core identities**: religion, ethnicity, race, clan, gender
- **Hierarchical identities**: dominant/subjected groups, caste
- **Insider/Outsider identities**: settler/indigenous groups, refugees/interiorly displaced persons/indigenous groups
- **Territorial identities**: regional/national/international, inter-village/neighbourhood, mafias/urban gangs
- **Political/ideological/affiliation identities**: political parties/associated groups, secessionist/liberation advocate/status quo
- **Economic/class identities**: rich/poor, oppressed/oppressor, core/periphery, economic classes

Identities can also cut across the types, especially when given/core identities overlap with the other types. Each of the types of identity-focused relations carries a strong potential for tension and risk. The programmer’s task is to identify the identity groups that have the greatest potential to engage in open, violent conflict. In Banggai ADP, Indonesia, a context analysis identified tensions based on religious identity, on insider/outside identities (settlers and indigenous), and clan identities. It was determined that tensions around religious identities carried the highest risk. Each of the types of identity-focused relations carries a strong potential for tension and risk.

A number of general indicators point to significant risk when present in a community. They include:

- a history of tensions/open conflict;
- a history of articulated historical, economic, political, social, cultural (etc.) grievances and losses of one group against another (e.g., military defeats, political marginalisation, loss of economic advantage, etc.);
- a perceived feeling of threat from the other group (e.g., loss of honour, invasion, political, social, economic marginalisation, etc.);
- identity groups with competing interests (e.g., agriculturalists and animal herders);
• changes in composition of identity groups (e.g., Muslims migrating to predominantly Christian areas, or vice versa, resulting in a closer ratio);

• an influx of new identity groups with different interests, values, customs and habits (e.g., settlers from one culture area begin to dominate over the indigenous population);

• a dominant and subjected or excluded group with a history of exploitation and injustice (e.g., a small ethnic group associated with a local monarch treats the majority as inferior and exploits them for economic gain);

• a breakdown in social structures that support peace (e.g., traditional systems, justice and law, mutual endeavour, exclusive attitudes and behaviours), or traditional mechanisms to deal with conflict are weakened to the point that they are no longer effective;

• regulations, behaviours, habits and practices (embedded in structures) that are perceived to discriminate against and belittle a group (e.g., one ethnic/religious group dominates political and social culture, practises favouritism, and insists on conformity to its values and habits);

• an aid programme that provides benefits/access to one group and not to another and puts one group into a position of disadvantage/advantage vis-à-vis another group.

Understanding a number of social dynamics related to conflict underscores the urgency of good assessments and responsive programming:

• To some degree, each community exhibits “structures of violence” that put vulnerable people at risk.

• Conflict is natural, but unmanaged conflict tends to escalate and become destructive.

• Destructive conflict interrupts the community development process; becomes an obstacle to an agency’s health, education, economic and community organising goals; and generates a crisis in the community and for the agency.

• Every community has the capacity to reduce escalating conflict and to stop violence when community mechanisms, especially traditional mechanisms, to reduce conflict and violence and to restore relationships are supported.

An LCP assessment will reveal stakeholder identity groups and identify those inter-group relations at greatest risk of escalating into open conflict (and hence un-
dermining the programme). It will also identify sources of tension as well as sources of connectivity.

2. Considering the Impact of Resource Transfers on Community Inter-group Relations

All programme interventions represent a host of resources. An agency injects outside resources and accesses local resources necessary for the programme. In addition to meeting basic human needs—the primary purpose of aid programmes—resources, in the political economy, come to represent power, access, strategic advantage, vested interests, and indeed for some, survival. Power over resources— withholding, controlling, accessing or freely providing—is loaded in terms of social interactions between groups. The community exerts this power over locally needed resources, and the outside agency exerts this control over resources needed from the outside. Whereas these dynamics are usually quite benign, they become an obstacle to quality programming when:

- power and access take on a significance of their own for certain interest groups;
- a healthy or equitable balance of existing relations is upset;
- legitimisation of vested interests occurs.

Resources that a programme implicates are material resources/commodities, funds, knowledge, employment, access, systems and structures (markets, education, political, land, facilities/assets, labour, etc.) and belief systems/world views. Social relations are implicated in all systems and structures touched by resource transfers.
The Wake-up Call—Case 2

A

n LCP training in Dili, East Timor, uncovered a conflict between two villages that arose when an agency introduced a reforestation project in what appeared to be underused, open space. The agency was not aware that the people of the village with which they were working had left the neighbouring village many years ago after an internal conflict. The apparently open land between them remained uncontested until the reforestation project added considerable value to that land and put the “renegade” village in a position of advantage over the original village. The project unknowingly upset a stable, if uneasy, relationship when it accessed a local resource (apparently underutilised common land, legitimisation from village leaders and labour) and injected outside resources (seedlings, know-how, wages, legitimisation of village rights to the land and organisation). The original village was left out in a development that it considered to be legitimately theirs. LCP assessment led the agency to consider a project redesign to incorporate the interests of both villages.

In this case, an LCP context assessment would have anticipated how the reforestation programme (resource-based) would have altered economic and power relationships between the two communities. The context of the potentially volatile relationship would have been uncovered and strategies developed to reduce and even transform inter-village tensions.

3. Considering the Impact of the Detailed Implementation Plan on Community Inter-group Relations

The Detailed Implementation Plan (DIP) forms the core of the programme design document. In addition to detailing why and what questions, it outlines the strategy for achieving programme goals—addressing who, when, where and how questions. It identifies who the beneficiaries are, who it works with, how resources are to be accessed and distributed, how the programme will be staffed, how community organising work will be done, where the office will be located, and where facilities/assets will be located. The source(s) of resourcing the programme are identified and an allocation plan is developed. The implementation schedule is designed. The monitoring and evaluation plan is presented, and the reporting schedule agreed upon. Staff capacity-building plans are drawn up. The design is usually based on

4 The author was an LCP co-trainer for World Vision East Timor field, programme and management staff.
detailed assessments, a base-line data gathering plan is devised, and indicators and benchmarks are established. The donor provides the proposal and DIP framework into which the programme design is written. The DIP is aligned with headquarters and donor mandates.

After community assessment work is complete, the LCP framework’s principle contribution is to the DIP. Each component is examined in light of its impact on the community, from the perspective of supporting local capacities for connectivity or exacerbating tensions. Each of the why, what, who, when, where and how questions can be linked to the community assessment. The organisational and donor mandates shape what objectives and activities can or cannot be included in the design. If an LCP assessment uncovers objectives, activities and strategies that do not support goals of tension reduction and connectivity enhancement, other options need to be identified.

In the early stages of programme development, attention paid to strategies designed to send implicit ethical messages to stakeholders in tension can help reduce those tensions. Policies undergirding agency “conduct” help guide decisions needing to be made throughout the programme: policies on the use of armed personnel and their facilities; establishing neutrality and trust; non-competitive collaborations with other partners; staff conduct and inter-group relationships; staff privileges and facilities, including evacuation; and approaches to conflict situations. Raising concern for implicit ethical messages to the policy level helps maintain a high standard of agency self-awareness in relationship to the beneficiary community.
AFTER cessation of intense communal conflict in North Maluku, Indonesia, where both Christian and Muslim communities had been decimated, World Vision Indonesia responded with an emergency programme followed by a community rehabilitation programme. A preliminary LCP assessment determined that Muslims and Christians would be equal participants in the programme. The North Maluku Rehabilitation Programme aimed to balance inter-religious and inter-ethnic representation among beneficiaries and in staffing. Aware that the beneficiary community was closely observing agency conduct led to establishing weapons-free zone policies, non-competitive collaboration principles with other NGOs operating in the area, and evacuation policies that valued local staff the same as external staff. Senior programme staff took great care whom they allied themselves with and whom they related to in order to maintain objectivity and a perception of impartiality. The agency designed staffing models to be a good example to a divided community. All media pieces were closely screened to project a hopeful, progressive image of the local communities as they strove to rehabilitate themselves.

Priority was given to communities considered most vulnerable to conflict and communities that, if not included, could become more vulnerable. Offices were made easily accessible. Implementation schedules were adjusted to accommodate religious festivals of both groups. Implementation plans and activities were designed to increase connectivity between Muslim and Christian communities. Muslim and Christian staff and community leaders received training in LCP and peacebuilding modules to build community capacity to work towards World Vision’s goals of transforming relationships; empowering sustainable, interdependent communities focused on the well-being and empowerment of children; and transforming systems and structures. Numerous rapid assessments of both the affected communities and the World Vision programme helped keep the programme on track in achieving these goals. Some programme activities were modified significantly, and others were dropped when the LCP lens determined that more harm than good would come of them if left to run their course. Even donor regulations were, on occasion, modified after a convincing LCP argument was presented.

The author conducted a number of LCP assessments in North Maluku, Indonesia, and advised the World Vision Indonesia programme team on applying LCP to the programme cycle. In North Maluku, LCP was used from the first tentative steps upon entering a volatile conflict situation in 2000 with an emergency response programme, and it has been applied throughout.
This North Maluku Rehabilitation Programme case demonstrates that strengthening local capacities for mitigating conflict and moving in the direction of fostering peacable communities is an achievable goal. Carefully formulated strategies and policies help a programme move in this direction.

World Vision has achieved some excellent results, even without the use of LCP, when thoughtful attention has been paid to conflict-sensitive quality programming. The “Peace Road” project in a West Kalimantan ADP, implemented before LCP was introduced to World Vision Indonesia, is a good example of how careful attention to consensus building between two conflicting ethnic groups resulted in a relaxation of tensions, accompanied by economic and social development. An Ethiopian ADP was successful in reducing demand for small arms and bringing peace between two warring ethnic groups, using conflict-sensitive approaches. World Vision Bouganville implemented an effective small arms reduction project with youth through excellent programming.

With the introduction of LCP as a quality programming tool, however, such outcomes are less a result of happenstance and strategies become more intentional and integrated. Part II examines in greater depth the integration of LCP into the programme cycle as a means of technically applying LCP as a tool for programming excellence.

Part II. Applying LCP to the Programme Cycle

The World Vision DME model (referred to hereafter as LEAP for Quality: Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning) is reflected in a six-component programme cycle. World Vision has adopted the LEAP programming framework to guide all programming through each of its six components:

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• Assessment
• Design/redesign
• Implementation/Monitoring
• Evaluation
• Reflection
• Transition

The graphic on the following page illustrates a contiguous, integrated process from early assessment through to transition, or phase-out.
A Bird's-eye View of Applying LCP in the Programme Cycle

1. Relationship mapping: Identify identity groups, assess the history of their relationships, identify issues and vulnerabilities, generate tentative divider/connector list, select indicators for further investigation, select strategic partners/beneficiaries.

2. Resource mapping: Assess impact of resource transfer on relationships.

Implementation pre-planning: Identify conflict-sensitive issues to consider in the DIP.

2. Apply assessment data to the DIP (why, what, who, when, where, how) logframe to:
   - Refine goals, outcomes/activities
   - Design baseline survey—include LCP training and assessment
   - Refine indicators
   - Risk identification and mitigation plan.
   - Resource management plan
   - Organisational management plan
   - Staff/community capacity building plan
   - Monitoring & evaluation and reporting plan
   - Implementation schedule

3. Throughout the implementation/monitoring component:
   - Conduct periodic LCP/LCP assessments
   - Track change indicators
   - Redesign programme components as indicated
   - Impact donor with results
   - Conduct community feedback activities

4. Evaluations assess:
   - Impact of the programme on social relationships
   - Achievement of desired peace outcomes
   - Effectiveness of risk management (as per logframe)
   - Agency responsiveness and adaptation to change

5. Reflection involves:
   - Honest self-assessment
   - Listening to and responding to the community’s assessment
   - Learning and applying lessons (good practice)
   - Developing follow-up action plans based on learnings
   - Documenting best practices and failures
   - Celebrating successes and recognising failures

6. LCP contributes to designing the:
   - Planned phase-out—exit strategy
   - Planned transition from one type of programming to another, e.g., from emergency > rehabilitation > development

A Shared Future—Applying LCP for Conflict-Sensitive Quality Programming
Even though the six components are presented as occurring chronologically, in reality assessment, design, implementation, monitoring, etc., are often repeated in an ongoing (iterative) process. Responsive learning and accountability is the driver of the process, and quality programming is the goal.

Rather than going into depth regarding LEAP for Quality, only what distinguishes it is highlighted. The objective is to demonstrate how the LCP tool is applied to a coherent LEAP model. This chapter is oriented to the World Vision community development model—the area development programme (ADP)—designed to last 10 to 15 years. Since ADP design is ideally community driven, the initial pre-programme assessment, design and early implementation phases can be quite lengthy to accommodate full community participation. LCP application is described for each component.

LCP’s primary contribution to the LEAP framework is context analysis throughout the six components. Whereas it would appear obvious that context analysis would be done in the course of programming, experience shows that it needs to be required in order for it to be done. While the LEAP framework acknowledges the need for context analysis, it is not spelled out in detail. This chapter contributes the detail for using the LCP framework in LEAP.

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8 This chapter focuses on the programme rather than the project cycle. Though they share the same six phases, there is some differentiation in scope. A programme is “a temporary undertaking, composed of a collection of interdependent projects, managed in a coordinated manner that together will provide the desired programme outcomes.” Programmes are usually phased, with target end dates of the initial phases well defined and committed. Subsequent phases are defined as the initial phase approaches completion, enabling new related projects to be initiated. “A project is a temporary undertaking that has a definite beginning and end, that is carried out to meet established goals within cost, schedule and quality objectives.” Application of LCP would vary somewhat, but it is outside the scope of this chapter to go into detail.
## I. Assessment Component

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Assessment in LEAP</th>
<th>The LCP Component in Assessments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A preliminary assessment precedes any design/redesign work. The <strong>purpose</strong> is to address the <em>why</em> question, gather general information to assess basic needs, resources, primary stakeholders, community dynamics, alignment with agency mission/vision/values. A preliminary assessment of needs and <strong>opportunities, risks, vulnerabilities and capacities</strong> yields a <strong>tentative set of indicators</strong> that the design phase will flesh out. <strong>Primary data</strong> is collected only when secondary data is inadequate. The scope is macro and holistic and establishes a basis for programme design. Relationships with stakeholders begin to form during the assessment as the agency begins to establish its presence. <strong>Additional assessments</strong> are conducted to meet specific needs.</td>
<td>A rapid LCP <strong>preliminary assessment</strong> elicits data primarily on the three crucial variables—relationship mapping and assessing the impact of resources and implementation strategies on those relationships—and a general list of dividers and connectors. A full community-based assessment, involving focus group discussions with various groupings is better done after trust with the community has been established. The <strong>purpose</strong> is to map out a general picture, inform the process of developing strategic relationships in the community, and formulate recommendations for the design phase. Unbalanced or potentially dysfunctional relationships that could impact programme design are identified, as are <strong>opportunities, risks and vulnerabilities and capacities</strong>. A <strong>tentative set of indicators</strong> will emerge, which will be tested in a full community-based assessment to be done later. Emphasis is less on establishing significance than on developing “hypotheses” for further elaboration and verification. <strong>Primary data</strong> is gathered through interviews with key stakeholders and from secondary sources. <strong>LCP assessments are ongoing</strong>, the frequency of which is determined by the complexity of the context—every 6 months for more intense conflicts and 12 months for those less intense. A significant change in the context would warrant an additional LCP assessment.</td>
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9 This description is based on assessment learning in World Vision Indonesia’s Area Development Programme in Banggai, Central Sulawesi, and in the North Maluku Emergency/Rehabilitation Programme.
The art of LCP context assessment is still in development. So far, no examples are known to the author of assessments done from the beginning of a programme cycle. The mid-cycle assessments done in the Banggai LCP Centre of Learning have contributed richly to knowledge about best emerging practices, even though these assessments did not yield the information suggested above. Various ad hoc LCP assessments in the North Maluku Rehabilitation Programme have also yielded rich information but are likewise not complete. Experience is sufficient, however, to “advise” the development of a more comprehensive framework.
## 2. Design/Redesign Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design/Redesign in LEAP</th>
<th>The LCP Component in (Re)Design</th>
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<tr>
<td>Programme design incorporates <strong>assessment results</strong>, along with other planning and consultative processes with multiple stakeholders. It fleshes out <strong>programme components</strong>: answering <em>why, what, who, when where and how</em> questions. Articulation of <strong>needs and opportunities</strong> that the programme will address are refined. It is aligned with national office and donor priorities and strategies. Cross-cutting themes such as gender, the environment, advocacy, peace-building, civil society, etc., are addressed. The <strong>implementation strategy</strong> is fleshed out (the <em>how</em>) and the management plan designed. This includes the overall monitoring and evaluation (M &amp; E) plan—indicators are refined and finalised and the baseline survey is designed. The <strong>logframe</strong> addresses <strong>assumption and risk factors</strong> and requires a risk mitigation strategy. In the World Vision ADP programme, this phase lasts up to two years, which permits implementation of a limited set of programme activities to test the design.</td>
<td><strong>LCP assessment results</strong> provide a “lens” for testing programme design. Each <strong>programme component</strong> (mandate, national office values, donor priorities, why, who, what, when, where, how) is tested for impact on community relationships. Options are elicited where potential for harm is identified, and options for enhancing capacities for peaceful and harmonious relations are identified and incorporated. The LCP assessment may have elicited <strong>needs of groups that are psychosocially at risk and vulnerable</strong> which the programme design may wish to address. LCP contributes to the design in the <strong>implementation strategy</strong> for beneficiary and implementing partner selection, recruitment procedures and staff selection; program location, office and facility location, implementation schedule; management policies; M &amp; E design—including selecting indicators for baseline data collection. The capacity building strategy—for staff and for the community—will also incorporate building capacity in LCP and in strategic peace-building competencies to manage the risks and enhance capacities for peace. The influence of LCP will be most visible in the “<strong>assumptions/risks</strong>” section of the <strong>logframe</strong>. LCP requires rigorous assessment of risk and clear analysis of causal relations underlying risks. The design document also includes a risk mitigation strategy. Community dysfunction caused by conflicted relationships constitutes a significant risk to the programme—and conversely, the programme could conceivably be a risk to the community. The LCP “lens” is crucial for filtering feedback from start-up activities in long-term community development programmes.</td>
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Note on Redesign: Openness to programme redesign is necessary for an agency that considers itself a learning and responsive agency, accountable to the community it serves. The context of a programme is dynamic and changing, quite outside of the control of the programme. The agency’s context is also dynamic. When World Vision Indonesia began to understand and implement LCP, distinct change resulted in the way the agency perceived its programmes. LCP assessments conducted by the LCP Centre of Learning in Banggai, Central Sulawesi, resulted in some minor programme redesigns. A much stronger strategy was designed for inclusive participation, including opening up opportunity for non-self-help group members to benefit from projects. Assumptions that at one time were normative had changed, and a new set of assumptions about the impact of a programme on the local context was taking precedent. Dynamics of regional conflict were also changing, and its impact on the ADP required close monitoring. The ADP initiated significant changes in its programme strategy and in its approach to the community. Programme components in the North Maluku Emergency/Rehabilitation Programme also were redesigned a number of times to resolve emerging tensions between communities.

3. Implementation and Monitoring Component

In LEAP, implementation and monitoring are combined as one component since they are interactive. Monitoring is seen as a continual process that guides implementation. Whereas implementation and monitoring are two intertwining processes, for the sake of clarity, this discussion treats them separately.

10 A logframe, formed from the words logical and framework, is a programme-management technique.

11 This section is based on work by the World Vision Indonesia Peacebuilding Unit. A framework called “Incorporating LCP in the ADP Design” was produced to assess ADP programme designs for conflict sensitivity. It posits a series of questions for each design component that implicates community relationships.
The full programme design is put to work—the field staff and management team are assembled, facilities are put into place, and activities begin. One of the first activities is implementing and analysing the baseline survey. The World Vision DME (design, monitoring and evaluation) model places the baseline survey(s) and analysis at the beginning of programme implementation. The purpose is to provide a basis for monitoring activities. **Programme indicators** established in the design determine the nature of data to be collected.

Before the baseline data survey is carried out, a full LCP training of staff should be facilitated, followed by an LCP assessment conducted by the trained staff. Key stakeholders interviewed at the beginning are once again interviewed, and focus group discussions engage the significant identity groups. Discussions with men’s and women’s groups, youth and children fill out a composite picture of the context. Assumptions and hypotheses generated in the initial rapid assessment are tested. LCP assessment results will provide several **key indicators for the baseline data survey**. Conflict-sensitive indicators for three domains to be monitored are established to achieve agency learning and accountability goals:

The context itself—change indicators for psychosocially vulnerable and at-risk groups and for identity group relations vulnerable to experiencing escalations of violent conflict due to changes in context;

The impact of the programme on that context—impact indicators for key areas of resource transfer and implementation plan on identified groups;

Community perception of agency responsiveness—perception/ feedback indicators.

**Note on Indicators:** As the field is still quite new, few—if any—standard indicators have been put forward for purposes of LCP monitoring and evaluation. Qualitative and proxy indicators (e.g., if “a” is present, then we can expect “b” to be impacted) are easier to identify than quantitative indicators. General “risk” indicators posited in the “crucial variables” discussion are, however, a good starting point for

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12 The section following is based on learnings from World Vision Indonesia’s LCP Centre of Learning in the Banggai ADP in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia.
developing more context-specific indicators. Indicators of changes in percentages and ratios—e.g., indigenous and settlers—are not difficult. Developing indicators requires in-depth understanding of programming, conflict issues, social processes, and change processes. Even though general conflict theories abound, each situation is unique and requires a localised approach. Ideally, the community should provide the key informants when developing indicators. For context-change indicators, critical tension points need to be identified and an indicator associated with it isolated—e.g., changes in attitudes to mixed marriages, rise in incidences of intolerance and stereotyping, exclusive/inclusive behaviours, etc. Programme-impact indicators can include levels of participation among identified groups in tension, development of policies/regulations guiding program management, critical incidents over distribution of program resources, changes in attitudes between identified groups, etc. Perception/feedback indicators can include levels of cooperation/compliance/resistance, attitudes towards the agency, etc. A general principle in developing community-based outcome/impact indicators is to ask: “What should change and what should not?” “How do you know when, if or how much it has changed?” Community members know best what is important to them. The agency also needs indicators for which it is accountable, for its own sake for management purposes. These tend to be more activity- and output-based. Indicators should also be based on assessment results and posited as hypotheses until sufficient knowledge and experience is gained to consider them truly indicative of the reality they intend to represent.
Monitoring in LEAP

Monitoring takes places mainly at the project level, where routine collection of information occurs principally about inputs, activities and outputs, on an ongoing basis to support learning, basic management and accountability. Monitoring draws attention to actual or potential problems in implementation, tracks progress towards desired results, provides information to maintain accountability, and encourages and celebrates the programme.

LCP Component in Monitoring

The LCP monitoring mandate is somewhat broader than the programme mandate. Since the context of conflict is dynamic—tensions escalate and de-escalate, stakeholders come and go, regional and national events have a local impact, etc.—regular monitoring of the context is required. As mentioned above, three domains are considered:

The context: Monitoring the context of community conflict or tensions tracks either an improving or deteriorating situation. The purpose of context monitoring is: a) to support and not undermine improvements in social relations as a result of how the programme is being implemented and b) to anticipate escalation of tensions as part of the risk assessment/mitigation plan—the early warning system. Potential (or actual) escalation calls for a response to help mitigate the conflict and the risk.

Programme impact: Monitoring tracks how resource transfer impacts the beneficiary groups and the community at large. Negative impacts call for a change in strategy and perhaps broadening parameters of the programme.

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13 The section following is based on learnings from World Vision Indonesia’s LCP Centre of Learning in the Banggai ADP in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia.

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Monitoring in LEAP</th>
<th>LCP Component in Monitoring</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Community feedback: Monitoring tracks community perceptions of the agency’s performance in implementing a Do No Harm approach. Agency “behaviour” is an important piece of the LCP framework, and it also requires monitoring. Community participation in the monitoring process is essential for establishing and maintaining trust and transparency, and is important for organisational accountability and learning. Quality LCP programming is, ultimately, best assessed by the participating community. Routine monitoring may call for redesign of programme activities, strategies and indicators, or in extreme cases, the programme itself.</td>
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There is still little, if any, experience in indicator-based and programme-wide monitoring. In WV Indonesia’s programmes, informal monitoring of implementing LCP assessment report recommendations is done, and where there are LCP facilitators, ongoing “informal” monitoring of the context and feedback to programme managers occurs.

Indicator development and indicator-based monitoring and evaluation have been the weakest links in applying the LCP framework to the programme cycle, in World Vision’s experience. Applying SMART\(^{14}\) standards to indicators useful at the field worker level has proven to be a challenge requiring much more work.

One monitoring lesson learned is that early on, community leaders should receive LCP training and conduct basic LCP assessments and monitoring of key indicators. Experience has shown that community leaders, even at the village level, can quickly grasp basic LCP concepts and assessment techniques and apply them to their programme activities. The community is the most effective monitor of LCP-type indicators.

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\(^{14}\) i.e., specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound.
4. Evaluation Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation in LEAP</th>
<th>LCP Component in Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations are “the facilitation of informed judgments about the merit or worth of a programme, based on verifiable evidence” and “to evaluate the TD (transformational development) journey and the organisational capacity to facilitate movement towards the desired scopes of change.” External evaluators provide unvested objectivity. Three types of evaluations are considered:</td>
<td>The LCP component in an evaluation accounts for key variables identified in the design and monitoring plans. If monitoring has been well done, evaluators would provide an objective, outsiders’ perspective. If monitoring has not been well done, the evaluation would need to be designed to elicit more substantial information about the three domains. Alternatively, if routine LCP assessments are done, an assessment should be planned just before an evaluation, with additional impact data required by the evaluation. An evaluation frequently elicits unexpected results. Evaluators familiar with the LCP framework will be alert to the Do No Harm values of the programme and will recognise indications of programme impact on social relations. An evaluation’s terms of reference can require evaluators to pursue these avenues of inquiry if and when they emerge.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mid-term/interim evaluations** investigate appropriateness of and progress towards long-term goals (programme), effectiveness of strategies, analysis of major problems affecting the programme, viability of phase-out plans and sustainability.

**End-of-programme evaluations** investigate appropriateness of the programme design to meet the needs, effectiveness of implementation strategies, results and impact on both the community and the agency (positive and negative), and effectiveness in meeting overall goals—how people's lives and relationships have been transformed, their abilities to manage development, impact on social structures, especially in relation to justice issues.

**Post-programme evaluations** investigate longer-term effects that can be “attributed” to the programme. They use a post-programme measurement of development indicators to see whether the community is still making progress against these quality-of-life indicators after World Vision’s direct involvement has ended.

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15 Flower, *LEAP*.
Little experience has accrued with formalising LCP in an evaluation, and using the LCP framework for evaluations is still scantily documented. The two LCP Centres of Learning—one in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, and one in Mindanao, Philippines—were evaluated in 2003 and 2004. The Indonesia evaluation was preceded by an LCP assessment designed to elicit information regarding community perceptions about the Banggai ADP’s application of Do No Harm strategies. Significant attention was paid to the community feedback loop, the ADP’s responsiveness to change, and programme impact. This proved to be an effective model for doing LCP-focused evaluations. In World Vision Indonesia’s three project evaluations of North Maluku Rehabilitation Programme, no formalised LCP component was incorporated, even though evaluators included comments on whether or not the projects were contributing to increasing or reducing tensions and/or connectors. LCP questions have been inserted into project evaluations, but systematic LCP evaluation assessments still need to be done. Incorporating LCP and peacebuilding concerns into programme and project evaluations is still a leading edge requiring further development.
5. Reflection Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection in LEAP</th>
<th>LCP Component in Reflection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reflection/reassessment is an ongoing part of monitoring and preparation for report writing. Reflection occurring after an evaluation feeds back into assessment/design components. The reflection process may require minimal additional data collection and may result in redesign of a programme. Reflection on changes in context is also essential. All stakeholders in the programme are involved, for the benefit of ongoing learning within and outside of the agency. The purpose of the reflection is to make informed decisions and plan necessary changes in this and future programmes, to identify lessons learned at a project’s completion that may be relevant to other projects and implications for the overall programme, and to make decisions following an evaluation regarding continuity of the project, revision or expansion, or a curtailing of the activities. The principles of reflection are that the community learns, that the programme staff members learn, that the institution learns, that others learn as learnings are disseminated, and that the future is different as a result. Good practices, as well as failures, are documented in the interest of learning and accountability. A vital component of reflection is celebrating successes and recognising and acknowledging failures.</td>
<td>Reflection is central to LCP assessments and monitoring. Incorporating observations and programme alignments/revisions or redesigns into programme reports is an important element of achieving accountability. Post-evaluation LCP reflection asks more questions at the philosophical, purpose level. Agency and community values meet during reflection in open dialogue in an atmosphere where programme pressures are temporarily suspended. Multiple stakeholders participate in the reflections in a spirit of learning and challenge. The formal LCP framework once again asserts itself as next steps are planned.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ongoing reflection is essential for LCP to be effective. This requires open honesty about what is working and what is not, and a willingness to let activities, and even objectives, go if they are shown to increase tensions. In the North Maluku Rehabilitation Programme, a training of religious leaders in trauma healing had to be dropped due to increasing political tensions and to the fact that the training would have had to be held, for funding reasons, in a narrow window of time between Idul Fitri and Christmas. The donor agreed to the change after an LCP assessment and reflection was submitted. It is important to celebrate successes, as well as document failures, in the reflection process. In the Banggai ADP the LCP coordinator used
reflection processes to keep LCP issues on the agenda of staff meetings and programming planning activities. However, programme reports did not yet reflect LCP issues, as the reporting structure did not yet require this. Post-LCP assessment reflections in the Banggai ADP involving field staff and senior management personnel yielded some of the most positive learning experiences. Commitments to pursue LCP-oriented goals and objectives were strengthened during these reflections as all participants began to recognise the intrinsic values underlying the LCP programming tool.

6. Transition Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition in LEAP</th>
<th>LCP Component in Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition occurs when there is a significant change in the way the agency relates to the community. In its long-term community development programmes, community ownership of and capacity for managing the development process is assumed by the community while the agency slowly withdraws. Capacity to manage conflict is also hoped for. While this is a definition of transition particular to World Vision, other transition scenarios are also relevant.</td>
<td>LCP contributes to designing a planned phase out, or exit strategy. Transfer of resources and valuing relationships are particularly sensitive issues during phase out. A programme can make a transition to a new, redesigned phase of an ongoing programme. Mistakes are corrected, gaps left by the old programme are filled, and new ways of relating are established. Planned transitions from one type of programme to another—e.g., from emergency to rehabilitation to development—require fresh assessments and new designs based on new principles, structures and processes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Applying LCP at Various Entry Points in the Programme Cycle

The LCP framework ideally is applied throughout the programme cycle, as a complement to other tools and methods. However, the LCP framework can also be effectively applied as a stand-alone tool during any one phase to achieve a specific objective at various entry points. Three types of LCP applications can be distinctively noted: full-programme-cycle application, mid-cycle application, and evaluation application.

Case 1, presented earlier in this chapter, would be an example of applying LCP for programme evaluation to assess what went wrong and to take post-project restorative action. Case 2 provides an example of applying LCP in the middle of a programme, where assessment identifies a serious problem requiring a programme
redesign. Case 3 is an example of how applying LCP from the beginning of a programme results in numerous design decisions that contribute to the agency’s larger peacebuilding goal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program component</th>
<th>Full-program-cycle application</th>
<th>Mid-cycle application</th>
<th>Evaluation application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assess</td>
<td>Accompanies general assessment for new programme areas. Rapid LCP pre-assessment by external expert(s), followed by assessments by trained staff. <strong>Purpose</strong>: to influence DME designs/planning based on good analysis and well thought-through recommendations</td>
<td>Introduced in the middle of implementation as a “stand-alone” assessment. Programme staff members are trained first. This is followed by field assessments. More focus is on assessment and the impact of the current programme. <strong>Purpose</strong>: to gather current “state of affairs” data and make recommendations to influence programme implementation.</td>
<td>Rapid assessment by an external expert as a component of evaluation. Focuses on gathering data on the context and impact of the programme. <strong>Purpose</strong>: to a) assess the impact of the programme to learn lessons and b) troubleshoot a problematic programme. Both produce recommendations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Re)Design</td>
<td>Assessment recommendations are incorporated into all design elements. <strong>Purpose</strong>: Laying the foundation for preventing escalation of tensions/conflict, mitigating risk related to programme design and strengthening local capacities for peace—design may include peacebuilding activities.</td>
<td>Assessment recommendations result in redesign of a programme or components of a programme deemed to be problematic. <strong>Purpose</strong>: to sensitise the agency, align programming, redress problems, and engage the community in participating in making changes contemplated.</td>
<td>Evaluation recommendations impact designs of new programmes or the redesign or rehabilitation of the current programme. <strong>Purpose</strong>: learning lessons for programming planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program component</td>
<td>Full-program-cycle application</td>
<td>Mid-cycle application</td>
<td>Evaluation application</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implement</td>
<td>Baseline data collection and monitoring plan design incorporates LCP indicators. LCP capacity building occurs throughout. <strong>Purpose:</strong> Conflict-sensitive programme implementation.</td>
<td>Implement recommendations, develop indicators (or proxy indicators) that track changes. LCP capacity building occurs throughout. <strong>Purpose:</strong> accountability through action.</td>
<td>Implement recommendations in future programming or taking corrective action in ongoing programme. Capacity building only in new phase or programme. <strong>Purpose:</strong> acting on lessons learned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor</td>
<td>Monitoring progress according to design, monitoring community response, and monitoring changes in context. <strong>Purpose:</strong> to keep the programme on track and responsive to change and to monitor for “early warning.”</td>
<td>Monitoring progress according to recommendations made, impact of changes in design, changes in context and changes in community perceptions of changes in the agency’s operations. <strong>Purpose:</strong> to gradually align the whole programme according to recommendations from routine assessments, and to monitor for “early warning.”</td>
<td>Monitoring focused on post-evaluation follow-up programming to ensure that recommendations are followed. A redesigned programme will generate its own programme indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program component</td>
<td>Full-program-cycle application</td>
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<td>Evaluation application</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate</td>
<td>Evaluate programme impact on social relations, agency responsiveness and community impact on the agency. <strong>Purpose:</strong> accountability and learning.</td>
<td>Evaluate programme impact on social relations, agency responsiveness and community impact on the agency. <strong>Purpose:</strong> accountability and learning.</td>
<td>Evaluate for learning lessons about programme impact or for taking corrective action due to problems with the host community. <strong>Purpose:</strong> accountability and learning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflect</td>
<td>Reflection occurs throughout the programme cycle, especially after LCP assessments. Post-evaluation reflection is a participatory process to generate recommendations and learn lessons for dissemination.</td>
<td>Reflection occurs throughout the remaining programme cycle, especially after LCP assessments. Post-evaluation reflection is a participatory process to generate recommendations and learn lessons for dissemination.</td>
<td>Post-evaluation reflection generates recommendations and lessons learned for ongoing or future programme design and dissemination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>Lessons learned and good practices are applied to transition planning and designs.</td>
<td>Lessons learned and good practices are applied to transition planning and designs.</td>
<td>Lessons learned and good practices are applied to transition planning and designs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

The LCP framework can make a significant contribution to quality, conflict-sensitive programme planning and implementation. Indeed, it has been shown to be an effective tool for doing rapid assessments of inter-group community relations and how programmes impact them. Accurately identifying identity groups and assessing the impact of injecting outside resources and accessing local resources is foundational to beginning conflict-sensitive programming. We have also noted the importance of developing policies that guide an agency’s conduct in contexts of conflict. A programme’s design and detailed implementation plan that reflect conflict-sensitive values contribute to reducing tensions and enhancing local capaci-
ties for peace. World Vision Indonesia’s experience with applying LCP in its North Maluku Rehabilitation Programme and its Banggai Area Development Programme underscores the contribution that the LCP framework made to its peacebuilding goals in these two programmes. In North Maluku, careful attention to details of quality programming helped reduce tensions and established a basis for re-establishing peaceful and harmonious relations after a period of serious communal conflict. Banggai ADP has helped de-escalate potential for communal conflict by being responsive and accountable.

Applying LCP to the LEAP for Quality programming model provides the mechanism for systematising its application into an agency’s operations. This puts wheels on an agency’s commitment to learning, to being responsive to the community, and to conflict-sensitive programming.

Applying the LCP framework to programming is still in the early stages of development. This chapter helps map the process. Systematically applying LCP to a full programme cycle remains to be done and lessons documented. World Vision Indonesia’s experience in applying the framework is still only partial. Particular attention should be given to gaining more experience in developing indicators (specific to each context), integrating these into baseline surveys, and linking the information obtained to all aspects of programme design. Systematically incorporating LCP into evaluations is also still at the beginning stages. It is hoped that as experience accumulates in these areas, a means for documentating and collecting lessons learned will be developed to benefit further development efforts.
Mainstreaming LCP
in a Federal Organisation

Abikök C. Riak

In the mid-1990s, the Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) was launched by the Collaborative for Development Action to investigate the relationship between assistance programmes and conflict. In February 1998, World Vision Sudan, in partnership with World Vision Canada, joined the LCPP to investigate effects of its aid programme on conflicts in southern Sudan and to demonstrate how field-based lessons learned through the project could be used to improve design and implementation of WV Sudan aid programmes. Along with several other organisations, such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services and Oxfam Quebec, World Vision became a humanitarian guinea pig. Overall, the experiment was successful. In the August 2000 edition of Development in Practice, I wrote, in reference to the World Vision experience: “Our involvement with the LCPP has provided a solid foundation for the long-term process of addressing and monitoring the relationship between aid and conflict in Sudan. It [has] challenged us to think about the ways in which our aid can unintentionally contribute to the conflict and the more subtle impact of our attitudes and actions and how they can translate to the perpetuation or negation of war. Most importantly, LCP has provided us with the opportunity to improve the quality of our work in Sudan.”

For those of us involved in the Sudan project, who perhaps feared that the lessons learned would never move beyond Sudan, the organisational transformation that has taken place over the past six-odd years is remarkable. What has become increasingly evident is that one of the sparks that ignited this transformation was application of LCP in a development context. This chapter explores strategies used by World Vision to build on lessons from Sudan and to mainstream LCP across the organisation’s federal international partnership. This chapter highlights how LCP lessons learned in development contexts fed into and influenced the agency’s core

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documents and initiatives. The chapter concludes by highlighting some gaps in the mainstreaming strategy and recommends a way forward to address those gaps.

Global and Regional Mainstreaming Strategy

Before 2000, most lessons learned in the LCPP that led to development of the analytical framework were based on experiential learning in a relief context. Thus in a workshop, it was relatively easy for relief practitioners to appreciate the relevance and applicability of the LCP framework. This was not the case when training development practitioners. Examples of large convoys of food being stolen to feed armies or sold to buy weapons were very foreign to most development workers attending LCP workshops. Most development practitioners were familiar with how agencies can create conflict in communities, but the concept of impacting existing conflict seemed to be a new one in development circles.

This was an important distinction because, quite frankly, the engine that drives World Vision is development, not relief. The bulk of WV resources are focused on its development work. Successful mainstreaming could be defined as the extent to which LCP was integrated in the agency’s development work. As Jonathan Goodhand and Nick Lewer have argued, mainstreaming conflict-prevention processes and systems is easier said than done. Even with the dramatic lessons learned from Sudan and in other LCPP implementation projects around the world, mainstreaming such a flexible conflict-sensitivity tool has proven to be quite complex.

That said, the mainstreaming strategy was based on a good understanding of how World Vision operates as an organisation and what formal policies, systems and practices, in addition to informal practices and culture, could be tapped to facilitate mainstreaming. Keys to successful mainstreaming were identified quite early in the process. These included 1) establishing ownership of the mainstreaming process, 2) allocating sufficient funding, 3) finding key offices to act as champions, 4) increasing in-house capacity to conduct trainings and assessments, 5) making a clear link for development contexts and 6) integrating LCP into existing initiative and strategies. Each of the five strategies is detailed below:

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Strategy #1: Establishing Ownership at all levels through individuals and regional networks

The most significant challenge to mainstreaming was ownership. Compared to organisations with much more hierarchical structures, World Vision’s federal structure made it difficult to map a realistic strategy that would have impact. World Vision is a partnership of more than 22,000 people working in more than 100 countries. There is no headquarters per se, and though we share the same logo, core values and mission statement, each WV office is unique. On a simplistic level, national offices are offices that implement programmes in the field and support offices raise funds for those projects to be implemented. In reality, the relationship is much more complex, as many field offices raise their own resources. Some offices operate as both an implementing and a funding office. Most field offices are locally registered organisations that have national directors reporting to a national board but no direct management line of authority to the support offices.

In 2001, World Vision appointed a global director for reconciliation and peacebuilding with the mandate to facilitate mainstreaming of LCP throughout the organisation. With this event, the possibility of successful mainstreaming became much more of a reality. The director’s ability to place LCP in the broader context of peacebuilding/reconciliation and WV’s Christian identity made the chances of success greater. This was the first step in mainstreaming: creating significance where none had been before. For the field offices, the director’s appointment was a clear statement that provided organisational legitimacy to peacebuilding and overall conflict sensitivity in a way that just sharing lessons from one project in Sudan could not do.

Ownership did not just rest at the highest levels of the organisation. As with mainstreaming at higher levels, the role of a key goal owner is critical at a national office level. In those national offices where a key individual was accountable for mainstreaming both LCP as a programming tool and conflict-sensitive approaches in general, the goals become achievable. The parallels do not end there. Even at a national office level, the challenge is that although key individuals are essential to mainstreaming, there has to be a point where ideas transcend the individual and become part of corporate identity. National offices that created structures to support mainstreaming were more successful than those that just appointed an individual to manage the entire process. For example, those national offices that integrated LCP into their long-term business plans and expected all staff to take responsibility for LCP were more successful than those offices that did not make structural changes.

Peacebuilding networks were established as a mechanism through which sharing of lessons and support could be provided and ownership could be broader based. Ef-
ective functioning of regional peacebuilding networks, feeding up to a global level network, has provided a forum for dissemination of lessons learned and for critical analysis of outcomes. Regional and national networks work with their respective colleagues on key issues. Currently three regional peacebuilding networks exist (Asia-Pacific, East Africa and the Balkans), and a global network meets once every other year together with the agency’s advocacy network. The Asia-Pacific peacebuilding network began in 2001 and is by far the most active. This is partly due to the presence of a fully engaged regional peacebuilding advisor to provide support to and coordination for the network. Once again, the importance of committed full-time staff working at key levels of the organisation cannot be underestimated.

**Strategy #2: Allocating sufficient funding**

An organisation is able to demonstrate what it values by the areas where it allocates its resources. Some national offices, such as Indonesia, Kosovo, Uganda and the Philippines, have invested resources in establishing peacebuilding teams. The capacity of these offices to focus on quality peacebuilding programming has been enhanced with the establishment of these teams. The regional peacebuilding networks in East Africa and Asia were supported with funds from WV offices in the U.S. and Australia.

With the hiring of a global director for reconciliation and peacebuilding, a peacebuilding fund was set up that staff and national offices could access to build capacity in peacebuilding/conflict management or to implement small-scale peacebuilding projects. The fund, however, is small. Over time, an indicator of successful mainstreaming could be the percentage increase in funds allocated for peacebuilding-related activities.

**Strategy #3: Managing organisational culture by working with the willing**

Organisational culture can impact readiness to engage in any mainstreaming process. Operating as a federation with no “headquarters,” WV’s international partnership demonstrates several “cultures” within a larger corporate one. What has emerged in the mainstreaming of LCP is that those offices exhibiting organisational cultures that demonstrate sound conflict-management principles and that are open to change are infinitely more inclined to be receptive to exploring the relevance and applicability of the LCP framework and analysis in their particular context. Those offices that are risk-averse have tended to be less keen to use the framework. Often programming recommendations (e.g., staff hiring, changes in operational procedures, diversification of the beneficiary population) that can come out of a LCP analysis can be threatening to the status quo. Those national offices that had positive experiences of working collaboratively with others (e.g., other NGOs, government
at all levels, schools, etc.) were also more inclined to approach LCP assessment and programme redesign positively.

The mainstreaming strategy focused on “working with the willing.” Over time, successful implementation in selected countries began to affect leadership in other countries. The Asia regional focus started in the Philippines and Indonesia. Their senior leadership was very willing. They provided staff and time. Most importantly, they created organisational space to allow staff to intentionally explore the role of LCP and peacebuilding in their development projects. Successes in the Philippines and Indonesia experiences have been disseminated widely. During the past four years, regional participation has expanded to include Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea, Nepal, India, Myanmar/Burma, the Solomon Islands and East Timor. In East Africa, Sudan used to be the only country involved with LCP mainstreaming. With establishment of the regional peacebuilding network, several other countries, including Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Congo, have become actively engaged. Staff members from Africa have traveled to Asia to learn from experiences in the southern Philippines. Staff members from Asia have traveled to Tanzania to share lessons and conduct training and assessments.

**Strategy #4: Increasing in-house capacity to conduct training and facilitate assessments**

In initial stages of involvement with the LCPP, external consultants facilitated all training and other forms of capacity building. Although that worked well in the short term, using external consultants for long-term capacity building and institutionalisation would have proved expensive and unsustainable, especially for an organization as large as World Vision. Therefore, one key strategy of mainstreaming was to increase internal capacity to conduct LCP trainings, analyses and assessments.

A series of training of trainers (TOT) workshops were conducted around the world. The TOTs had several purposes. The first was to increase awareness and understanding of the analytical framework. The second was to ensure a large range of trainers available to train effectively in different languages. WV started in 1998 with one LCP trainer. Now more than 100 LCP trainers, ranging in age, gender and nationality, are able to train in more than 10 languages, from Arabic to Bahasa Indonesia to Kiswahili. The third purpose of the TOTs was to identify potential champions who could be used strategically in the mainstreaming process, and the fourth was to field and address any potential challenges to mainstreaming. Selection of trainers was strategic, focused on those individuals with “the ability to conduct training workshops, demonstrate a focused priority and interest in peacebuilding in a devel-
development context,” as well as those “in roles within World Vision that would include responsibility for conducting LCP training in their national offices in the future.”

Over time, it became clear that the TOTs equipped people to be trainers but did not provide skills to conduct field-based LCP analysis/assessments or higher-level macro analysis. Different levels of training were created to address this gap in TOT methodology. Basic training was designed to introduce staff to the LCP concept. More in-depth training for disseminators was developed for staff who had responsibility for managing projects in conflict areas. Most recently, training modules have been developed to help staff at the community level conduct analyses of the context of conflict using a methodology merging LCP and peacebuilding concepts with commonly used participatory learning and action (PLA) tools. These tools are collectively called Integrating Peacebuilding and Development (iPAD). The first iPAD training took place in Tanzania in late 2003 with trainers from the Philippines and Indonesia. For those interested in analyses of macro (national and sub-regional) conflict, a training module was designed called Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC).4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implicit Ethical Messages in the LCP Framework5</th>
<th>“Positive” Implicit Ethical Messages6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms and power</td>
<td>Non-violence, risk-taking, rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrespect, mistrust and competition between aid agencies</td>
<td>Collaboration, cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid workers and impunity</td>
<td>Accountability, transparency, solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different values for different lives</td>
<td>Expressed value for all lives, respect, equality, inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerlessness</td>
<td>Distributed power, hope, personal responsibility, possibility thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belligerence, tension and suspicion</td>
<td>Respect, courage, trust, perseverance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicity</td>
<td>Own voice, media access, truthfulness, accuracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5 Anderson, Do No Harm, and Anderson, Options for Aid in Conflict.
To facilitate the uptake and learning, the LCP framework was translated into several languages, and *Do No Harm* and *Options for Aid in Conflict* were translated into Bahasa Indonesia. The latter was a joint effort with Mercy Corps Indonesia. Case studies originally written in English were translated into several other languages, such as Spanish and Arabic. Currently, most TOTs are conducted in English. Increasingly, there is a need to be more intentional in conducting TOTs and developing TOT training materials in other languages.

Over time, there has been a subtle merging of LCP methodologies with core peacebuilding theories in trainings. For example, the LCPP identified seven implicit ethical messages (IEMs) that “negatively reinforce the war environment.” Development practitioners wanted to know how to positively reinforce a peace environment. When IEMs were presented as positive opposites, as shown in the table, they took on meaning for development practitioners.

**Strategy #5: Making the case for LCP in a development context**

Jackson notes that “the world of international action has supposedly been divided into two rather discrete parts, relief and development, each with its own (mostly) distinct kinds of personnel. Further, this division is premised on a fundamental axiom: Relief action takes place (mostly) in the context of societies which have ‘broken down’ in conflict while development assistance is offered in stable societies which are ‘on the road to progress.’” A literature review revealed few examples in the field outlining the relationship between long-term development programming and conflict. Though there has been some movement towards integrating WV’s core relief and development functions, the gap Jackson refers to is evident and presented significant obstacles for mainstreaming because LCP was first introduced in a relief setting and was, therefore, seen as a “relief tool.”

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8 Anderson, *Do No Harm*, p. 55.


LCPP lessons learned and examples from relief settings did not resonate with development practitioners. Many staff were put off by the term “do no harm.” They felt that because they were committed to working with communities for the long haul, they had a moral obligation to not only do no harm but to do better development work and support the building of peace. It was evident that if LCP was to be mainstreamed into core functions of the organisation, it needed to be repackaged for development practitioners. This involved identifying common core development concepts and assessment methodologies where LCP could be relevant. It also involved writing teaching and practical learning case studies based on experiences of development practitioners. As we searched for material to base case studies on, we realised that we could not answer empirically or experientially the question of how our development work interacted with conflict.

In response to this question and to the general gap in LCP knowledge around development programmes, the WV Asia-Pacific Regional Office (APRO) launched an initiative to investigate the relationship between conflict and development programming. Two LCP Centres of Learning (CoLs) were established in 2000, one in the Philippines, the other in Indonesia. The purpose of the CoLs was to provide a field-based learning environment for modeling the LCP framework and researching impact and lessons learned in a development context. The CoLs operated as focused laboratories for modeling, through the intentional documenting and disseminating of LCP impact and lessons learned, and by offering a field-based learning environment to staff from other programmes.

Some key lessons emerged in application of LCP in a development context.

1. LCP is relevant and applicable in a development context

What is interesting to note is that key challenges documented in the Options Manual, originated for relief settings, have parallels in the development context. Beneficiary selection, decisions on who to hire (national/international), decisions about what assistance to provide or where to provide it were shown to also be important in a development context. Of particular interest in a development context is the issue of partnering. In some field offices, World Vision works solely through partners rather than implementing directly. As in the LCPP implementation projects, an agency’s decision to work with one partner, as opposed to another, can send very strong signals about what is valued and what is not. Staff ethnicity and religion often overlap with existing conflicts. In the Indonesia CoL, staff members generally were not from the local area; some were “settlers,” and few were from indigenous groups. WV’s most significant injection to the community, after development assistance, was the hiring of staff. In an area with significant tensions between
indigenous groups and settler groups, the potential for WV to feed into existing conflict was evident.

In fact, what clearly emerged from the CoLs is that development projects that feed into conflict negatively can potentially have a much greater negative impact on a community’s ability to respond effectively to conflict. Most development aid does not involve large capital investments, as one would see in a relief programme, so impacts (both positive and negative) are sometimes harder to see. Negative or positive impacts may be more linked to the symbolic dimensions of aid rather than the material ones. Negative impacts in a development context seem more insidious, as they tend to reinforce broader systemic and structural roots of conflict. In contrast, development work with positive impacts on the context of conflict could have great potential for creating a catalyst in communities plagued by conflict to engage positively and find alternatives to violence. This is simply due to the fact that the “tyranny of the urgent” so often cited as a challenge to relief work is less of a factor in most development contexts.

2. Gaps between World Vision core documents and project design documents

Work in the CoLs revealed an interesting inconsistency: Project designs did not address context, explicitly or implicitly. For example, data on overall education quality and school attendance were available, but there was no analysis of who had access to education and who did not, or which groups attended school and which did not. In addition, there was no analysis of underlying structures and systems that contributed to poor quality of education and how the project intended to address those structural impediments.

Even though the WV transformational development policy is a radical call for all WV programmes to “intentionally address policy, systemic and structural constraints on development by promoting change in systems and structure” through use of “processes and actions that promote both just and peaceful relationships within individuals and families and among households, communities and social systems,”11 project designs did not reflect this. In one particular province in Mindanao in the southern Philippines, community assessment revealed that land ownership was the most significant divider manifested in frequent incidents of communal violence between indigenous groups and Visayan settlers, who, through relocation policies in the 1920s and 1950s, now own most of the land.

The programme design in the above case did not mention the issue of land conflicts. Initially, staff members did not see this as a contributing factor to the conflict because they felt that they worked with all members of the communities equally. Not until two years into implementation of the CoL did one community member note concern about the project not addressing land ownership. She thought that because all of the WV staff were Visayan settlers the issue was not considered important. As the LCPP experience would indicate, perceptions are key to understanding negative and positive impacts of development aid on conflict. It is not only about being fair. An organisation must strive to be perceived as fair.

In the case described above, recommendations would not necessarily suggest that the programme design had to change to include land ownership. Rather, a recommendation was made that if WV was truly committed to “promoting change in systems and structures,” then WV should work with the community to find alternative ways of addressing the issue. For example, they could have another NGO focused on land issues come to the project and meet with community members to discuss the Indigenous People’s Land Rights Act. Several options exist for how WV could acknowledge and do something about the land ownership issue without changing the core of the original project design.

3. Development assistance as politics: the role and power of staff

During community assessments of the CoLs, development staff members were reluctant to acknowledge the power they wielded. They saw themselves as part of a nongovernmental organisation and, therefore, not related to anything political. One powerful lesson from the Philippines CoL was linked to the agency’s role in supporting community organisational structures that, although democratically formed, mirrored the status quo of Mindanao, with Visayan settlers in control and indigenous groups marginalised. The CoL demonstrated that to not act or acknowledge something was equal to accepting it. Through the CoL, staff members were able to see specific, concrete examples of how work they did could strengthen systems of exclusion and elite building as opposed to systems of inclusion.

Increasingly, staff realised that to be more effective, development practitioners in communities of conflict needed to be more aware of politics and local dynamics underlying their work. Staff wanted to be more skilled in communication and in negotiation. Several trainings were offered by the regional peacebuilding network to address this gap.

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12 For the full story, see Chapter 4 in this volume: “What Are We Trying to Develop? Lessons Learned from the Philippines in Community Leadership.”
4. Increased clarity of purpose

For most of the past six years, the terms *Local Capacities for Peace* and *Do No Harm* have been used interchangeably with a strong preference towards the former. Staff began to see the LCP framework as a peacebuilding tool. The CoLs helped clarify differences between LCP and peacebuilding. As noted by the WV director for peacebuilding and reconciliation, “LCP was not designed as a peacebuilding tool. Peacebuilding is an active and intentional effort to resolve conflicts and build communities that can live peacefully with each other and live with diversity, tensions and divisions without resorting to destructive or violent acts. LCP lays the foundation for peacebuilding, ensuring that destructive conflicts are not exacerbated by the introduction of aid. When the LCP analysis leads to strengthening local capacities for peace and building networks of relationships that contribute to peace, then LCP overlaps with peacebuilding.”

Lessons from the Centres of Learning provided a bridge to think through how, where and in which contexts it could implement direct peacebuilding programmes (e.g., trauma healing) and in which contexts it should focus on traditional relief and development work, using peacebuilding techniques to improve programme impacts. The experience of the CoLs taught that we did not have to change who we were as an organisation to have a positive impact on community relationships. We did not need to reinvent ourselves into a peacebuilding organisation to be able to address structural issues that contributed to poverty and conflict. Lessons from the CoLs also act as a call to more intentionally support direct civil society and governance programming as ways to actively address structural causes of poverty and conflict.

*Strategy #6: Intentional integration into existing initiatives and organisational strategies*

A key success factor in mainstreaming LCP has been the focus on finding ways to ensure that the Do No Harm (DNH) process was deeply imbedded into core organisational functions and processes. By using documents that already existed and had organisation-wide input and buy-off as a launching pad for mainstreaming, potential obstacles were minimised. For example, one commonality among all WV offices is an understanding of transformational development, where “the preferred future for all boys and girls, families and their communities is wholeness of life with dignity, justice, peace and hope.” The Transformational Development Policy states that development programmes should “have a bias for peace and reconciliation and employ processes and actions that reduce risks and enhance capacities of families

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13 Bill Lowrey, World Vision, CEO Briefing Number 44, Local Capacities for Peace (LCP), December 2001, p. 3.
and communities to cope, mitigate and respond to disasters, conflicts and HIV/AIDS.” This is reaffirmed in the WV Emergency Relief Policy, which states that all relief interventions should be implemented with a “peacebuilding bias that builds connections between families and neighbours.”

Implementation of the Centres of Learning coincided with and helped to influence three organisation-wide initiatives:

1. *Transformational Development Track III*: An initiative launched to understand how best WV could support community resilience to crises such as violent conflict.

2. *Transformational Development Indicators*: Development of a standard set of indicators to measure quality of life in communities where WV works.

3. Development of an overall *design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation framework* that could be used by all offices around the world.

**Track III: Integrating peacebuilding into development**

In early 2001, the WV International Partnership identified three major threats to transformational development: pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, natural disasters and destructive conflict. In July 2001, Track III was launched to develop a common framework to integrate proactive approaches to mitigate these threats. The Track III advisory group articulated strategic processes that help to frame integration of peacebuilding, disaster management, and HIV/AIDS responses into long-term development. In relation to peacebuilding, case studies from around the world, including two from the CoLs, distilled common themes and developed a framework highlighting strategies needed to support peacebuilding outcomes in development projects. Five strategic processes identified are listed below, together with illustrative activities that could be conducted to support the processes:

1. **Creating a culture of participation and good governance**
   - Facilitate formation of community-based organisations (CBO) that model and contribute to wise governance.
   - Facilitate formation of interdependence and solidarity among diverse groups.
   - Reduce and challenge leverage for manipulators (actors/systems who gain from conflict).
   - Enhance knowledge/capacity of community to forecast, analyse and prepare to face either opportunities or threats.
2. Transforming people and relationships

- Enhance capacity and commitment to resolve differences and conflicts without destructive or violent means.
- Strengthen traditional coping mechanisms, and create new ones, for peace-building with family as a basic unit.
- Facilitate participatory “targeting” process that considers vulnerabilities and capacities through an LCP lens.
- Facilitate mutually supportive and bonded relationships in the face of conflict.

3. Working in coalitions that impact beyond commonly recognised boundaries

- Ensure just distribution of community and project resources through sustainable livelihood programmes.
- Use economic development to reduce vulnerability to conflict.
- Economic development must result in enhanced community coping mechanisms.
- Sustainable livelihoods must enhance functioning of community structures.

4. Enhancing community capacities that generate hope

- Conduct regular capacity-vulnerability analysis and use it in redesigning the project.
- Participatively identify “windows of hope” and partner with such groups intentionally.
- Monitor vulnerabilities and capacities of the “windows of hope” partner group.
- Increase connectors and decrease dividers, in partnership with the “windows of hope” group.

5. Developing sustainable livelihoods with just distribution of resources

- Identify community-based organisations at local, national, regional and global levels and develop formal and informal networks and alliances.
- Grow increasingly inclusive of a wider stakeholder group.
• Use project design to incorporate global and national issues.

Each strategic process has related indicators illustrative in nature that can be used to support development of more specific and relevant indicators for successful integration of peacebuilding into development programmes. Strong links exist between lessons from the CoLs and the indicators that were developed.

These indicators include the following:

• Reduced leverage of manipulators (actors/systems who gain from destructive conflict).

• Facilitated participatory “targeting” process of considering vulnerabilities and capacities through an LCP lens.

• Community-Based Organisations and WV have formal and informal networks and alliances at local, national, regional, and global levels for peacebuilding.

• Impact of conflict and peacebuilding and relationship among diverse groups monitored and evaluated regularly.

• Participatively identified capacities and partnered with “agents of hope” (connectors).

• Partnership with “agents of hope” able to increase connectors and decrease dividers.

• Economic development used to reduce vulnerability to destructive conflict.

• Sustainable livelihood programmes enhance effective functioning of community structures and civil society.

Developing these strategic processes and illustrative indicators overlapped with another WV global initiative, focused on developing common indicators to measure development impact.

Transformational Development Indicators

Over the past seven years, WV has established an indicator framework called transformational development indicators (TDIs). The overall purpose of TDIs is “to show the status of the quality of life of communities, families and children where World Vision is facilitating community-based, sustainable, transformational development programmes.”\(^{14}\) All development programmes are mandated to measure TDIs as

part of programme evaluation in each management cycle. The indicators measure, for example, water quality and access, diarrhoea management, household resilience, nutrition, immunisation and education.

The TDIs most closely associated with peacebuilding are “emergence of hope” and “caring for others.” Emergence of hope means “men, women, boys and girls perceive and demonstrate hope in their future. Dimensions of this emergence of hope include people’s perception of the past and the present, attitude towards future, self-esteem and spirituality.” Care for others means “men, women, boys and girls perceive that they care for others and others care for them in their community. Care for each other is defined around dimensions of use (sharing) of community resources, gender relations, protection and valuing of children, well-being of vulnerable persons, and conflict prevention and resolution.”

Each TDI has a supplementary resources guide providing “practical programme guidance and examples... as well as further references and resources and a glossary of terms and definitions.” The Caring for Others indicator resource guide was developed as the CoLs were being implemented and references case studies written about the CoLs. It includes a component on conflicts and resolution that clearly reiterates the essential message of the LCP project: “aid is not neutral in the midst of conflict.” The six steps involved in a LCP analysis are described, highlighting the following principles:

- Understand the local context—it’s history, culture, diversity, causes of disputes, tensions and traditional conflict resolution methods
- Emphasise the role of development teams and attitude, behaviour, example of development facilitators
- Build sustainable livelihoods and improved standards of living
- Strengthen and widen community organisations, social capital and civil society

In project design, the recommendation is to “use LCP as a tool of analysis of conflict context before programme inception and during the project cycle.” In evaluation of “caring for others,” guidelines are provided for monitoring and evaluating changes in social, cultural, political and economic patterns. Sample indicators include:

- Enhancement of traditional problem-solving mechanisms

• Reduction in number of conflicts
• Increased social freedoms
• Reduced leverage of manipulators (actors/systems who gain from destructive conflict)

Additional TDIs are being developed to focus more intentionally on measuring “transformed systems and structures.”

Design, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

In late 2002 a committee was formed with a mandate from WV senior leadership to “develop a common framework for programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.” During the past three years, significant work and consultation has gone into development of World Vision International’s design, monitoring and evaluation framework called LEAP: Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning. LEAP replaces all previous DME (design/implementation/monitoring/evaluation) frameworks and is the frame around which “WV staff must now build their programmes and projects.”16 LEAP involves of six components of programme and project cycle management: assessment, design, implementation and monitoring, evaluation, reflection and transition. Underlying each component is the importance of context analysis. Earlier versions of the framework did not include context because it was generally assumed that context analysis takes place. The director for peacebuilding and reconciliation was active in review ses-

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visions of LEAP in mid-2004. Including context analysis was an acknowledgement that although essential, it often does not take place.

LEAP identifies “peacebuilding and conflict resolution” as a cross-cutting theme. LEAP cautions practitioners to be aware of and acknowledge “dynamics of culture, power and gender relations” among groups in a community. It also supports measurement of the “extent of cooperation or conflict between stakeholders.”17 That said, the LEAP framework is very broad and does not explicitly refer to or encourage project design that supports Local Capacities for Peace outcomes. In addition, LEAP programming manuals and tool kits have not been developed but are scheduled to be finalised in 2006. This presents additional opportunity to ensure that LCP thinking and tools will be further integrated into the design, monitoring and evaluation framework.

The Way Forward

At this point one could ask whether World Vision has been successful in mainstreaming use of the LCP framework—or whether the organisation has been able to maximise LCP potential for conflict prevention and mainstreaming. Quite honestly, the answer is a firm “not yet but we’re getting there.”

To date, LCP mainstreaming in World Vision has moved forward through a timely combination of the right people at the right time armed with commitment and adequate funding, rather than application of any specific theory of organisational culture and its links to mainstreaming. We started to mainstream use of the LCP framework as a programme-quality tool. However, what was actually being mainstreamed was a process and an attitude, a way of thinking about working in and on conflict. We were mainstreaming a conflict-sensitive approach to development. This is now clearly articulated and understood in core organisation-wide documents and monitoring systems.

Our experiences over the past six years have provided an excellent means for World Vision to reach this end, providing concrete examples of how development aid can impact conflict negatively or positively, advocating for increased awareness of conflict, its different manifestations and the interaction of our development work and conflict. The combination of Transformational Development Track III, TDIs and LEAP supports the emergence of a practical framework for how development practitioners can, through their ongoing development programming, address issues of conflict and intentionally facilitate peacebuilding in the communities where they live and work. A design, monitoring and evaluation working group will support

17 Flower, LEAP, p. 32.
organisation-wide implementation of LEAP and other initiatives related to pro-
gramme quality.

Over the next few years, the extent to which LCP lessons and assessment tools are included in LEAP programming manuals and tool kits will be a direct reflection of World Vision’s ability to truly mainstream LCP as a conflict-sensitive approach to development programming. Increasingly, many terms of references for evaluations of projects conducted in conflict situations have a component evaluating the extent to which the project contributed to local capacities for peace. An indicator of successful mainstreaming could be regular and reliable inclusion of a LCP component to all projects implemented in conflict areas. This will become more evident with the TDI evaluations mandated for all WV development programmes.

Regional networks in Asia and East Africa are functioning well. In the recent response to the Asia tsunami, LCP assessment and context analysis teams were deployed to Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India and Thailand. Long-term operation plans for all four countries included references to LCP methodology and key issues to consider in implementation of different projects, with a number of staff being hired to support ongoing mainstreaming. WV Afghanistan staff recently developed terms of reference for a LCP programme evaluation for its Western Afghanistan operations.

With these positive moves towards establishment of the LCP framework as a foundational tool for programming in all conflict contexts, there are still gaps in our capacity. These gaps are most evident in our ability to respond to conflict-based disasters, to target provision of large-scale food relief in a conflict-sensitive manner, and to assist individual country programmes facing conflict issues but not yet part of a regional peacebuilding network. World Vision is at a critical point in the mainstreaming of LCP.

An opportunity exists to build on successes of the past and continue to make LCP a core capacity for all staff and functions. The question is: will we be content with what we’ve accomplished or will we take this opportunity to advance mainstreaming to another level?